By Michael A. Ross, MS
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Stemming from and following the Court’s Opinion and Order granting summary judgement in favor of the Defendants (The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball and Major League Baseball Inc.) on March 31, 2021, the Plaintiff (Angel Hernandez) filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the decision pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
While addressing the claims set forth by the Plaintiff, the Court assumed familiarity with the factual background in this specific case as established in the previous opinion delivered. See Hernandez v. Office of Comm’r of Baseball, No 18 Civ. 9035, 2021 U.S. Dist. WL 1226499 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021). Or visit https://sportslitigationalert.com/mlb-umpire-sues-the-league-commissioner-for-racial-discrimination/
The decision rendered in March of 2021, granted the MLB’s motion for summary judgement and denied the partial summary judgement motion set forth by Hernandez as moot. In regard to the disparate claims set forth by Hernandez, the Court found that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there were genuine issues of material fact proving the MLB proffered reasons for not promoting the Plaintiff to crew chief based on the foundation and reasoning of discrimination. More specifically addressing the disparate impact claims established by the Plaintiff, the Court determined that a failure to demonstrate that disparity existed, that there was a casual connection between the process and disparity, and that there existed an alternative practice for choosing crew chiefs that would satisfy MLB’s business needs without inflicting discrimination as required by the case law.
As a result of the original findings and Orders issued forth by the Court, Hernandez moved to alter, amend, or vacate the Court’s Opinion and Order through the lens on Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is noted that Rule 59 may be granted only if the movant satisfies the heavy burden of demonstrating an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Additionally noted is the understanding and perspective stating that Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple. Applying Rule 59 must be narrowly construed and strictly applied as to not serve as an avenue for a substitute for appealing a final judgement and as a means to provide a second attempt for those who do not satisfy original claims or receive the favorable verdict they wish to receive during the original Court decision. Because of the parameters and application of such a rule, Rule 59 is treated as an extraordinary remedy and is to be utilized sparingly.
CASE ANAYLSIS AND KEY FACTORS
The Plaintiff contends that the Court made clear errors in law in its analysis of Hernandez’s disparate claims, and that the Court improperly assumed the role of factfinder.
Addressing the suggested errors of law first, Hernandez contends that the Court failed to follow key precedents in regard to the inexorable zero. In addition to this claim, Hernandez also contends that the Court incorrectly relied on MLB’s statistical analysis because the sample size was too small. Within these claims, Hernandez solely references precedential cases that were previously cited in the original ruling when addressing such matters as they were considered and weighed upon before the original ruling was delivered. It is noted that the Court adequately discussed in-depth Hernandez’s argument about the inexorable zero resulting in the determination that it was less compelling in the present context, where both the pool of umpires and the number of available promotions were small. The Court does reference the small applicant pool, small number of minority umpires, and the small number of promotion opportunities renders the fact that very few minorities were promoted is statistically meaningless because of the parameters being evaluated. Although consideration of the points provided by Hernandez were given, the Court finds that “merely repeating the arguments (Hernandez) previously made and that the Court already considered and rejected, is not sufficient to meet the high standard for a Rule 59(e) motion.”
The second implication within Hernandez’s claim insists the Court did not fully consider the legal impact of whether the small sample size of umpires and crew chiefs was a direct result of MLB’s own discriminatory conduct. Extending upon this argument, Hernandez furthers that the Court’s decision would incentivize employers to keep relevant employee pools and the number of minority employees small enough to avoid liability for disparate impact discrimination, which is contrary to the Second Circuit law and policy. In response to these claims, the Court finds that neither of these arguments suggest a “change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice” as is required. As a result of the Court’s determination toward these claims, it is decided these are essentially policy arguments that are inappropriate to consider in a Rule 59(e) motion.
The third argument provided by Hernandez states that the precedential cases used to determine the Court’s granting of summary judgement previously do not fully support their ruling. Hernandez’s relies on two court cases that were a part of the original ruling thus introducing no new evidence or new valid perspective that should be considered. The Court, as a result, determines there is no law that can be deemed to have been overlooked resulting in the agreement that Hernandez simply disagrees with the interpretation and application of the caselaw established in the previous ruling delivered.
The remainder of the arguments set forth by Hernandez through the lens of errors or law were already addressed previously during the original case and presented no counter argument needing further consideration and evaluation to justify the application of Rule 59(e). Based on the aforementioned criteria and consideration, the Court concluded that it did not overlook a controlling issue of law or did it make a clear error of law.
In regard to the role of the factfinder issue, Hernandez contends that throughout the original case resulting in the Opinion and Order in question, the Court improperly assumed the role of factfinder. By definition, the factfinder is someone or an entity that is an impartial party or examiner that is designated to appraise the facts underlying a particular matter of a case. Hernandez states that the Court improperly made credibility determinations and weighed evidence, primarily pointing out instances in which the Court referenced in its decision that some ambiguity was present as to how the MLB develops evaluations and the criteria it utilizes to determine crew chief promotions. This claim was determined invalid as the Court was found to have applied the correct legal standard applicable to summary judgement motions. The ambiguous nature mentioned in the decision was also addressed as an outcome due to the nature of the criteria in question, and not due to any genuine disputes of material fact.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above evaluation, application, and justification, Hernandez’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate the Court’s original Opinion and Order was denied. The pursuit to utilize Rule 59(e) serves as an example of the checks and balances found within the legal system for those who believe a rendered verdict delivered unjustly can be reconsidered and given further evaluation. In this case, the Plaintiff failed to meet the parameters set forth to ensure that utilizing and effectively applying the purpose of Rule 59(e) is not taken advantage of simply on the grounds that one party is not happy with the outcome of a given case. As mentioned in this case, successfully applying Rule 59 is strictly enforced and considered because of the potentially negative long-term effects that could result from precedential framework deriving from inappropriate use of such legislation.
References
Hernandez v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 18-CV-9035 JPO, 2022 U.S. Dist. WL 179770
Michael A. Ross is the Department Chair and an Assistant Professor of Sport Management at Shorter University and a PhD student at Troy University specializing in research related to youth sport studies, leadership, sport law, social media policies and procedures within athletics, and participation motivations in sport and recreation.
