An Indiana Court of Appeals has reversed a lower court, which had issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) that prevented the Indiana High School Athletic Association (IHSAA) from punishing two schools for an incident that occurred on February 7.
The appeals court ruled that the lower court erred when it granted the TRO after finding that the schools had “demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.”
Both Hammond High School and Griffith High School re voluntary members of the IHSAA. On Saturday, February 7, 2015, the Hammond varsity boys’ basketball team played the Griffith team at Griffith. A Hammond player fouled a Griffith player during the game, which caused the Griffith player to slam into the padded wall behind the basket and fall onto the floor. Thereafter, members of both teams left the bench area and began fighting on the court. Coaches, parents, and fans entered the court during the altercation. Officials ended the game, and the schools suspended the students who were involved on the following Monday. Each student received a five-day out-of-school suspension.
The IHSAA promptly summoned Hammond and Griffith officials to IHSAA headquarters to review the circumstances of the incident. The meeting agenda listed four IHSAA rules to be discussed: Rule 3-1, Rule 3-6, Rule 8-1, and Rule 8-4. Rule 3-1 requires “each member School to control its athletic program in compliance with the rules and regulations of the Association.” Rule 3-6 provides, in relevant part, that the member School’s responsibility for the conduct of its athletic program includes responsibility for the actions of its staff members, its participants, and any other individual or organization actively engaged in activities promoting the athletic interests of the member School. Rule 8-1 states a student’s conduct “in and out of School, shall be such as (1) not to reflect discredit upon their School or the Association, or (2) not to create a disruptive influence on the discipline, good order, moral or educational environment in the School.” Finally, Rule 8-4 provides, in relevant part:
“a. Any contestant, coach, Contest Administrator or School Administrator who is ejected from a Contest for an unsportsmanlike act the first time during a sport season shall be suspended for the next Contest at that level of competition and all other Contests at any level in the interim, unless an IHSAA sport-specific rule or policy provides a different protocol or penalty for a first ejection.
“c. Any contestant, coach, Contest Administrator or School Administrator who is ejected from a Contest for an unsportsmanlike act a second time during a sport season shall be suspended for the next two (2) Contests at that level of competition and all other Contests at any level in the interim, unless an IHSAA sport-specific rule or policy provides a different protocol or penalty for a second ejection.”
IHSAA Commissioner Bobby Cox imposed the same penalties for each school: “(1) suspending participation in the state tournament; (2) cancelling each school’s remaining regular season games; (3) declaring the February 7 game a double forfeit; (4) requiring each basketball coach to complete a ‘Teaching and Modeling Behavior’ course; (5) requiring each varsity boys’ basketball player to complete a ‘Sportsmanship’ course; (6) strongly encouraging all other boys’ basketball players to complete a ‘Sportsmanship’ course; and (7) placing both schools on probation for the entire 2015-16 school year.”
The schools and players appealed. On February 25, the IHSAA Review Committee affirmed. Two days later, they filed a complaint seeking judicial review of the decisions and a preliminary injunction. The regular season had concluded by that point, and sectionals began on March 3. The complaint alleged the commissioner’s decisions were “not a fair and logical interpretation or application of the IHSAA’s own rules” and that the Review Committee’s decisions upholding the penalties “were arbitrary and capricious, illegal, overreaching, excessive, and offensive to basic notions of fairness.”
The trial court agreed, entering a preliminary injunction prohibiting the IHSAA from enforcing its suspension of Hammond and Griffith. The trial court concluded the penalties imposed “constituted ‘disparate treatment’ and suggested the IHSAA was not following its own rules.”
Further, it “found the plaintiffs demonstrated they would suffer irreparable harm if they could not participate in the state tournament because players from both teams were being courted by college recruiters. The trial court concluded this threatened injury outweighed any potential harm to the IHSAA because the IHSAA would suffer no harm as a result of the injunction. As for a likelihood of success on the merits, the trial court concluded, ‘The Plaintiffs . . . set forth substantial evidence that supports their assertion that the decisions of the IHSAA w[ere] not based upon evidence presented, w[ere] illegal[,] arbitrary and capricious, excessive, and contrary to law.’
“In the weeks to follow, the schools participated in the state tournament. Hammond was eliminated in the sectional round, while Griffith advanced to the state championship.”
In reviewing the arguments, the appeals court noted that, while the students’ claims were now moot, it was still important to decide whether the trial court erred in granting the preliminary injunction as to the schools in case a similar situation arises.
“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the remedies at law are inadequate, thus causing irreparable harm pending resolution of the substantive action; (3) the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving party from the granting of an injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by granting the requested injunction. State v. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d 794, 803 (Ind. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 218, 184 L. Ed. 2d 43 (2012).
“The IHSAA contends the trial court erred in concluding the schools demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. We agree. Our supreme court has determined the IHSAA is treated as a voluntary association with respect to challenges brought by member schools. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 228. Absent fraud, illegality, or abuse of civil or property rights having their origin elsewhere, we do not interfere with the internal affairs of a voluntary association, nor do we second guess an association’s interpretation or application of its rules. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d at 256.8 Here, the sanctions imposed did not violate IHSAA rules, and nothing in the rules requires the IHSAA to impose consistent punishments for similar violations. See id. (stating voluntary associations may adopt rules ‘which will control as to all questions of discipline’). There was no evidence suggesting the suspensions constituted fraud, illegality, or an infringement of rights as to the schools, yet the trial court concluded the schools demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.
“The trial court also failed to distinguish between the schools and the students and seemed to apply an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to both challenges. Even assuming an arbitrary and capricious standard of review should apply to school challenges, the trial court exceeded the scope of such review by engaging in its own fact-finding. Instead of analyzing the record to determine whether substantial evidence supported the Review Committee’s decision, see Watson, 938 N.E.2d at 680, the trial court concluded the plaintiffs ‘set forth substantial evidence’ to support their position, tr. at 310. The trial court applied the incorrect standard of review to the schools’ challenge, improperly substituted its own judgment for the IHSAA’s, and erred by concluding the schools demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. In short, the trial court erred when it granted the schools’ request for a preliminary injunction.”
Indiana High School Athletic Association, Inc., and Hammond Gavit High School v. Nasir Cade, et al.; Ct. App. Ind.; Court of Appeals Case No. 45A03-1503-PL-84, 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 66; 3/11/16
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC: Robert M. Baker III, Law Office of Robert M. Baker III, Indianapolis, Indiana. (for defendants) Rhett L. Tauber, Jared R. Tauber, Tauber Law Offices, Schererville, Indiana. Michael J. Jasaitis, Ryan A. Deutmeyer, Austgen Kuiper Jasaitis, P.C., Crown Point, Indiana.
