The 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a lower court’s ruling that effectively dismissed the claim of a football fan, who sued the New England Patriots, its coach Bill Belichick, and National Football League after it was revealed that the Patriots were surreptitiously videotaping the signals of their opponents.
Plaintiff Carl J. Mayer was a New Jersey resident and New York Jets season ticket-holder. On Sept. 7, 2007, he sued the Patriots and Belichick on behalf of all similarly situated New York Jets season ticket-holders and other New York Jets ticket-holders, claiming the Patriots’ actions “violated the contractual expectations and rights of New York Jets ticket-holders who fully anticipated and contracted for a ticket to observe an honest match played in compliance with all laws, regulations and NFL rules.” He would later amend his complaint on Aug. 19, 2008 to include the NFL as a defendant.
The court wrote that Mayer’s complaint centered on the belief that when “purchasing tickets to watch the New York Jets, as a matter of contract, the tickets imply that each game will be played in accordance with NFL rules and regulations as well as all applicable federal and state laws. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants tortuously [sic] interfered with their contractual relations with the New York Jets in purchasing the tickets. They further claim that the defendants violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the New Jersey Deceptive Business Practices Act. The plaintiffs also claim that the defendants violated federal and state racketeering laws by using the National Football League as an enterprise to carry out their illegal scheme. Because the defendants have been found in other games to have illegally used video equipment, this action seeks damages for New York Jets ticket-holders for all games played in Giants stadium between the New York Jets and the New England Patriots since Bill Belichick became head coach in 2000.”
After they were served with the amended complaint, the Patriots and Belichick filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The NFL subsequently filed its own motion to dismiss as well.
The court noted that the Patriots and Belichick included with their motion “a copy of a Jets ticket stub from an Aug. 17, 2007, game against the Minnesota Vikings. This stub stated, inter alia, that ‘this ticket only grants entry into the stadium and a spectator seat for the specified NFL game.’ It added that ‘admission may be refused or ticket holder ejected in the sole discretion of the New York Jets LLC or New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority, subject to refund (or without refund if the ticket-holder is disorderly or fails to comply with these ticket terms or any security measures).’ (Id.) The district court also received a brief from the Jets as amicus curiae, supporting the respective motions to dismiss. The district court ultimately granted the motions to dismiss in an order entered on March 23, 2009,” reasoning that the various causes of action “must be dismissed as a matter of law because Mayer failed to allege any actionable injury.”
In considering the appeal, the panel of judges noted how “highly unusual (and even unique)” the circumstances in the case were. “Simply put, no one in the past has ever brought a legal action quite like this one. However, past cases do, at the very least, provide this court with certain general legal principles especially relevant to the present matter. Taking into account these principles, the numerous arguments of the parties on appeal, the record on appeal, and the district court’s own ruling, we ultimately conclude that the district court was correct to hold that Mayer failed to set forth a legally cognizable right, interest, or injury here. At best, he possessed nothing more than a contractual right to a seat from which to watch an NFL game between the Jets and the Patriots, and this right was clearly honored. More specifically, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would reach the exact same legal conclusion if it were confronted with this appeal. See, e.g ., Holmes v. Kimco Realty Corp., 598 F.3d 115, 118 (3d Cir.2010).”
While ending the suspense early, the panel of judges did embark on an exploration of “how tickets to sporting and other entertainment events have been treated in the past. As the district court recognized, New Jersey has generally followed a so-called ‘license’ approach.
So too has the United States Supreme Court “in a decision written by Justice Holmes, (which considered) the exclusion from a race track of a ticket-holder suspected of drugging a horse.” Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club of D.C., 227 U .S. 633, 635 (1913).
Turning back to the current case, the court noted that “the ticket stub provided by the Patriots … appears consistent with this traditional approach. For example, it unambiguously stated that ‘this ticket only grants entry into the stadium and a spectator seat for the specified NFL game.’ The stub further made clear that the Jets and the owners of the stadium retain sole discretion to refuse admission or to eject a ticket-holder.”
But the plaintiff was never barred or ejected from the stadium, further bolstering the defendants’ argument that he had failed to state a claim.
The panel went on to explore how other courts “have recently struggled to deal with litigation arising out of the often complicated ticket arrangements between teams and their fans. Season ticket-holders accordingly have sued teams, with varying degrees of success, claiming that some action (e.g., moving the team itself to another city) violated either their renewal rights or other rights related to their status as season ticket-holders. See, e.g., Oshinsky v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-cv-1186 (PGS), 2009 WL 4120237, (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2009); Brotherson v. Prof ‘l Basketball Club, LLC, 604 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1283-96 (D.Wash.2009); Charpentier v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 75 Cal.App. 4th 301, 308-16 (1999); Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Genden & Bach, P.A., 545 So.2d 294, 295-96 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (per curiam); Skalbania v.. Simmons, 443 N.E.2d 352, 356-63 (Ind.Ct.App.1982); Wichita State Univ. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Marrs, 28 P.3d 401, 402-04 (Kan.Ct.App.2001) (per curiam); Yarde Metals, Inc. v. New England Patriots Ltd. P’ship, 834 N.E.2d 1233, 1235-38 (Mass.App.Ct.2005); Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 401 N.Y .S.2d 233, 235-38 (App.Div.1978); Bickett v. Buffalo Bills, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247-48 (Sup.Ct.1983); Beder v. Cleveland Browns, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 716, 719-23 (Ohio Ct.App.1998); Stern v. Cleveland Browns Football Club, Inc., No. 95-L196, 1996 WL 761163, (Ohio Ct.App. December 20, 1996). Similarly, other courts have addressed the closely related question of whether such alleged renewal rights may be sold by the bankruptcy trustee. See, e.g., Abele v. Phoenix Suns Ltd. P’ship (In re Harrell), 73 F.3d 218, 219-20 (9th Cir.1996) (per curiam); Grossman v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club Ltd. P’ship (In re Platt), 292 B.R. 12, 17-18 (Bankr . D.Mass.2003); In re Liebman, 208 B.R. 38, 39-41 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1997); In re I.D. Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. 490, 493-502 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992).
“Nevertheless, the existing ‘season ticket’ case law ultimately does not really help Mayer. Several of these cases have actually indicated that there may be different and distinct kinds of rights or interests implicated in the season ticket context.”
The panel continued, noting that “although the factual circumstances and claims before this Court appear to be rather unique, several courts have addressed relatively similar theories of liability with respect to the related issues of alleged poor performance and rule violations. The district court itself cited to some of these decisions, and it specifically focused on two of them: Bowers v. Federation Internationale de l’Automobile, 489 F.3d 316 (7th Cir.2007), and Castillo v. Tyson, 701 N.Y.S.2d 423 (App.Div.2000). Both of these rulings provide clear support for the district court’s dismissal of Mayer’s complaint.”
Mayer v. Belichick et al.; 3rd Cir.; No. 09-2237; 5/19/10
Attorneys of Record: (for appellant) Carl J. Mayer, Esq. (Argued), Mayer Law Group, Bruce I. Afran, Esq. (Argued), Princeton, NJ, for Appellant.Daniel L. Goldberg, Esq. (Argued), Charles L. Solomont, Esq., Bingham McCutchen, Boston, MA, David Kistler, Esq., Stephen M. Orlofsky, Esq., Blank Rome, Princeton, NJ. (for appellee) Paul M. Eckles, Esq., Shepard Goldfein, Esq. (Argued), Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York, NY.
