A federal judge from the Eastern District of Missouri has granted NFL player Reggie Bush’s motion to remand his lawsuit back to state court in a case in which he sued the St. Louis Rams and others over an injury he suffered on the sideline after a play had ended.
In so ruling, the court found that “the duties at issue here arise out of the common law duty of care sports teams owe to their invitees, and not out of any particular terms in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),” which would have triggered review by the federal court.
The impetus for the litigation was an incident that occurred on November 1, 2015 when Bush, a running back for the San Francisco 49ers, was playing in a game against the St. Louis Rams at the Edward Jones Dome in St. Louis, MO. While trying to slow down out-of-bounds after a play had concluded in the first quarter, Bush slipped on a concrete surface surrounding the turf playing field at the Dome. He allegedly suffered an injury to his left knee, which ended his football season.
In early 2016, Bush sued the St. Louis Regional Convention and Sports Complex Authority, the St. Louis Convention & Visitors Commission, and the Rams in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis. In the instant complaint, he filed claims against the Rams for premises liability (Count III) and negligence (Count IV). Bush sought damages “in the form of lost wages, medical expenses, loss of future earnings, and pain and suffering,” together with punitive damages for the Rams’ “complete indifference to or conscious disregard” for his safety and that of others.
The Rams removed the suit to federal court on February 24, 2016, claiming that Bush and the Rams are both bound by CBA governing the terms and conditions of employment in the NFL. As such, the Rams maintain federal question jurisdiction exists in this case because the plaintiff’s state-law tort claims are completely preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Bush then filed a motion to remand on March 24, 2016, asserting his claims should be remanded to Missouri state court because they are not preempted by the LMRA.
The court noted in its analysis that Section 301 of the LMRA comes into play when there is a lawsuit “for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), or, in other words, suits for breaches of CBAs.” Williams v. National Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 2009).
Further, “Section 301 completely preempts state law claims that are ‘substantially dependent upon analysis’ of a CBA, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), because ‘the application of state law…might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state law principles as there are States.’” Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, 21 F.Supp.3d 1020, 1025 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988); Williams, 582 F.3d at 874). “However, the [Supreme] Court has established that section 301 does not preempt state law claims merely because the parties involved are subject to a CBA and the events underlying the claim occurred on the job.” Williams, 582 F.3d at 874.
“In applying the section 301 preemption doctrine, the Court begins with the ‘claim itself,’ Trustees of the Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 331 (8th Cir. 2006), and applies a two-step approach in order to determine if the claim is sufficiently ‘independent’ to survive complete preemption. Williams, 582 F.3d at 874.
“First, a state law claim is preempted if it is based on a provision of the CBA, meaning that the CBA provision is at issue and it actually sets forth the right upon which the claim is based. Second, § 301 complete preemption applies where a state law claim is dependent upon an analysis of the relevant CBA, meaning that the resolution of the plaintiff’s state law claim requires interpretation of a provision of the CBA. The Eighth Circuit in Williams reiterated that 301 preemption only applies to claims that require interpretation or construction of the CBA as opposed to those which only require reference to it or where the CBA need only be consulted during its adjudication. Green, 21 F.Supp.3d at 1025-26.”
The section 301 preemption analysis starts with the negligence claim.
“Under Missouri law, a negligence claim requires the plaintiff to prove that the Rams had a duty to protect him from injury, the Rams failed to perform that duty, and the Rams’ failure proximately caused injury to Plaintiff. Green, 21 F.Supp.3d at 1027 (citing L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247, 257 (Mo. banc 2002)). Bush’s negligence claims are premised on the common law duty of care that sports teams owe to their invitees. According to Bush, this duty required the Rams “to remove or warn of dangerous conditions in the Dome and to maintain the Dome, including the playing surface and surrounding areas, in a reasonably safe condition.”
