Workers’ Compensation Ruling Involving Dolphins Could Have Far-Reaching Implications

May 20, 2011

By Nicole Bryson, Esq.
The Miami Dolphins (Dolphins) suffered a devastating loss in its suit against former wide receiver, Kendall Newson, when Judge Lenihan ruled earlier this month that the team could not dispute Pennsylvania jurisdiction in a workers’ compensation claim filed by Newson.
 
Mr. Newson, a former wide receiver for the Dolphins, was injured in 2005 during a preseason game at Heinz Field in Pennsylvania and sought injury benefits under Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation statutes. Pennsylvania [like California] is known for its friendly workers’ compensation statutes.
 
The Dolphins claimed that Newson could only seek benefits in Florida under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and Implementation Agreement between the National Football League Management Council (NFLMC), and the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA).
 
Moreover, the Dolphins asserted, Mr. Newson’s pursuit of Pennsylvania state workers’ compensation benefits was in breach of contract provisions mandating arbitration of workers’ compensation disputes and providing for exclusive jurisdiction under Florida law.
 
The complaint filed by the Dolphins asked the Judge to order a dismissal of Mr. Newson’s state workers’ compensation claim, enjoining him from pursuing injury benefits in Pennsylvania, or, at minimum, a stay pending the outcome of the arbitrator’s ruling on the contractual workers’ compensation issues.
 
Judge Lenihan refused both and granted the NFLPA’s motion to dismiss and in doing so, blasted the Dolphins’ position.
 
Under Florida Law, professional sports clubs are not required to provide workers’ compensation benefits for their players. However, the NFLMC, on behalf of the Dolphins, and the NFLPA, on behalf of players, agreed in the CBA and Implementation Agreement that the Dolphins would allow players to claim “equivalent benefits” under Florida law through an independent arbitration panel. In return, the Dolphins received immunity from tort suits.
 
The Judge, noting the key language of the Implementation Agreement was permissive and not mandatory and only applied to Florida workers’ compensation claims for “equivalent benefits,” concluded that Mr. Newson could proceed with his state workers’ compensation claim.
 
Nothing in the CBA or Implementation Agreement indicated “equivalent benefits” was the exclusive remedy for Dolphin players. Nor did any provision in the Implementation Agreement speak to claims filed under other state’s laws. Thus, the Implementation Agreement could not be construed to prohibit injured players from filing in states other than Florida where they may have statutory rights to workers’ compensation benefits.
 
The Judge also affirmed the interlocutory order issued by Pennsylvania workers’ compensation Judge Briston, which expressly held that the provisions of the Commonwealth’s Workers’ Compensation Act applied to all injuries occurring within Pennsylvania and private contracts by an employee or his union could not effectively waive the right to benefits.
 
In the court’s view, because Mr. Newson’s claim for workers’ compensation against the Dolphins was not related to his contractual right to “equivalent benefits” under Florida law, but his statutory right to claim benefits in Pennsylvania, the Implementation Agreement had no bearing on his claim. Thus, the Pennsylvania state court had jurisdiction over Mr. Newson’s claim and the work-related injuries he suffered.
 
Judge Lenihan also observed similar rulings that have come out of other courts recently with regard to contract provisions providing for exclusive jurisdiction.
 
In Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, the Maryland Special Court of Appeals recently affirmed that Maryland’s workers’ compensation act covered [professional] football players and Maryland had jurisdiction over their claims. The contract’s forum selection clause providing exclusive jurisdiction outside of Maryland was ineffective because it would contravene Maryland’s strong public policy interest in protecting its injured workers.
 
In a similar case, Cincinnati Bengals (Bengals) v. Abdullah, the Southern District Court of Ohio refused to hear the Bengals’ legal challenge to players’ rights to file claims under California’s workers’ compensation law. In doing so, the court also forewarned the Bengals that seeking an injunction during the California workers’ compensation litigation appeared to be a collateral attack on California’s “favorable rulings” and the California court, in fact, sanctioned the Bengals for “attempting to circumvent” its order.
 
While noting these decisions in admonishing the Dolphins for the offensive nature of their federal district court action [to enjoin or stay Mr. Newson’s Pennsylvania workers’ compensation claim], Judge Lenihan stopped short of sanctioning the Dolphins for “attempting to circumvent” the authority of the Pennsylvania state court. However, she also refused to stay the Pennsylvania state workers’ compensation proceedings.
 
Since arbitrators are limited in their role to interpreting the provisions of the CBA and the players’ contracts and cannot dictate how a state authority should treat claims pursuant to its workers’ compensation laws, there was no need to stay the state workers’ compensation proceeding pending the arbitrator’s decision.
 
Furthermore, in order for the Implementation Agreement to preempt state court jurisdiction, there must be clear and unmistakable waiver. As noted above, the NFLMC and NFLPA had no authority to waive the rights of covered employees, including professional football players, to seek workers’ compensation benefits in states other than Florida. Thus, even assuming the Implementation Agreement waived the right of Newson and other Dolphin players to seek workers’ compensation benefits in Pennsylvania (which it does not), such an agreement would be void.
Even if construed as a valid waiver, it was not “clear and unmistakable” because the language of the Implementation Agreement could reasonably be interpreted (as this court did), as applying only to claims for contractual equivalent benefits under Florida law rather than all claims for workers’ compensation against the Dolphins.
Since it was not “clear and unmistakable,” the waiver was ineffective and Newson could pursue workers’ compensation benefits in Pennsylvania state court while the arbitration, as to the meaning of the relevant contract provisions, was pending.
 
For Newson, prevailing under Pennsylvania law would mean a difference of almost $4,000 per year, plus medical benefits that his attorneys claim are better than those available in Florida. For Dolphins management, while Newson’s benefits may not seem like much, increased benefits for hundreds of players over time add up significantly.
 
The right of injured players to claim workers’ compensation benefits in states where they played games rather than where the team is based has been a long-standing issue in the National Football League.
 
Despite several decisions by arbitrators, the NFLMC and NFLPA continue to debate the meaning of contractual workers’ compensation language. However, Judge Lenihan’s ruling should effectively end the dispute, at least where courts are concerned.
 
While a student at University of San Francisco School of Law, Nicole Bryson interned with the Oakland Raiders legal department focusing solely on workers’ compensation. She passed the February 2011 California Bar exam and hopes to start a career involving workers’ compensation and sports. She can be reached at nmbryson@dons.usfca.edu
 


 

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