A federal judge from the District of Connecticut has denied Quinnipiac University’s motion to dismiss the claim brought by the school’s former head softball coach, who is alleging that the school violated the anti-retaliation provision of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., and various state laws.
In so ruling, the court found that the plaintiff had made “plausible” case for retaliation.
Plaintiff Germaine Fairchild, who now serves as an assistant coach for Fairleigh Dickinson University, was on staff at Quinnipiac when the school garnered national headlines because of alleged violations of Title IX.
The impetus for the that lawsuit was Quinnipiac’s March 2009 announcement that in the 2009-10 academic year it would eliminate its varsity sports teams for women’s volleyball, men’s golf, and men’s outdoor track and field, while simultaneously creating a new varsity women’s competitive cheerleading team.
Five women’s volleyball players and their coach filed suit against Quinnipiac in April 2009, alleging that Quinnipiac violated Title IX by denying women equal varsity athletic participation opportunities and sought injunctive relief preventing Quinnipiac from eliminating the women’s volleyball team.
Following a bench trial in 2010, District Judge Stefan R. Underhill, who is overseeing the instant litigation, found that Quinnipiac violated Title IX by failing to afford equal participation opportunities in varsity sports to female students. Biediger v. Quinnipiac.
As for Fairchild, she was the head coach of the women’s softball team at Quinnipiac for over a decade, until she was terminated in July 2013. Fairchild was hired by Quinnipiac’s athletic director, Jack McDonald, in October 2001. She entered into a written contract with the university, which was renewed annually until 2013.
During Fairchild’s tenure and under her direction, the women’s softball team made it to the Northeast Conference tournament seven times and made the finals four times. Fairchild asserts that she received many positive letters from athletes, parents, assistant coaches, administrators, colleagues, student-athletic trainers and outside observers of Quinnipiac Athletics during her time as the women’s softball head coach at the University. In her 2012 performance review, McDonald rated Fairchild as “high” for a merit increase.
“During the course of the Biediger lawsuit, Fairchild was subpoenaed to testify as a witness at the preliminary injunction hearing and at a deposition,” wrote the court. Fairchild provided “credible testimony” implicating the university. “Fairchild was terminated on July 11, 2013, exactly three weeks after I approved the consent degree in Biediger.”
The court noted in the decision that the plaintiff claims “she was terminated in retaliation for providing testimony supportive of the plaintiffs in the Biediger lawsuit, in violation of both Title IX and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q. .. Quinnipiac argues that Fairchild’s speech was not protected under either statute.”
The judge went on to review relevant provisions of Title IX as well as the landmark case of Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173, 125 S. Ct. 1497, 161 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2005), which prohibits retaliation against “a person because she complains of sex discrimination.” Id. at 174.
Furthermore, the court noted that a party’s speech is protected when it is one of “public concern. … The plaintiff’s interest in expressing himself on the particular matter must not have been outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the employment relationship.” Lopez v. Burris Logistics Co., 952 F. Supp. 2d 396, 406-07 (D. Conn. 2013).
The judge wrote that Quinnipiac “asserts that Fairchild’s testimony was not a protected activity as a matter of law, under Title IX or section 31-51q, because it did not actually relate to Title IX sex discrimination or a matter of public concern; instead, Fairchild testified only to Quinnipiac’s roster-management program, a ‘lawful practice,’ and the application of that lawful practice to the women’s softball team.”
The court noted that such a determination cannot be made at the summary judgment stage.
“Construing the factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Fairchild has pleaded sufficient facts to support a Title IX retaliation claim and a section 31-51q claim against Quinnipiac,” wrote the court. “The complaint alleges that Fairchild testified as a witness at a preliminary injunction hearing and at a deposition in a Title IX lawsuit brought by female student athletes and their coach against Quinnipiac. Fairchild did not engage in this speech solely to air personal grievances; she did so pursuant to a subpoena.
“Lastly, the complaint asserts that Fairchild was terminated on July 11, 2013, three weeks after I approved the consent decree in Biediger. On those facts, it is plausible that she was terminated in retaliation for providing ‘truthful testimony about her observations of unequal treatment of female student athletes at Quinnipiac,’ in violation of both Title IX and section 31-51q.”
Germaine Fairchild v. Quinnipiac University; D. Conn.; No. 3:13cv1877 (SRU), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55511; 4/22/14
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Lewis H. Chimes, LEAD ATTORNEY, Maria Eugenia Garcia Quintner, Law Office of Lewis Chimes LLC, Stamford, CT. (for defendant) Lawrence Peikes, LEAD ATTORNEY, Wiggin & Dana LLP, Stamford, CT.
