By Ivan Lancaster
A federal judge from the Eastern District of Louisiana has granted the motion to dismiss that was filed by, Roger Goodell, the Commissioner of the National Football League (NFL) who was named as a defendant in the Complaint filed by Jonathan Vilma, a New Orleans Saints football player.
Six statements were made by Goodell in conjunction with the investigation resulting in the well-known discipline against Vilma, other Saints players, as well as Saints personal associated with the Saints “Bounty Program” which targeted certain opposing players for the purpose of injuring them.
In his Complaint, Vilma identified the six statements that were made by Goodell as Commissioner of the NFL and alleged that the statements were slanderous or libelous, caused him extreme emotional distress, injured his professional reputation, and also accused him of criminal conduct.
Soon after, Goodell filed his motion to dismiss based on three grounds: “(1) the claims [were] preempted under Section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185; (2) they [were] barred by the mandatory, binding dispute resolution procedures of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the NFL; and (3) they [were] inadequately pled.” (internal quotations omitted)
Goodell’s argument that all of Vilma’s claims were preempted was supported by ample Fifth Circuit caselaw.
In his motion to dismiss, Goodell argued that “claims that require the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement [were] preempted by the LMRA.” Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 79 F.3d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 1996).
In opposition to Goodell’s motion to dismiss, Vilma argued “that the state-law claims do not require an analysis of the terms of a CBA.” Vilma based this argument on the fact that most of the defamatory statements were made “prior to Vilma himself being formally disciplined.”
The court disagreed and said that discipline was first imposed upon the non-player staff of the Saints and later imposed upon Vilma. The court found that all statements were based upon the same underlying investigation into the so-called “Bountygate” allegations. The court believed that “Vilma’s claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress [had] to be evaluated through the lens of what the CBA allow[ed] Goodell to do.”
Unfortunately for Vilma, the terms and conditions of his employment were governed by the NFL Player Contract and the Constitution and Bylaws incorporated into the CBA.
Paragraph 15 of the standard NFL Player Contract reads as follows: “Player … acknowledges his awareness that if he … is guilty of any … form of conduct reasonable judged by the League Commissioner to be detrimental to the League or professional football, the Commissioner will have the right, … to suspend Player for a period certain or indefinitely.” Tec. Doc. 23-8 at 277-28.
Not only did Goodell have the right to suspend Vilma, but the CBA “also authorize[d] him to investigate actions that he suspect[ed] constitute[d] conduct detrimental” to the game of football. (internal quotations omitted) The court found that all of Goodell’s statements were “made in connection with the NFL’s investigation of the pay-per-performance/bounty allegations.”
Vilma’s claim that Goodell made the statements in his individual capacity was contradicted by his own Complaint.
Vilma argued that his case had nothing to do with the NFL’s decision to discipline him since “Goodell’s statements were not made within the confines of any forum or procedure created by the NFL-NFLPA CBA nor were they a part of any duties or responsibilities of the Commissioner’s office.” Rec. Doc. 72 at 5.
The court rejected Vilma’s argument that Goodell was responsible for the alleged offending statements in his individual capacity. The court found that all of the statements made by Goodell were made by him as Commissioner of the NFL. The court noted that Vilma even sued Goodell as Commissioner of the NFL and according to Vilma’s “own Complaint, the defamation claims [were] directly related to Goodell’s decision to suspend, that is, discipline Vilma, pursuant to the CBA arbitration procedure.”
Instead of stating a claim upon which relief could be granted, Vilma’s Complaint was filled with conclusory allegations.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED.R.CIV.P.12(b)(6). The pleading does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but there must be more than “labels and conclusions” and a “formulaic recitation of the elements of [the] cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2009). If the factual allegations, in Vilma’s Complaint, did not rise above the speculative level or it was “apparent form the face of the complaint that there [was] an insuperable bar to relief,” Vilma’s claim must be dismissed. Id. at 555.
The court found that every single one of Vilma’s claims failed to meet the 12(b)(6) standard since “mere assertions of malice and of outrageous conduct [were] insufficient conclusory allegations.” According to his Complaint, “[f]or all of the defamation claims, including the non-per se claims, Vilma made the conclusory statement that all of Goodell’s statements were made with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity and/or with malice.” Rec. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 48, 54, 60, 66, 72, 78, 84, 90, 102. (internal quotations omitted) Vilma produced very few facts to support his claim.
Furthermore, the only statement that was made to support his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was that “Goodell’s Statements and conduct were extreme and outrageous.” Id. at ¶ 106. Since no other facts were alleged beyond that conclusory statement, the court held that his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim could not go further.
By the time this decision was handed down by the court, Vilma had accepted a revised discipline that still found he had engaged in conduct detrimental to the game of football, but no suspension or fine was imposed on him. Even with the revised discipline, the court felt that the matter could have been handled in a “less heavy handed way, with greater fairness toward the players and the pressures they face.” However, the court also felt that the matter was “as protracted and painful as the Saints season itself,” that the litigation was unnecessary and ruled that there was no way Vilma’s Complaint could survive the initial motion to dismiss.
