A West Virginia state appeals court has ruled that a trial court exceeded its authority when it in interfered with the “legitimate” rule-making authority of the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission (SSAC) when it issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction that prevented the implementation of the suspension.
The events that led to the dispute occurred with 14 seconds left in a AAA football playoff game on November 19, 2010. A player for South Charleston High School intercepted a pass thrown by the Hurricane High School quarterback. Immediately after the interception, a Hurricane player threw several punches at a South Charleston player and then a number of players from both teams joined the melee on the field. Despite the remaining time on the clock, a decision was made to call the game because of the undeniably charged atmosphere and a resultant concern for the safety of everyone involved.
Based on the special report submitted by the game officials, the SSAC suspended the four players from the next football game to be played — the AAA semifinal game against Brooke High School, which was scheduled for November 27, 2010. In response to the SSAC suspension, the players sought a temporary restraining order from the circuit court. They argued specifically that the officials improperly identified the players to be suspended after the game had ended and, further, that the SSAC ruling was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of statutory authority.
Following an ex parte hearing on November 23, 2010, a circuit court granted a temporary restraining order with regard to the SSAC’s suspension of the football players. The SSAC filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order on November 26, 2010. On Saturday, November 27, 2010, the respondent football players participated in the AAA semifinal game when South Charleston played and defeated Brooke High School by a score of 29-28.
On Monday, November 29, 2010, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the respondents’ request for injunctive relief. Testimony was taken from numerous witnesses, including two of the officials from the November 19, 2010 football game. Based on its conclusion that the game officials violated SSAC rules by failing to eject the subject football players during the football game, the circuit court granted a preliminary injunction by order entered on November 30, 2010.
Two days later, the SSAC appealed, seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the preliminary injunction issued by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.
Central to the trial court’s rationale for its decision against the SSAC was the fact that the officials seemingly violated rules set forth by the National Federation of State High School Associations (NFHS), which state that “game officials shall assume authority for the contest, including penalizing unsportsmanlike acts, 30 minutes prior to the scheduled game time . . . and the officials’ jurisdiction extends through the referee’s declaration of the end of the fourth period or overtime.”
The court reasoned that because the ejections that were reported to the SSAC were not announced on the field before the game was called, the trial court concluded that “the officials lacked authority to make those ejections. Reasoning that the ‘WVSSAC’s power to suspend a player is limited to the ejection call made by the official on the field,’ the trial court ruled that the officials and the SSAC both violated Rule 1 of the NFHS football rules. The trial court took the position that once the game was over, only the school principal, and not the SSAC, had the right to make a suspension ruling.” The decision, the trial court held, was thus “an arbitrary and capricious application of an otherwise reasonable Rule 1.”
The appeals court disagreed.
“From our review of the record of this matter, the trial court arguably interpreted the term ‘jurisdiction,’ as it is used in Rule 1, in an overly legalistic manner and also failed to consider the unique extenuating circumstances of this particular football game. With regard to the trial court’s position that the calling of the game terminated the authority of the game officials to make their ejection decisions, this conclusion simply does not withstand scrutiny.
“Seeking to apply the NFHS Rules in a virtual vacuum, independent from the realities of the electric atmosphere that existed on the field, the trial court placed undue emphasis on the language of Rule 1 which provides that the game officials have authority over the field and players ‘through’ the end of the contest. The trial court seemingly faults the officials for calling the game and obeying the directives of law enforcement to clear the field. Implicit in the trial court’s ruling is the conclusion that to comply with both the NFHS and SSAC rules, the game officials had to opt not to call the game and remain on the field to announce which players were ejected for participating in the on-field fight. Not only is this conclusion not supported by the rules, but it reflects a failure to fully consider and appreciate the events that had just transpired on the field.
“In marked contrast to the trial court’s interpretation of the subject rules, the duties and/or authority of the game official do not automatically cease with the running of the game clock. When asked whether the ending of the game terminated the authority of the officials at the hearing on the preliminary injunction, Michael Webb, the football clinician for the SSAC and rules interpreter, who serves as the SSAC’s rules representative on the National Federation of High School Football Rules Committee, testified: ‘No, sir, it does not. Their jurisdiction extends through the end of the game, and then as they leave the field the jurisdiction is extended until they finish their duties. In this case, writing up the report and all that stuff for the governing body, which is the SSAC.’ It stands to reason that the performance of duties that flow directly from the on-field officiating fall within the ‘jurisdiction’ or authority of the officiating position. To suggest otherwise is to deny both the realities of athletic competitions and the post-game tasks the officials are routinely required to complete.”
The panel concluded that, “by superimposing its judgment on how the SSAC applied its own rules with regard to handling ejections and suspensions, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. Simply put, the trial court lacked any authority to engage in a review of the SSAC’s decision to suspend the respondent players pursuant to its properly promulgated rules. As a result of that improper exercise of jurisdiction, the SSAC is entitled to a writ of prohibition.”
State of West Virginia ex rel. the West Virginia Secondary School Activity Commission, et al. v. Honorable Carrie Webster, Judge of The Circuit Court Of Kanawha County, et al.; S. Ct. of App. W.V.; No. 10-4001, 2011 W. Va. LEXIS 10; 2/24/11
Attorneys of Record: (for petitioners) William R. Wooton, The Wooton Law Firm, Beckley, West Virginia. (for individual respondents) C. Benjamin Salango, Preston & Salango, PLC, Charleston, West Virginia. (for Brooke County Board of Education, intervenor) David F. Cross, Wellsburg, West Virginia. Michael G. Simon, S. David Wilharm, Frankovitch, Anetakis, Colantonio & Simon, Weirton, West Virginia. Michael E. Nogay, Sellitti, Nogay & McCune, Weirton, West Virginia.
