A federal judge from the District of Minnesota has dismissed the lawsuit of a former National Hockey League (NHL) player, who sued two NHL teams and two insurance companies, claiming that they were aware that the traumatic brain injuries he suffered put him at risk for permanent damage, but did not warn him about the danger. The lawsuit was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
Plaintiff Michael Peluso was a former professional hockey player, who played in the NHL from 1989 to 1998. He is currently a resident of Minnesota, and he resided in Minnesota during the entirety of his NHL career.
The two team defendants in the case are the New Jersey Devils, LLC and St. Louis Blues Hockey Club, L.P., for which he played.
The two insurance defendants in the case are Chubb Group Holdings, Inc. (Chubb) and Federal Insurance Company (Federal), a subsidiary of Chubb.
Peluso played as a forward or “enforcer” during his professional hockey career, a position that required “constant initiating and engaging in bare knuckled fist fights.” During a fight in a Dec. 18, 1993 game, Peluso was struck in the head with his helmet off and lost consciousness. His head struck the ice when he fell, and he was later diagnosed with a concussion. Within a week, Peluso was back on the ice and engaging in game-time fights again. Two months later, on Feb. 14, 1994, Peluso suffered a grand mal seizure, his first. He was hospitalized overnight and prescribed medication.
The event that is central to Peluso’s claims is Peluso’s examination by the New Jersey Devils’ team neurologist, Dr. Marvin Ruderman, on Feb. 21, 1994. Dr. Ruderman issued a report stating his opinion that Peluso’s seizure was “most likely related to a post-traumatic seizure as a consequence of the cerebral concussion in December 1993.” Ruderman’s report further stated: “I do not believe that the participation in playing hockey in itself poses an excessive risk for the development of further seizures unless [Peluso] were to sustain head injuries. He will continue to use a helmet.” Dr. Ruderman sent this report to the New Jersey Devils’ general manager, team doctor, and orthopedic surgeon. Peluso’s claims against Defendants are predicated on Defendants’ alleged concealment and tortious disregard of the Ruderman report, leading Peluso to play professional hockey for several more years and suffer irreparable damage to his brain, according to the complaint. Peluso continued to play professional hockey for four years after his first grand mal seizure. In 2016, he was diagnosed with dementia and a seizure disorder.
In 2012, Peluso filed a workers’ compensation claim in California. Peluso alleges that Chubb, which was a party to this claim as the Team Defendants’ workers’ compensation insurer, had possession of the Ruderman Report and wrongfully withheld it from discovery in that action.
In May 2016, Peluso learned of the Ruderman Report when his counsel obtained it from parties in In re NHL Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation. Shortly after obtaining the Ruderman Report, Peluso filed an additional workers’ compensation claim in California, alleging serious and willful misconduct under Cal. Lab. Code § 4553.
Peluso filed the instant action on April 20, 2017, alleging various torts arising from Defendants’ failure to disclose the Ruderman Report, failure to warn Peluso about his risk of further brain injury, and misrepresentation of Peluso’s fitness to continue playing hockey.
Defendants Chubb and Federal moved to dismiss Peluso’s Complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Insurer Defendants; (2) the Court should abstain from hearing the case under applicable abstention doctrines; (3) Peluso’s claims are barred by the first-filed rule and the workers’ compensation exclusive-remedy doctrine; (4) Peluso’s claims violate the direct action rule; (5) Peluso’s claims are barred by operation of the statute of limitations; (6) Peluso has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (7) the Court should dismiss the Complaint for insufficient process and insufficient service.
The Team Defendants also moved to dismiss Peluso’s Complaint. The Team Defendants argued for dismissal on the following grounds: (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Team Defendants; (2) Peluso’s claims are barred by the workers’ compensation exclusive-remedy doctrine; (3) the Court should abstain from hearing the case under applicable abstention doctrines; (4) Peluso has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (5) Peluso’s claims are a wrongful attempt at claim-splitting.
