A California state appeals court has affirmed a court’s award of attorney fees to a parent, who sued so that his daughter could participate on a varsity soccer team.
In finding for the parent, the appeals court found that the trial judge made the requisite finding that the defendant school district acted “capriciously” when it prevented the man’s daughter, who had transferred from a private school, from participating on the soccer team at the public high school in the school district.
By way of background, Jessica Zuehlsdorf attended Los Angeles Baptist High School, a private school, where she played varsity basketball. After her freshman year, she transferred to Royal High School, a public school. Pursuant to the California Interscholastic Federation (CIF), Jessica could not play varsity basketball at Royal because she had participated in that sport at the private school. She was, however, permitted to play any other varsity level sport at Royal, including varsity soccer.
As required by the CIF rules, Jessica completed a transfer eligibility form, which was signed by the principal of the private school, Royal’s principal (Robert LaBelle) and approved by the southern section CIF director. Jessica tried out for varsity soccer and made the team. Before her first game, however, Jessica’s coach, at the direction of Principal LaBelle, told her she could not participate.
Jessica’s father filed a petition for writ of mandate on Jessica’s behalf, seeking a temporary restraining order enjoining appellants from preventing her from playing varsity soccer at Royal. The appellants filed opposition, arguing that Royal is governed by the Marmonte League, which has its own constitution. It is composed of four school districts and eight high schools, represented by the school principals.
The appellants acknowledged that Jessica was eligible to play varsity soccer under CIF rules, but claimed that the CIF permits them to enact more stringent regulations concerning eligibility. The courts disagreed, granting the TRO and preliminary injunction that “enjoined appellants from obstructing or interfering with Jessica’s participation in the varsity soccer program.” It further found that “it is illogical and capricious for (appellants) to point to the CIF regulations and argue that (Jessica) be excluded from Marmonte League competition when the CIF has expressly approved (Jessica’s) compliance with all CIF rules.”
In November 2004, the plaintiff moved to set the matter for trial, seeking a permanent injunction and to recover attorney fees. The court granted respondent’s motion for attorney fees and costs. In its minute order, the court stated that Judge Kellegrew’s ruling on the OSC “clearly finds that the District’s decision to exclude (Jessica) was arbitrary and capricious. … [Respondent] is entitled to the fees and costs that were incurred to overcome the District’s decision.”
The defendants appealed, arguing that “there was no factual finding that appellants acted arbitrarily and capriciously as required by section 800 and (the plaintiffs) were not ‘ultimately the prevailing party.’”
On the first point, the appeals court wrote that “Judge Kellegrew issued a detailed written decision concluding that the Marmonte League’s exclusion of Jessica, based on their own rule whose terms they could not define, was “illogical and capricious.” He noted that, if the rule was interpreted as the Marmonte League suggested, a student would never know if he or she was qualified to participate. Contrary to appellants’ argument, the court made a very clear factual finding that their conduct was capricious. There was no abuse of discretion.”
On the second, the appeals court noted that the judge “heard the testimony of witnesses, considered documentary evidence and issued a decision in which he cited to Judge Kellegrew’s findings that appellants acted capriciously in preventing Jessica’s participation on the team. Although Judge Hintz denied the permanent injunction as moot, this did not deprive respondent of prevailing party status entitling him to fees. He was successful in his attempt to have Jessica reinstated in the program while appellants failed in their efforts to prevent her participation. Moreover, the award of fees achieved the legislative purpose underlying the statute: to prohibit the arbitrary or capricious actions of a public entity. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that respondent was a prevailing party, thus he is entitled to attorney fees under section 800.
Jessica Zuehlsdorf, a Minor, etc., et al., v. Simi Valley Unified School District et al.; Ct. App. Calif., 2d App. Dist., Div. 6, 2007 Cal. App. LEXIS 288; 3/1/07
Attorneys of Record: (for defendants) Thurbon & McHaney, Robert E. Thurbon and Erin E. Mackey; (for plaintiff) Rehwald Glasner & Chaleeff and William Rehwald.
