A New York State appeals court has affirmed the ruling of a lower court to grant summary judgment to a defendant, who was sued after he collided with a plaintiff at a roller skating rink.
The impetus for the suit was an accident that occurred at Guptill’s Arena when the defendant, who was exiting from the main skating rink to the practice rink, slipped and fell on the plaintiff.
Invoking the assumption of risk doctrine, the appeals court wrote that “Participants engaging in a sport or recreational activity are deemed to have assumed the commonly appreciated risks inherent in that activity (see Morgan v State of New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 484, 685 N.E.2d 202, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421 [1997]; see also Clements v Skate 9H Realty, 277 A.D.2d 614, 615, 714 N.Y.S.2d 836 [2000]). Spectators and bystanders also assume risks associated with a sporting event or activity, even at times when they are not actively watching the event (see Procopio v Town of Saugerties, 20 AD3d 860, 860, 799 N.Y.S.2d 316 [2005], lv denied 5 N.Y.3d 716, 840 N.E.2d 1031, 807 N.Y.S.2d 17 [2005]; Sutton v Eastern N.Y. Youth Soccer Assn., 8 A.D.3d 855, 857, 779 N.Y.S.2d 149 [2004]).”
The appeals court can draw a line on the defense when it can be shown that the incident was caused by “other people’s reckless or intentional conduct (see Morgan v State of New York, supra at 485; Sutton v Eastern N.Y. Youth Soccer Assn., supra at 859; Martin v Luther, 227 A.D.2d 859, 860, 642 N.Y.S.2d 728 [1996]).”
Connecting the current case with case law, the court added that “collisions with other skaters are common and constitute an inherent risk participants assume when skating (see Reid v Druckman, 309 A.D.2d 669, 670, 765 N.Y.S.2d 878 [2003]; Zambrana v City of New York, 262 A.D.2d 87, 87, 691 N.Y.S.2d 471 [1999], affd 94 N.Y.2d 887, 727 N.E.2d 573, 706 N.Y.S.2d 76 [2000]; Kleiner v Commack Roller Rink, 201 A.D.2d 462, 607 N.Y.S.2d 142 [1994]; Lopez v Skate Key, 174 A.D.2d 534, 571 N.Y.S.2d 716 [1991]; Stemmler v State of New York, 32 A.D.2d 861, 861, 301 N.Y.S.2d 403 [1969]).
“Here, plaintiff had been skating at the rink, was taking a break in the practice rink area, was still wearing her roller blades and was standing only a few feet from the main rink in an area still used for skating. Even if, as she argues, she was no longer a participant, she was a spectator close enough to the activity to have assumed the inherent risks (compare Lopez v Skate Key, supra). Although defendant had not skated for 10 to 15 years prior to this collision, he had been skating for some time that evening in an acceptable manner and without incident. There is no evidence that he violated any rink rules (compare Vega v County of Westchester, 282 A.D.2d 738, 739, 724 N.Y.S.2d 72 [2001]).”
The court added that the “plaintiff initially testified at her deposition that defendant was skating too fast, but she acknowledged that she only saw him in her peripheral vision a few seconds before the collision and acknowledged, ‘He wasn’t going too fast which you are not supposed to do.’ While there was conflicting testimony regarding whether defendant simply lost his balance or fell while trying to avoid some children who cut in front of him, both scenarios constitute inherent risks of roller skating which plaintiff assumed (compare Lopez v Skate Key, supra). As no material factual issues exist, Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.”
Christine Newcomb v. Guptill Holding Corporation et al.; Sup.Ct.N.Y., App. Div., 3d Dept; 99676; 2006 NY Slip Op 5280; 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8616; 7/6/06
Attorneys of Record: (for appellant) Friedman, Hirschen & Miller, Albany (Lynn M. Blake of counsel). (for respondent) Ryan & Smallacombe, Albany (David T. Luntz of counsel).