Peluso’s central jurisdiction argument regarding Chubb and Federal was that they “consented to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota. “Citing Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1990), Peluso argues that Chubb has consented to personal jurisdiction by registering entities with the Minnesota Secretary of State and appointing an agent for service. But while Peluso submits registration records for Chubb Alternative Risk Solutions, Inc., Chubb & Son Inc., Chubb Insurance Solutions Agency Inc., Chubb Services Corporation, and Chubb Structured Products Inc., he presents no registration records for the relevant defendant in this case–Chubb Group Holdings, Inc.,” wrote the court. The defendants “are correct that the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over them on the basis of a third party’s consent. Thus, Peluso’s argument … is unavailing.
“Peluso also argues that Insurer Defendants’ contacts in Minnesota are so continuous and systematic that they are subject to general jurisdiction in the state. As support for this claim, Peluso asserts that Chubb has two offices in Minnesota and submits as evidence a printout from a career-interest webpage associated with Chubb. This printout includes a long list of ‘regional and branch network . . . locations,’ including two in Minnesota. Peluso argues that Chubb’s ‘numerous and substantial connections with Minnesota subject it to general jurisdiction, which Peluso asserts can then be imputed to Chubb’s subsidiary, Federal.
“In the first instance, the court does not consider Peluso’s list of ‘Chubb’ locations to be strong evidence that defendant Chubb Group Holdings, Inc. has continuous and systematic contacts in Minnesota. It is not clear from the list which Chubb entity or entities it refers to, and Peluso has provided no additional information about these purported Minnesota Chubb offices. Further, even assuming that these locations are associated with Chubb Group Holdings, Inc. in some meaningful way, that does not reach the extraordinarily high threshold that the caselaw sets for general jurisdiction … .”
The court was similarly unimpressed with the plaintiff’s argument that the Insurer Defendants are subject to specific jurisdiction. “For specific jurisdiction to apply, ‘the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him,” wrote the court citing Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. “Here, Peluso argues that Insurer Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota because they violated their obligation to provide his physicians with crucial information for his treatment here. But this describes a connection to Peluso, not to the state of Minnesota,” a fatal flaw in the plaintiff’s argument.
Turning to the Team Defendants, the plaintiff sought to apply specific jurisdiction “because they directed their fraudulent conduct ‘at Peluso in Minnesota,’ by fraudulently inducing him to enter an employment contract to play professional hockey despite extreme risk to his health,” wrote the court. “Peluso notes that his employment contracts required him to participate in promotional activities, including some ‘directed at and within Minnesota.’ Peluso also argues that Team Defendants directed their conduct at Minnesota by fraudulently inducing him to execute a release of claims against the NHL and member teams, which was signed in Minnesota in 2000 … .
“Similar to Insurance Defendants, Team Defendants argue that Peluso’s arguments fail because he does not show that Team Defendants’ conduct connected them to Minnesota, rather than simply to Peluso. Team Defendants further argue that the 2000 release does not confer jurisdiction because it was executed by the NHL, not by Team Defendants, and that the cases Peluso cites are distinguishable.”
The court agreed, noting that it does not see “any conduct by Team Defendants that was purposefully aimed at the state of Minnesota or that took place in Minnesota and forms the basis for Peluso’s claims here.”
Michael Peluso v. New Jersey Devils, LLC; St. Louis Blues Hockey Club, L.P.; Chubb Group Holdings, Inc., a/k/a Chubb Group, a/k/a Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, a/k/a Chubb Insurance Group, a/k/a Chubb Group Los Angeles; and Federal Insurance Company; D. Minn.; Case No. 17-cv-01299 (SRN/BRT), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144387; 8/24/18
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Shawn D. Stuckey, Glenn, Stuckey, & Partners, LLP, Santa Ana, California. (for defendants) Christopher J. Schmidt and Jonathan B. Potts, Bryan Cave LLP, St. Louis, Missouri; Joseph G. Schmitt and Scott M. Rusert, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Mark R. Azman and Shamus P. O’Meara, O’Meara Leer Wagner & Kohl, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
