A federal judge from the Eastern District of Missouri has sided with Saint Louis University (SLU) in a case where the school was sued by a former student athlete, who alleged that the school was negligent as well as violated Title IX and the terms of a contract it had with her. Joan Roe alleged that the claims all stem from alleged mistreatment related to a purported back injury and an alleged rape.
In so ruling, the court found the plaintiff’s argument lacked substance, or was off-base.
In the fall of 2006, Roe was a student at SLU, where she received a partial athletic scholarship to play for the SLU Intercollegiate Field Hockey team. On or about August 11, 2006, she signed the University Field Hockey Team Rules to indicate that she received a copy of them, and that she understood their import and agreed to abide by them.
Also on or about August 11, 2006, the 18-year-old executed a Sports Medicine Authorization and Acknowledgment of Risk (Authorization). The fourth paragraph of the Authorization form provided:
“I agree to release and hold harmless Saint Louis University, its employees, agents, representatives, coaches, physicians, athletic trainers, student-athletic trainers, and volunteers (collectively “Releases”), from any and all liability, actions, cause of action, debts. Claims or demands or any kind and mature (sic) whatsoever which may rise by or in connection with my participation in any activities related to Saint Louis University intercollegiate athletic teams. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT THIS RELEASE COVERS ANY LIABILITY, CLAIM AND ACTION CAUSED ENTIRELY OR IN PART BY ANY ACT, FAILURE TO ACT, MISTAKE, FAILURE TO SUPERVISE, OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ANY OF THE RELEASES.
ECF No. 243, Exh. SS.”
The court began by noting that the plaintiff struggled with her academics in the fall of 2006, which caused her to be suspended by her coach.
In September of 2006, Roe claimed she suffered a back injury. She was unsure of whether the injury occurred during field hockey practice or during weight training. Roe did allege that the university’s athletic trainers were negligent in how they treated her following the injury. She claims that she suffered a further disc herniation in her lower back as a result of a particular weight training session in which she participated on October 26 and the university’s failure to restrict her participation in such activities.
The plaintiff also claimed she suffered a sexual assault on October 27, 2006. She had been told to stay home that night for academic reasons, while the field hockey team played a game in Richmond, Virginia. The plaintiff attended an off campus Halloween party. She contends that alcohol and illegal substances were present and, that she was allegedly raped by a fellow student at SLU at the time. The plaintiff has testified that she remembers going to the Halloween party, but cannot remember what happened for the remainder of the night or many details about the alleged assault.
On or about December 19, 2006, the plaintiff’s father contacted the University’s Department of Public Safety to report his daughter’s alleged assault. On or about that date, Larry Purvis of the Department of Public Safety began an investigation of the incident in light of the plaintiff’s father’s information. Purvis’ investigation included efforts to locate other students that may have attended the party, and contacting other students, including a student that was known to be with the plaintiff on the night of the incident. The plaintiff’s father also contacted St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department to report the alleged assault, who then conducted its own investigation. On or about January 26, 2007, the university’s Office of Student Affairs contacted the plaintiff, informed her on the university’s adjudicative process and forwarded her an incident report. Neither the plaintiff nor her parents ever submitted an incident report to the University’s Office of Student Conduct regarding the alleged sexual assault. No criminal charges were ever filed in conjunction with the alleged sexual assault.
The plaintiff would ultimately sue SLU, seeking damages against SLU for various alleged injuries under theories of negligence, Title IX – deliberate indifference, Title IX -disparate treatment, intentional misrepresentation/false promise, negligent misrepresentation/deceptive merchandising practice, and breach of contract.
The defendant moved for summary judgment on the claims
As for the plaintiff’s negligence claims, the defendants claimed the plaintiff “knowingly released her claims under the Authorization and because, even if the plaintiff had viable negligence claims against the university, she would not be able to prove those claims at trial. Furthermore, the defendant argued that it is entitled to summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s negligence claim for ‘failure to supervise’ because the defendant had no duty to supervise or safeguard its students at the October 27, 2006 private, off-campus Halloween party.”
In considering the arguments, the court turned to Missouri law, which says that “a contract provision exempting one from liability for his negligence will never be implied but must be clearly and explicitly stated. Gates v. Sells Rest Home, Inc., 57 S.W.3d 391, 397-398. Whether a contract or exculpatory clause is clear and explicit or ambiguous and non-exculpatory is a matter of law, a matter for the court to decide and not the jury. Id. at 397.
On that point, the court found that “there is no question that the language above is clear and explicit. It unambiguously releases the defendant SLU from any and all liability, actions, cause of action, debts. Furthermore, it unequivocally states that the plaintiff understands and agrees to release any negligence on the part of Defendant. Not only does the Authorization state that the plaintiff understood the clear and explicit language, but the plaintiff testified that she fully understood the document upon signing it. See ECF No.244, Joan Roe Dep. I 64:17-65:9. As such, the plaintiff’s signature on the Authorization, and her admitted understanding of its significance before signing it, releases the defendant from any claims the plaintiff may seek.
On the second facet of the plaintiff’s negligence claim — that the defendant failed to supervise and ensure safety at the off-campus Halloween party where the plaintiff was allegedly sexually assaulted — the court found that SLU “owed no duty to supervise and ensure the plaintiff’s safety at the private, off-campus party that took place on October 27, 2006.”
Turning to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims, the court again sided with SLU, finding that its response to the alleged sexual assault “was clearly reasonable in light of all known circumstances. Despite only having the limited information the plaintiff provided, SLU responded to her very serious alleged assault in a wholly adequate fashion.”
Next, the court examined Roe’s allegation that SLU violated Title IX “by failing to supervise her athletic training in an equal manner in which the defendant treats its male student athletes. Further, she contends that SLU failed to provide medical care and ‘educational follow up’ it provides to its male athletes.” The judge found that the plaintiff failed “to submit any evidence of male student-athletes being treated differently than female student-athletes,” which gutted her argument.
As for SLU’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, the court ruled for the university, finding the plaintiff has not provided “any detail regarding which specific terms the defendant allegedly breached.
“Assuming Plaintiff was able to provide sufficient facts to support her claim, it would still fail. Policy manuals and NCAA guidelines documents do not constitute a contract. Guiliani v. Duke University, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44412, 2009 WL 1408869 at *3-4. As such, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.”
Joan Roe v. Saint Louis University, et al.; E.D. Mo.; No. 4:08CV1474 HEA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183265; 12/31/12
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) David J. Fraser, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID J. FRASER, Trabuco Canyon, CA; James M. Fraser, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICE OF JAMES M. FRASER, Orange, CA. (for defendant) Debbie S. Champion, LEAD ATTORNEY, RYNEARSON AND SUESS, L.L.C., St. Louis, MO; Neal F. Perryman, LEAD ATTORNEY, Sarah E. Mullen, LEWIS RICE, St. Louis, MO; Victor H. Essen, RYNEARSON AND SUESS, L.L.C., St. Louis, MO.
