The Iowa Supreme Court has held that University of Iowa (UI) President Sally Mason was well within her rights to fire the school’s longtime dean of students after he reportedly mishandled a high-profile 2007 sexual assault case involving football players.
In so ruling, the high court rejected claims by Dean Phillip Jones that he was wrongly terminated and defamed by Mason as well as a law firm, the Stolar Partnership, that criticized his response to the assault.
Jones, who had been dean of students since 1981, oversaw a comprehensive array of UI student services, including residence life, the Iowa Memorial Union, disciplinary processes, student government, and numerous other departments and functions of the university. He was the administrator of the Code of Student Life and related policies and regulations governing students. Mason terminated Jones’s employment after reviewing a report prepared by Stolar, which was critical of Jones’s handling of an alleged October 2007 sexual assault of a female student-athlete perpetrated on her by two members of the UI football team. The assault occurred at a UI dormitory in the early morning hours of October 14, 2007.
On the morning of October 15, Fred Mims, associate athletic director for student services, advised Jones’s office by telephone of the alleged sexual assault. Mims had been contacted by the head coaches of both the victim and the perpetrators, and had discussed the incident with Gary Barta, the university’s athletic director.
“Jones did not take any action as a result of this information,” wrote the court. “During the next several days, the department of athletics (DOA) commenced an informal investigation into the incident. DOA met with the victim and her father, the alleged perpetrators, and otherwise attempted to handle the incident on an informal basis. This was purportedly pursuant to the direction of the victim and her father. This informal investigation also involved many additional members of the university community.”
Jones discussed the incident with Mims on October 18 and 19. By that time, the football players had been suspended from the football team. In their discussions, Jones expressed concern about “double jeopardy” in further action involving the football players. Mims explained that the alleged perpetrators had been suspended for team rule infractions for withholding information from the team coach, not due to the allegations of sexual assault, which were governed by the Code of Student Life. “It was determined the alleged perpetrators should be informed of the possibility of further action in writing,” noted the court.
On October 19, Mims again contacted Jones to discuss the incident and how Jones’s office planned to proceed. Jones expressed concern about the handling of the investigation and stated that the incident should be reported to the Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity (EOD)—the university’s administrative department designated to investigate complaints of sexual assault.
On October 23, the DOA decided that all notes and investigative interviews gathered as part of its informal investigation should be finalized and a report turned over to the office of EOD, the office of student affairs, and the general counsel. Jones received his copy of the report late that morning or early afternoon. Jones scanned through the documents, but because it did not contain a formal, signed complaint, he elected to place the report in a general disciplinary file. Jones did not call EOD, contact Mims, contact the victim, or take any other action at that time.
The court went on to outline other actions taken by Jones, which might suggest that he was either dragging his feet or disinterested. In a discussion with the mother, on November 13, he allegedly told her that he “had nothing” on the incident, and that he did not know who she (the mother) was.
Ultimately, this led the Board of Regents to enlist Stolar to investigate the university’s response to the matter. The law firm was critical of Jones’ aforementioned comments to the mother as well as his failure to “exercise his interim sanction power to remove” the accused perpetrators who shared the same dormitory as the victim.
Among the other findings:
“Jones’ misstatements and poor communications were largely responsible for the student-athlete’s mother’s perception that the department of athletics was attempting to cover up her daughter’s allegations.
“The office of the vice president for student services and dean of students failed in its responsibilities to the student-athlete and to the university in this case. Phillip Jones had the authority to intervene at numerous points in the process and to achieve the results necessary to protect the student-athlete. As early as the day after the alleged assault, Jones knew of the incident and had authority and resources to separate the alleged perpetrators from the student-athlete.”
On September 23, Mason sent Jones a letter terminating his employment with the university due to a “loss of confidence and trust in him based upon his failure to perform the duties and responsibilities of his position on behalf of the University of Iowa in response to the October 2007 sexual assault.” Mason also elaborated on Jones’ failures in the media.
During the summer of 2009, Jones sued the university, the regents, Mason as president of the university and individually (collectively state defendants), and Stolar, alleging false light invasion of privacy, defamation, wrongful termination, intentional interference with an employment contract, intentional interference with prospective business advantages, due process violations, and civil rights violations.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, a motion that was granted. Jones appealed.
The high court first affirmed that the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA) was applicable in that it shields the institutional state defendants from tort liability. The state is immune from suit for false light invasion of privacy and defamation under the Act.
Next, it looked at the defamation and false light claims against Mason, and whether “the conduct at issue is deemed to have been outside the scope of her employment,” which would have allowed the claim to continue.
“Jones essentially argues Mason improperly blamed him for the mishandling of the sexual assault investigation in order to protect herself and preserve her position with the University,” wrote the court.
“As discussed below, it is undisputed in this record that Jones was terminated due to Mason’s loss of confidence in his professional abilities based on his handling of the sexual assault incident. A termination on this basis was well within the scope of Mason’s employment. … Therefore, Mason enjoys the same sovereign immunity as the institutional state defendants. See Iowa Code § 669.5(2)(a).”
The court went on to side with the defendants with regard to the lower court’s decisions on the remaining claims brought by Jones.
Phillip E. Jones v. University of Iowa et al.; S.Ct. Iowa; No. 12-0292, 2013 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 96; 8/23/13
Attorneys of Record: (for appellant) David J. Dutton, Cheryl L. Weber, and Erin Patrick Lyons of Dutton, Braun, Staack & Hellman, P.L.C., Waterloo, Iowa. (for appellees University of Iowa, The Board of Regents for the State of Iowa, and Sally Mason) Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jeffrey C. Peterzalek and Jordan G. Esbrook, Assistant Attorneys General. (for appellee Stolar Partnership, LLP) Gregory M. Lederer and Megan R. Dimitt of Lederer Weston Craig PLC, Cedar Rapids.
