A federal judge from the Middle District of Florida has dismissed, in part, a lawsuit brought by a former middle school girls’ basketball coach, Althea Owens, who alleged that her son (E.S.P) suffered discrimination based on race when he tried out for the at Suwannee Middle School baseball team and failed to make the squad.
Owens, who made a dual-filed charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Florida Commission on Human Relations after her son failed to make the team, was subsequently fired as the basketball coach at Suwannee Middle School, leading to an additional claim of retaliation.
Owens, who is African American, lodged claims for retaliation and race discrimination.
In Count II of her complaint, the plaintiff alleged retaliation, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (Title VII). The defendant, Suwannee County School Board, countered in a motion to dismiss that the coach “is attempting to raise both opposition and participation claims, and that the opposition claims are not properly plead. It is not necessary for the Court to decide whether an opposition claim has been properly plead, because Plaintiff has sufficiently plead her retaliation claim, including that she engaged in protected activity,” according to the opinion. “Although Defendant challenges whether the Board had knowledge of Plaintiff’s complaint, the temporal proximity (two weeks) between Plaintiff’s EEOC charge and her termination is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).”
Count III of the plaintiff’s complaint also centered on retaliation, this time pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000d et seq. (Title VI). “Title VI claims involving employment are limited to circumstances when federal funds are provided for the purpose of providing employment,” wrote the judge. “Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant receives federal funds and that such funds are fungible is insufficient. See Jones v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 681 F.2d 1376, 1378 (11th Cir. 1982); Russell v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 8-23442-CIV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34315, 2009 WL 936662, at *6 (S.D. Fla. April 6, 2009) (collecting cases that Title VI claims require employer receive federal funds for purpose of employment). Deficiencies with this claim were previously identified, but not adequately corrected in the amended complaint. Compare Doc. 12 at 15-16, with Doc. 19 at [*3] 8-9.”
Count IV alleges retaliation against the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. §1981, through 42 U.S.C. §1983. “Section 1981 claims against a state actor are properly treated as §1983 claims and must show that the violation of the right to make contracts is ‘caused by a custom or policy within the meaning of Monell and subsequent cases.’ See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 105 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1989); Butts v. Cnty. of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2000); Mizzell-Bullock v. Seminole Cnty. Pub. Sch., No. 23-11599, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 317, 2024 WL 65199 at * (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024). What Plaintiff describes as a policy sufficient to meet Monell requirements is not related to her termination,” wrote the court.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that “the longstanding practice of denying African American children the opportunity to participate in sports teams, often in favor of white and non-black students, has been prevalent and predates E.S.P. for at least the prior two years to E.S.P. trying out for the team.”
The court continued, noting that this “allegation describes a practice of discrimination against African American children, such as E.S.P., and does not identify a policy, custom or practice, related to Plaintiff’s termination. In addition, Plaintiff alleges she was terminated by the Principal Williams but does not allege facts as to how the termination was ratified by the School Board, other than a conclusory statement that such ratification occurred. Doc. 19 ¶¶58, 62. Deficiencies with this claim were previously identified, but not adequately corrected in the amended complaint. Compare Doc. 12 at 7-9, with Doc. 19 at 10.”
Count V centered on allegations of race discrimination against E.S.P. under the Florida Education Equity Act (FEEA), Fla. Stat. §1000.05, and seeks both compensatory and punitive damages under Fla. Stat. §760.07. “The Parties agree that FEEA only provides equitable relief. The Parties disagree whether other relief is permitted under Fla. Stat. §760.07, which provides:
‘Any violation of any Florida statute that makes unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion, gender, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status in the areas of education, employment, or public accommodations gives rise to a cause of action for all relief and damages described in s.760.11(5), unless greater damages are expressly provided for.’”
The court continued, “In turn, §760.11(5) provides ‘the states, and its agencies and subdivisions shall not be liable for punitive damages.’ Thus, punitive damages are not permitted against the School Board. The Court is not persuaded that compensatory damages are also prohibited but declines to expressly rule on the issue at this time.”
Finally, the court considered Count VII, which alleged race discrimination against E.S.P. under 42 U.S.C. §1981, through §1983.
In order to state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff “must allege (1) intentional racial discrimination (2) that caused a contractual injury. Ziyadat v. Diamondrock Hosp. Co., 3 F.4th 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021).” The plaintiff’s claim failed here “because there is no alleged interference with a contract. Cf. Jackman ex rel. K.J. v. Kindergarten Prep, Inc., No. 8:23-cv-1598-TPB-AEP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185057, 2023 WL 6809647, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2023) (denying motion to dismiss because plaintiff alleged interference with a right to contract with defendant to provide educational services).”
The court reasoned, “Even if E.S.P. was not selected for the baseball team due to his race, Plaintiff has not alleged a contractual right was involved and has not cited any authority that would support finding a contractual right was involved in these circumstances. Deficiencies with this claim were previously identified, but not adequately corrected in the amended complaint. Compare Doc. 12 at 22-23, with Doc. 19 at 14-15.”
In sum, the court granted without prejudice the defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts III, IV, and VII, while denying the motion as it related to Counts II and V.
Althea Owens v. Suwannee County School Board; M.D. Fla.; Case No. 3:23-cv-1174-TJC-SJH; 9/9/24
