A Utah appeals court has reversed, in part, the decision of a trial court, which granted summary judgment to a university that was sued after a student and member of the Ballroom Dance Team suffered an accident while practicing a lift with another team member.
In so ruling, the appeals court found, in a majority decision, that a special relationship existed between plaintiff Shawnna Rae Cope and her instructor, who “had a duty of reasonable care” to protect the student.
Cope was a member of the Utah Valley State College (UVSC) Ballroom Dance Tour Team in 2005. On September 21 of that year, she was injured when she fell while practicing a lift with another team member. Cope’s instructor was supervising the team’s rehearsal at the time of the injury. Before the injury occurred, the instructor stopped the rehearsal to have some couples demonstrate the lift and the instructor then worked with each couple individually on the lift. The instructor realized that Cope and her partner were doing the lift incorrectly. The instructor warned Cope and her partner that “either you guys do this or we are going to cut the lift from the routine.” When Cope and her partner attempted the lift over the left shoulder, the partner lost his footing and Cope fell, hitting her head on the partner’s knee and suffering an injury.
Cope sued UVSC on August 14, 2006. Following discovery, UVSC filed a motion for summary judgment on July 29, 2010, arguing that the alleged facts were insufficient to establish that it had a special relationship with Cope that gave rise to a duty of care. The trial court denied the motion. UVSC renewed its motion on December 20, 2010, based on video evidence showing that Cope and her partner had practiced the lift together, albeit incorrectly, on at least one occasion prior to the date of Cope’s injury. In light of this evidence, the trial court revised its earlier decision. It determined that Cope, aware of the couple’s prior difficulty in performing the lift, nevertheless accepted the risk of continuing to attempt it. The trial court concluded that because the instructor gave Cope the option of either learning the lift correctly or having it cut from the routine, Cope could have elected not to do the difficult lift without further consequence and thereby avoid her injury. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that no special relationship arose and that the instructor thus owed Cope no duty of care.
Cope appealed.
One consideration for the panel of judges was whether the instructor owed a duty of care to Cope.
“When governmental actors are involved, special considerations apply to a duty analysis,” wrote the majority. “’As a matter of public policy, we do not expose governmental actors to tort liability for all mishaps that may befall the public in the course of conducting their duties.’ Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, ¶ 11, 125 P.3d 906. The public duty doctrine limits a governmental actor’s duty to situations where a special relationship exists between the government and specific individuals:
“The public duty doctrine provides that although a government entity owes a general duty to all members of the public, that duty does not impose a specific duty of due care on the government with respect to individuals who may be harmed by governmental action or inaction, unless there is some specific connection between the government agency and the individuals that makes it reasonable to impose a duty. Day v. State ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 1999 UT 46, ¶ 12, 980 P.2d 1171.”
The panel continued, noting that university personnel “do not generally have a special relationship with students. Webb (citing Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 2003)). However, in Webb, our supreme court implicitly recognized a category of cases where a special relationship arises in the university setting. The possibility that a special relationship can be created follows from the fact that ‘a college student will inevitably relinquish a measure of behavioral autonomy to an instructor out of deference to her superior knowledge, skill, and experience.’ Id. ¶ 24.”
The panel went on to “extrapolate a general rule: a special relationship is created when (1) a directive is given to a student (2) by a teacher or coach (3) within the scope of the academic enterprise. See Webb.”
Among the cases the panel relied upon was Orr v. Brigham Young University, 960 F. Supp. 1522 (D. Utah 1994), aff’d without published opinion, 108 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1997). In that decision, a Utah federal district court applied Utah law in determining whether a private university owed an injured football player an affirmative duty of care. The court rejected the player’s claim of “a special relationship with the university by virtue of his football player status.” Id. at 1529. Specifically, the court rejected the football player’s claim that, “by playing football for BYU, he became in essence a ward of the university without any vestige of free will or independence.” Id. at 1528.5
The court relied on the distinction between “a large undifferentiated group, such as a university student body,” and “narrow classes of individuals who for some reason were distinguishable from the mass.” Id. (quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 236-37 (Utah 1993)). Although the court found no special relationship that would create a duty to act, the court acknowledged that “when training . . . services are provided and then negligently performed, liability could result under existing theories of negligence.”
Id.
UVSC cited several cases holding “that a duty of reasonable care arises only when a coach or instructor increases the risk of harm beyond that inherent in an activity.”
The panel noted that it was too early to make that call. “(W)hether … the instructor created an unreasonable risk of harm, increased the risk inherent in competitive ballroom dancing, or was otherwise unreasonable in his acts and omissions is a question for the trier of fact.”
UVSC also argued that “policy considerations weigh against imposing a duty of care on coaches of physically strenuous activities. If a duty of reasonable care is imposed, UVSC argues, instructors will hesitate to challenge participants to excel.”
The panel disagreed. “Participants in sports or extra-curricular programs look to the instructor for direction as they acquire the skills needed to compete. They trust in the instructor’s training, expertise, and appreciation of the risks involved. Participants expect instructors to challenge them to excel, but they also expect those instructors to act reasonably in doing so. Furthermore, the standard of reasonable care mitigates the policy concerns raised by UVSC: it leaves ‘coaches free to challenge or push their students to advance their skills level as long as they do so without exposing the student athletes to an unreasonable risk of harm.’ See Kahn v. East Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 103, 75 P.3d 30, 51-52 (Cal. 2003).
“We conclude that the undisputed facts in this case establish the existence of a special relationship and thus a duty of reasonable care on the part of Instructor. We caution that the existence of this duty does not resolve questions of breach and proximate cause.”
Shawnna Rae Cope v. Utah Valley State College; Ct. App. Utah; Case No. 20110147-CA, 2012 UT App 319; 721 Utah Adv. Rep. 5; 2012 Utah App. LEXIS 328; 11/8/12
Attorneys of Record: (for Appellant) Terry M. Plant and Stewart B. Harman, Salt Lake City. (for Appellee) Mark L. Shurtleff, J. Clifford Petersen, and Sandra L. Steinvoort, Salt Lake City.