The Rams argued that “an analysis of the CBA and its incorporated documents is necessary to determine the scope of the above duty.” Specifically, the Rams asserted the following articles of the CBA require interpretation in order to resolve the plaintiff’s claims:
Article 39: Players’ Rights to Medical Care and Treatment
Article 41: Workers’ Compensation
Article 44: Injury Grievance
Article 50: Committees
The Rams also claimed the following section of the NFL Player Contract requires interpretation in order to resolve the plaintiff’s claims:
“9. INJURY. Unless this contract specifically provides otherwise, if Player is injured in the performance of his services under this contract and promptly reports such injury to the Club physician or trainer, then Player will receive such medical and hospital care during the term of this contract as the Club physician may deem necessary, and will continue to receive his yearly salary for so long, during the season of injury only and for no subsequent period covered by this contract, as Player is physically unable to perform the services required of him by this contract because of such injury. If Player’s injury in the performance of his services under this contract results in his death, the unpaid balance of his yearly salary for the season of injury will be paid to his stated beneficiary, or in the absence of a stated beneficiary, to his estate.”
The Rams argued that Bush’s claims against them, particularly for “lost wages, medical expenses, and loss of future earnings” require interpretation, “both in determining the Rams’ relative duty to monitor and warn (the plaintiff) about the ‘playing surface’ and ‘stadium facility,’ and its obligation, if any, to provide (the plaintiff) with medical care and compensation as a result of the injury he sustained while a member of the opposing team.”
Upon consideration, the court found “an interpretation of the above provisions is not essential to the plaintiff’s case.” As an example, it cited a flaw in the plaintiff’s argument with respect to Article 39. The court found “that neither the cost of medical services rendered by club physicians (to be paid for by the club, i.e., the 49ers), nor the provision of preventive, medical, surgical, or rehabilitative care for players by clubs is at issue in the plaintiff’s suit. In other words, the plaintiff does not claim he failed to receive contractually mandated care; instead, he claims he was not warned of a dangerous condition existing at the stadium.”
The judge went on to note that “the strongest argument put forth by the Rams involves Article 50, Section 1. … (T)hat provision requires the establishment of a Joint Committee for the purpose of discussing, among other things, the player safety and welfare aspects of playing equipment, playing surfaces, and stadium facilities. The Joint Committee does not have the power to commit or bind any of the signatories to the CBA, however, nor does the CBA establish a contractually agreed upon standard of care applicable to the plaintiff’s claims. Upon consideration the court agrees with Judge Perry’s analysis of the provision set forth in Green, as follows:
‘Mere reference to part of a CBA is insufficient for preemption; the relevant inquiry is whether the resolution of the claim depends upon the meaning of the CBA. Williams, 582 F.3d at 876. The [Rams do] not show how the interpretation of (this section) is essential to plaintiff’s case.’ Green, 21 F.Supp.3d at 1028.
“Thus, the court agrees with the plaintiff that the duties at issue here arise out of the common law duty of care sports teams owe to their invitees, and not out of any particular terms in the CBA. A substantial dependence upon an analysis of the CBA thus cannot serve as a basis for removal.”
Reginald Bush v. St. Louis Regional Convention and Sports Complex Authority; St. Louis Convention & Visitors Commission; and The St. Louis Rams, LLC; E.D. Mo.; Case No. 4:16CV250 JCH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72518; 6/3/16
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Jeremiah T. Reynolds, Nicholas Cooper Soltman, Shawn Holley, LEAD ATTORNEYS, KINSELLA AND WEITZMAN, LLP, Santa Monica, CA; John G. Simon, LEAD ATTORNEY, THE SIMON LAW FIRM, P.C., St. Louis, MO; Kevin M. Carnie, Timothy M. Cronin, LEAD ATTORNEYS, SIMON LAW FIRM, PC, St. Louis, MO. (for defendants) Dean A. Stark, Debbie S. Champion, LEAD ATTORNEYS, RYNEARSON AND SUESS, L.L.C., St. Louis, MO. Daniel N. Allmayer, Lloyd William Raber, LEAD ATTORNEYS, SWANSON AND MIDGLEY, Kansas City, MO; Daniel L Nash, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, AKIN AND GUMP, Washington, DC; Marla S. Axelrod, LEAD ATTORNEY, Stacey Recht Eisenstein, AKIN AND GUMP, Washington, DC.
