A federal judge from the Western District of Washington his dismissed the claim of a pro se plaintiff, who sued the Seattle Seahawks, National Football League and others, alleging various constitutional and statutory violations arising out of the Seahawks’ restriction of primary-market ticket sales for the NFC Championship game between the Seahawks and the 49ers to buyers with billing addresses in Washington and other nearby states and provinces.
Plaintiff John Williams III, a resident of Nevada and a 49ers fan, alleged that he was denied an opportunity to purchase tickets to the aforementioned game. While conceding that he could have bought tickets in the secondary market, the prices would be “inflated.”
In his lawsuit, Williams sought a declaration that the geographic restriction is unlawful on the basis of “economic discrimination and violation of public accommodation,” as well as damages for violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act and its federal counterpart, for violation of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, and for unjust enrichment.
The defendants moved to dismiss.
In considering the arguments, the court noted that it is required to construe pleadings liberally in the favor of a pro se litigant. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995).
However, the court noted that the defendants correctly point out “a free-standing assertion of ‘economic discrimination’ does not state a cognizable legal claim.”
Furthermore, the court agreed with the Seahawks that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not extend to discrimination on the basis of state residence. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). Neither does the Washington equivalent, the Washington Law Against Discrimination. See RCW 49.60.215
Next, the court turned to the plaintiff’s antitrust claims, pursuant the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. It found the Sherman Act inapplicable because the plaintiff’s “threadbare allegations do not relate to competition between firms in a market, but to the exercise of a natural monopoly on sales of tickets to a single stadium.” The Clayton Act, meanwhile, “applies solely to commodities. Tickets to a Seahawks game are not tangible goods, but revocable licenses, so the Clayton Act does not apply. See Kennedy Theater Ticket Servs. V. Ticketron, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 922, 925-27 (E.D. Pa. 1972).”
Finally, the court turned to the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants are unjustly enriched by sales on the secondary market for amounts in excess of the face value.
It wrote: “A plaintiff claiming unjust enrichment must plausibly allege facts supporting three elements: ‘a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.’ Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 191 P.3d 1258 (2008). Since the plaintiff cannot allege he purchased a ticket on the secondary market (indeed, he alleges he was unable to attend the game), he never conferred a benefit upon any defendant. This claim fails as well.”
John E. Williams III v. National Football League et al.; W.D. Wash.; CASE NO. C14-1089 MJP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155488; 10/31/14
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Pro se, Las Vegas, NV. (for defendants) Jonathan David Pressment, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, Haynes And Boone, LLP, NEW YORK, NY; Molly A Terwilliger, LEAD ATTORNEY, Philip S McCune, Summit Law Group, SEATTLE, WA. John Goldmark, Robert J Maguire, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Davis Wright Tremaine (SEA), SEATTLE, WA.
