A federal judge has ruled that a female golfer, who claimed she suffered gender discrimination when she was not allowed to participate in a men’s golf tournament at a municipal golf course, can continue with part of her lawsuit.
Elaine Joyce sued the city, the golf course and several individual defendants, pursuant to 1) Massachusetts anti-discrimination statutes, M.G.L. c 272, §§ 92A, 98 and M.G.L. c. 151B, § 5, 2) the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 and 3) the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, M.G.L. c. 93A.
Dennis Pines and Dennis Highlands are municipal golf courses, meaning they are open to the public and anyone can become a member for a fee. Membership includes privileges, such as the ability to participate in various tournaments. In 2007, the available tournaments included two women’s events for two days of tournaments and five men’s events for ten days of tournaments as well as mixed-gender events.
Elaine Joyce is an avid golfer. She was a member of the municipality’s golf courses. The pending dispute arises out of the defendants’ refusal to allow Joyce to play in a men’s members-only tournament at Dennis Pines on May 5 and 6, 2007.
Part of the defendants’ rationale for the decision was that they did not want to change the rules at such a late date, since it would be unfair to other members who may or may not desire to play in a tournament under the revised rules.
Ultimately, the defendants did agree that, while no changes would be made for the current tournament, changes would be made in the future, providing all tournaments include a men’s and a women’s field. In addition, it made another change, formally allowing women to play in men’s tournaments, as the plaintiff had originally requested.
While the plaintiff, in light of the changes, ultimately withdrew her Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination claim, other elements of her complaint persisted.
The court first analyzed the claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause, which can be shown “only when the plaintiff can demonstrate that a disparate impact and discriminatory intent nonetheless lie behind the facially-neutral law. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-74, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870 (1979).”
On this point, the court agreed with the plaintiff that “the tournament schedule and Joyce’s subsequent preclusion from the men’s event categorized participants by sex on its face.” Furthermore, construing the defendants’ argument more liberally does not help them. Specifically, the proposition that an Equal Protection claim requires proof of differential treatment or some disadvantage is a non-starter because here men and women were openly and officially treated differently. Women could not play in the May 2007 tournament and, overall, women were afforded fewer tournament opportunities (two days versus ten).”
The court, therefore, turned to whether “the proffered justification is ‘exceedingly persuasive.’ The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the defendants,” who “must show at least that the challenged classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996).”
Examining whether the municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain constitutional violations, the court wrote that it was “responsible for denying Joyce entry into the May 2007 men’s tournament due to a longstanding policy and practice to hold such events and individuals with the requisite authority carried out that policy with respect to the tournament in question. In fact, the defendants admit various factual allegations that refer to a ‘policy’ and ‘historical practice’ of limiting certain events by gender. The Town defendants are, therefore, liable for certain federal law violations.”
Next, the court turned to the individual defendants, and their argument that acting within their official capacities entitles them to qualified immunity. The court agreed, granting summary judgment to the individual defendants.
“Men and women are often constitutionally separated in sports. And believing that they were offering equally-desirable opportunities to each gender, the defendants reasonably believed that they were acting lawfully. When a complaint was filed, they chose not to disrupt their practice by changing the rules two days before the tournament. Instead, they promised to reassess their policy and, thereafter, changed it. Finally, it bears emphasizing that the holding in this case results from the defendants’ failure to advance a persuasive justification for their acts, not necessarily because no such justification exists.”
If the defendants left their putt short in defending their conduct, so, too, apparently, did the plaintiffs fail to exploit their opportunity with their state court claims. After finding for the defendant on those claims, the court noted that the plaintiff had “an alternative method of obtaining relief.” Riseman v. Orion Research Inc., 394 Mass. 311, 475 N.E.2d 398, 400 (Mass. 1985).
“The fact that Massachusetts has a statute to cover precisely the conduct alleged here (i.e., a distinction or discrimination in a place of public accommodation) weighs against expanding the reach of Chapter 93A to accomplish an identical task. As just stated, its applicability to this dispute is tenuous at best. Thus, although the same conduct obviously can give rise to liability under more than one law, the existence and aptness of M.G.L. c. 272, § 98 strongly mitigates against imposing liability under Chapter 93A.”
Elaine Joyce v. Town of Dennis et al.; D. Md.; Civil Action No. 08-10277-NMG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31294; 3/30/10
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Laura R. Studen, Lawrence P Murray, Burns & Levinson, Boston, MA. (for defendant) Leonard H. Kesten, LEAD ATTORNEY, Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, Boston, MA; Kristin Tyler Harris, Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, LLP, Boston, MA.
