A district judge from the Western District of Pennsylvania has reversed a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to deny a motion to dismiss filed by a school district and other defendants, who claimed they were entitled to qualified immunity.
In so ruling, the district judge leaned heavily on Mann v. Palmerton Area School District, 872 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2017), which emphasized that the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity inquiry must be analyzed “at the appropriate level of specificity.”
The facts of the instant case were unrelated to the sports world. The case involved the tragic death of an eleven-year old boy, Noah Wion, who was struck by a vehicle while crossing State Route 430 at his designated bus stop. The plaintiffs sued, relying on a state-created danger theory of liability, contending that Noah’s death was caused by the defendants’ decision to place Noah’s bus stop in a location that required him to cross a dangerous county road during hazardous conditions.
The defendants moved to dismiss, which the magistrate judge denied. On Dec. 1, 2017, the defendants appealed.
While the court affirmed the denial, in part, it reversed the magistrate’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss that was brought on qualified immunity grounds.
In its analysis on the latter, the court noted that for qualified immunity to apply, the plaintiff must allege that there has been a violation of a constitutional right and “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). With respect to the second prong of this analysis, the Magistrate Judge broadly concluded that there is a “clearly established right . . . not to be removed from a safe environment and placed into one in which it is clear that harm is likely to occur, particularly when the individual may, due to youth and other factors, be especially vulnerable to the risk of harm.” (Docket No. 34 at 13) (citing L.R. v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2016)).
“However, in Mann v. Palmerton Area School District, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that the ‘clearly established’ prong of the qualified immunity inquiry must be analyzed ‘at the appropriate level of specificity.’ Mann, 872 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2017). In other words, qualified immunity is only denied where factually-similar precedent exists that would have placed the defendant on notice that his or her specific conduct was constitutionally unlawful. Id. (noting that a court must ‘frame the right at issue in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense, in light of the case’s specific context, not as a broad general proposition.’) (quoting Spady v. Bethlehem Area School District, 800 F.3d 633, 638 (3d Cir. 2015)).
“The Third Circuit’s holding in Mann adroitly illustrates this principle. In Mann, a high school football player sustained a hard hit during practice that appeared to cause a concussion. Id. at 169-70. Despite displaying concussion symptoms, the student continued to participate in practice, ultimately sustaining a traumatic brain injury. Id. His parents filed a lawsuit alleging that the head football coach’s failure to remove their son from practice amounted to a state-created danger. Id. at 170. In response, the football coach raised the doctrine of qualified immunity. Id.”
Turning to the instant case, the court noted that the plaintiffs “attempted to overcome qualified immunity by relying on L.R. v. School District of Philadelphia for the broad proposition that an individual has a right “not to be removed from a safe environment and placed into one in which it is clear that harm is likely to occur.” Id. at 173 (citing L.R., 836 F.3d at 249). The Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ invitation to extend L.R. in this fashion, observing that the general principles pronounced in L.R. had never been applied in “the specific context [of] a football player fully clothed in protective gear, including a helmet, who experiences a violent blow, shows signs of a concussion, and is required to continue to engage in the same activity that caused the first substantial hit.” Id. Because the Court could not find any decision “where a state-created danger was established after a student-athlete was required to continue to compete after sustaining a substantial hit,” the Court concluded that there was not “sufficient precedent at the time of action, factually similar to the plaintiff’s allegations, to put [the] defendant on notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.” Id. at 173-74 (quoting Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016)).
The court wrote that “the same is true in the instant case. Plaintiffs have failed to cite any precedent in which a court applied the state-created danger theory to the location or approval of a bus stop.”
Kathleen Wion, as Administratrix of the Estate of Noah Samuel Wion v. Hunter K. Rodland, et al.; W.D. Pa.; Civil Action No. 17-135 Erie, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5572/ 1/12/18
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) William J. Kelly, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, Kelly Law Firm, Erie, PA. (for defendants) Christopher J. Sinnott, Marnen Mioduszewski Bordonaro Wagner & Sinnott, LLC, Erie, PA. Bradley A. Wright, Randall J. Moore, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Roetzel & Andress, Akron, OH; James M. Girman, John T. Pion, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Pion, Nerone, Girman, Winslow & Smith, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA; Jessica L. Sloan, Roetzel & Andress, LPA, Akron, OH. Alexander K. Cox, LEAD ATTORNEY, Knox McLaughlin Gornall & Sennett, P.C., Erie, PA; Richard A. Lanzillo, LEAD ATTORNEY, Knox, McLaughlin, Gornall & Sennett, Erie, PA.
