In a split decision, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has reversed a lower court’s decision, which only partially granted summary judgment to a school district in a wrongful death case. Instead, the high court found that the circuit court should have granted absolute summary judgment to the district.
Lonnie C. Magee, Jr. was a 17-year-old student athlete on the Mount Olive Attendance Center football team. While practicing with the football team on Aug. 8, 2007,
Lonnie collapsed. Emergency medical personnel arrived to find Lonnie unresponsive. CPR and all other lifesaving efforts ultimately failed, and Lonnie was pronounced dead at a near-by hospital in Collins, Miss. Heat stroke was determined to be the cause of death.
On Feb. 25, 2008, Lutricia Magee, individually and on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Covington County, asserting claims of negligence and res ipsa loquitur.
The Covington County School District subsequently filed an answer, and then moved for summary judgment on May 14, 2008. The court granted the defendant’s motion as it related to the plaintiff’s claim of Res Ipsa Loquitur, but denied the remainder.
The ruling was appealed.
The central issue according to the Supreme Court was whether the district had a statutory duty to provide a safe environment for its students and to minimize risks to its students and whether it executed on that promise. The high court also considered the applicability of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) as a shield for the district.
Taking the latter first, the court restated the district’s argument, based on both Prince v. Louisville Municipal School District, 741 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1999), and Harris v. McCray, 867 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 2003), that its conduct was discretionary, and summary judgment should have been granted pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d). In Prince and Harris, this court deemed the coaching responsibilities of coordinating and supervising practice to be discretionary acts. The Harris court wrote that “we must balance the serious negative repercussions which could result for all extra-curricular school activities if the discretionary decisions of coaches are not exempt from liability … with the need for providing a well-rounded education.”
Reviewing in the instant case, the court noted that it “must realize the consequences of our decision today were we to find Coach McCray and the school district liable on the facts of this case. High school football coaches around the state would lose their ability to control their football teams. Discipline of a football team would become non-existent. If a coach refused a player’s request to have a water break — to see a trainer — to not have to run any more wind-sprints — to not have to do any more one-on-one blocking/tackling drills, because of that player’s complaint of ‘feeling weak’ or ‘not feeling good’ or simply ‘not feeling like it,’ that coach would be very much aware of the fact that he or she would be running the risk of being successfully sued along with other school officials and the school district, should that player later suffer physical or medical problems related to the coach’s failure to cow to the player’s every whim and wish. On the other hand, if the coach, in fear of a successful lawsuit, should cow to the player’s every whim, wish and demand, then the coach would lose the respect of the players, and discipline and morale would be lost.
“The district’s discretionary decision to allow coaches the ability to set and conduct practices is rooted in policy — coaches know their players and must be able to control their teams.
“Although this court is once again faced with a devastating and tragic situation because of the untimely death of a high-school student, we are constrained to find that the applicable provisions of the MTCA ‘operated to shield the district and its coaches and employees from any liability.’ Harris, 867 So. 2d at 193. The exemption from liability found in Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d) is applicable to today’s case. As a result, the trial court’s denial, in part, of the district’s motion for summary judgment must be reversed.”
In a dissenting opinion, two justices agreed that “coordinating and supervising high school football practice are discretionary acts within the meaning of Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d). Prince v. Louisville Mun. Sch. Dist., 741 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1999); Harris v. McCray, 867 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 2003).”
However, they disagreed with “the majority opinion’s conclusion that the discretionary acts at issue in the present case were grounded in social, economic, or political policy, which would have to have been the case in order for statutory immunity to apply.”
Covington County School District v. Lutricia Magee et al.; S.Ct. Miss.; NO. 2008-IA-01207-SCT, 2010 Miss. LEXIS 45, 1/28/10
Attorneys of Record: (for appellant) William Buckley Stewart, Sr., Robert P. Thompson. (for appellee) Gerald Patrick Collier.
