The Indiana Court of Appeals has overturned a ruling by an administrative law judge for the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), which found that a private religious school violated the Indiana Civil Rights Law (ICRL) when it prevented an African-American student athlete from playing on the varsity basketball team. The ruling means the commission will rehear the case.
During the 2006-07 season, Aleesha Bullock was the leading scorer on the varsity basketball team at Cardinal Ritter High School, which is a private, religious institution owned and operated by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis.
However, Bullock was not selected to play for the varsity team for the 2007-2008 term. The basketball coaches, including Coach William Clark, allegedly felt that Bullock had shown a lack of commitment to the basketball program because she had chosen to play soccer rather than attend basketball conditioning. Clark told Bullock’s parents that she was not chosen to play because many younger players were improving at a faster rate and better fit with the way he wanted to develop the team in the future.
On January 9, 2008, Bullock’s mother, Myrna Bullock, filed a complaint against Ritter, alleging that the school had violated the ICRL. The complaint alleged that Ritter had cut Bullock from the varsity basketball team because of her race. The school maintained that she was not chosen for the team due to concerns over her level of improvement and commitment to the basketball program.
On October 21, 2009, the ICRC determined that there was not probable cause to believe that an unlawful discriminatory practice occurred. The girl’s mother appealed. On May 12, 2011, the ICRC reversed the finding of no probable cause. At this point, Bullock, who was now of legal age to bring the complaint on her own behalf, was substituted as the complainant.
On May 23, 2012, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge. At the hearing, Bullock’s parents testified that Clark provided them with the following reasons for cutting Bullock: “1) he was concerned about her commitment to the team due to the fact that she had consistently failed to attend summer basketball conditioning; 2) younger players were playing at or above Bullock’s level; 3) he was choosing players who would help to develop the team for the future; and 4) Bullock had not played at her usual level at summer camp or at tryouts.”
The judge concluded that the school had violated the ICRL by cutting Bullock from the girls’ basketball team because of her race, and ordered it to pay Bullock $75,000.
The school appealed.
Upon review, the appeals court found that the ICRL did apply, even though the school was owned by a religious institution. It also found that the school was not shielded by Constitutional protections. Down 0-2 in the count, the school connected with its argument that there were “serious procedural inadequacies that present themselves in this case.
“First, it is evident from the record that the ICRC took an inordinate amount of time to perform its statutory duties. Bullock was denied admission to the girls’ basketball team in the fall of 2007.” It took until May 2012, the same year that Bullock’s high school class graduated from college, before the matter was heard by an administrative law judge. “We find that such a delay cannot be considered appropriate.
“Second, the procedure utilized by the ICRC was deficient. Courts that review administrative decisions are prohibited from reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses and must accept the facts as found by the administrative body. Natural Res. Comm’n v. Sugar Creek Mobile Estates, 646 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). This prohibition arises from the fact that the administrative agency, through its duly appointed administrative law judge, is the party who heard directly the witnesses’ testimony, observed their demeanor, and determined their credibility.
“Here, the administrative law judge who heard the witnesses’ testimony retired six months after the hearing in this matter and did not enter proposed findings. Then, a different administrative law judge, who did not hear the parties’ testimony, did not observe their demeanor, and did not make any credibility determinations based on what she heard or observed, entered the Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order. Therefore, in entering the proposed findings, the administrative law judge was weighing evidence that she did not hear and determining the credibility of witnesses that she did not see.”
The court continued: “When, as here, a case hinges entirely on credibility, the issuance of an order by an administrative law judge who did not hear the evidence or observe the witnesses is not in accordance with law, is contrary to the Constitutional rights of the parties, and is without observance of procedures required by law. Therefore, we vacate the order of the ICRC and remand with instructions to conduct a new hearing and issue a timely ruling.”
Cardinal Ritter High School, INC. v. Aleesha Bullock; Ct. App. Ind.; No. 93A02-1401-EX-47, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 439; 9/5/14
Attorneys of Record: (for appellant) John S. (Jay) Mercer, Mercer Belanger, Indianapolis, Indiana. (for appellee) Frederick S. Bremer, ICRC Staff Counsel, Civil Rights Commission, Indianapolis, Indiana.
