Power Lifter’s Claim Revived Because of Faulty Instruction to Spotters

Feb 16, 2007

A Maryland state appeals court has reversed in part a ruling by a trial court, which had found that a powerlifter, who was injured during a competition, assumed the risk of injury.
 
Specifically, the court found that the spotters had been given faulty instruction, of which the powerlifter was not aware. He therefore could not have assumed that risk.
 
The incident occurred on November 8, 2003 when the plaintiff was attempting to bench press 530 pounds in the 2003 Southern Maryland Open Bench Press & Deadlift Meet, a powerlifting competition sanctioned by the American Powerlifting Association, and organized by William Duncan, the faculty sponsor of Patuxent High School’s weightlifting club, and APA President Scott Taylor.
 
The plaintiff was trying to lift 530 pounds, when the bar began to fall. The spotters were unable to prevent the injury, which included a shattered jaw.
 
The plaintiff sued for negligence, alleging that the bar fell because the spotters, who were there for the purpose of intervening in the event of danger, failed to intervene because they were instructed not to do so unless signaled. After a trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed.
 
The appeals court noted that the plaintiff was experienced at the sport, having been powerlifting competitively from 1994 through 1999. In that time, he had competed in between 15 and 20 competitions at the local, national, and international levels, and won awards at most of the competitions.
 
The court then reviewed assumption of risk and its case law support in the state of Maryland.
 
“Recently, in Kelly v. McCarrick, 155 Md. App. 82, 841 A.2d 869 (2004), this Court reviewed the law of assumption of the risk extensively in the context of a sports injury. In that case, we held that a sports participant assumes all risks incidental to the sport which are obvious and foreseeable, i.e., the usual and foreseeable dangers that a participant expects to encounter. Id. at 96-97 (citing Nesbitt v. Bethesda Country Club, Inc., 20 Md. App. 226, 232, 314 A.2d 738 (1974) (other citation omitted)).
 
“Stated differently, the risks assumed by participants in a game, sport, or contest, are only the ‘usual and foreseeable dangers that a similarly situated player reasonably would expect to encounter’ during that game, sport, or contest. Kelly, 155 Md. App. at 96- 97. The usual and foreseeable dangers include ‘risk of injury resulting from the type of physical contact that is an integral part of the sport as it is typically played,’ Id. at 97 (citing Hammond v. Bd. of Educ. of Carroll County, 100 Md. App. 60, 69-70, 639 A.2d 223 (1994)), as well as dangers that are ‘known to be within the range of possibilities; neither sure nor necessarily apt to happen; but one that will happen if the conditions are ripe for it.’ Id. at 106 (citation omitted). It follows that a participant does not assume an enhanced risk beyond what is inherent in the sport unless the participant has knowledge of facts that, applying an objective test, would charge the participant with knowledge of the enhanced risk. See id. at 104. These principles govern our disposition of this case.”
 
The appeals court quickly leaned on the plaintiff’s aforementioned experience in the sport to make an initial determination.
 
The plaintiff, “given his admitted knowledge and experience, assumed the risk, as a matter of law, of being injured by the bar during a lift, under usual circumstances. This includes risks normally associated with spotters. The risk of a bar falling and seriously injuring the lifter, during a lift of heavy weights, is a risk attendant to the sport.”
 
The court, however, reached “a different conclusion with respect to the improper instructions, concluding that they presented an enhanced risk, not normally incident to the sport. As stated previously, a person lifting heavy weights assumes that spotters may not prevent injury that occurs as a result of a failed lift, but the lifter does not assume the risk that a spotter has been instructed not to intervene until signaled to do so, even if the spotter perceives danger. Absent knowledge of any facts indicating that spotters had been given improper instructions, appellant did not assume the risk, as a matter of law, with respect to negligent acts causally related to such instructions and which were a proximate cause of the injuries.
 
“Although an injured party will be held to have assumed even the enhanced, or non-usual risk, when the injured party had actual knowledge of the facts giving rise to the risk and voluntarily chose to encounter the risk, the evidence does not demonstrate that appellant had actual knowledge of the assumed improper instructions given to (the spotters) that they were not to touch the bar until signaled by the judge. (the spotters) testified that, as a result of the instructions given them, they did not react immediately when they perceived that appellant was in danger. Consequently, appellant did not assume the risk as a matter of law of claims based on the instruction not to touch the bar until signaled by a judge.”
 
Christopher Cotillo v. William Duncan et al.; Ct. of Special App. Md.; No. 2859, September Term, 2005, 2006 Md. App. LEXIS 264; 12/6/06
 
Attorneys of Record: (for appellant) Kimberly A. Alley of Littleton, MA. and Henry L. Belsky of Baltimore, MD. (for appellee) Jason Beaulieu of Baltimore, MD. and Samuel Shapiro of Silver Springs, MD. (J. Michael Sloneker on the brief) of Baltimore, MD. and (Michael Mann on the brief) of Towson, MD.
 


 

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