A federal judge from the Eastern District of California has granted a school district’s motion for summary judgment in a case where the district was accused by a wheelchair- bound plaintiff of violating the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (ADA), and regulations promulgated there under at 28 C.F.R. Part 35 et seq, as well as a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (RA).
In so ruling, the court found that because the school district’s bleachers at the football stadium have not been modified since 1972, the seating qualifies as part of an existing facility and falls under the Department of Justice’s “existing facilities” guidelines, which is a more forgiving standard.
Timothy S. Daubert is paralyzed from the waist down and uses a wheelchair for mobility. He alleged that he has attempted to attend football games at the Lindsay High School Stadium for several years, but has been prevented from having the same experience as able-bodied fans because the bleacher seating is not accessible to wheelchair users. Daubert stopped attending the games and complained to the school district, but he alleged the district took no action.
As a result, he sued under the aforementioned grounds and sought injunctive relief and requestsed that the district “be required to provide accessible bleacher seating or programmatic access to persons in wheelchairs, actual damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit.”
The school district moved for summary judgment, leading to the instant opinion. The defendant’s core argument was that the stadium does not violate the ADA or the RA. “Because the bleachers at the stadium have not been modified since 1972, the seating qualifies as part of an existing facility and falls under the Department of Justice’s ‘existing facilities’ guidelines. Existing facilities are bound by the ‘program access standard,’ which mandates that a public entity operate services, programs, or activities that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. Under this standard, the program is viewed in its entirety.
“The defendant argues that the district has developed methods that allow wheelchair users to have meaningful access to watch and enjoy football games at the stadium. This is evidenced by the fact that there are three places throughout the facility where persons in wheelchairs can view and participate in football games.”
The court went on to write that “the crux” of the plaintiff’s argument is that “program access” is more than just the ability to watch the football game at the stadium. Instead, plaintiff contends that “meaningful access requires that wheelchair users be permitted to experience the game from the same viewing angle as the rest of the public seated in the bleachers.”
The court disagreed, noting that “assessing a program’s accessibility is a subjective evaluation that entails viewing the program in its entirety.”
On this point, “it is undisputed that there are no barriers preventing wheelchair access from the parking lot to the field. Moreover, once an individual enters the stadium, the handicapped seating on the field is accessible to wheelchair users. Wheelchair users are not required to sit in one area on the field, but can view the game from a variety of locations including: 1) from either end zone, 2) from any corner of the field, or 3) at either of the 25 yard lines. Some of these options include sitting behind a fence while others do not.”
While the school district has not made structural modifications to the facility, “it has developed a plan that accommodates wheelchair users,” wrote the court. “It has designated several different areas where wheelchair users may sit with a companion and have an unobstructed view of the game. This allows the plaintiff and other wheelchair users to have meaningful access to football games. Although the plaintiff cannot sit in the bleachers where he prefers, the accommodation provided satisfies the existing facility access standard. Where physical presence is coupled with an opportunity to participate in the activity, the public agency has met its requirement to provide program access, even if the level of access provided is not the most optimal or convenient. Association for Disabled Americans v. City of Orlando, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1320-1321 (M.D. Fla., 2001).”
Timothy S. Daubert v. Lindsay Unified School District; E.D. Calif.; 1:09-CV-1463 GSA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62967; 5/4/12
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Mark D. Potter, LEAD ATTORNEY, Center for Disability Access, San Diego, CA; Russell Clive Handy, Center for Disability Access, LLP, San Marcos, CA. (for defendant) Michael Joseph Maurer, LEAD ATTORNEY, McCrmick Kabot Jenner & Lew, Visalia, CA.
