Dolphins Join the Battle against Workers’ Compensation Benefits

Apr 8, 2011

By Nicole Bryson, JD
 
A long-standing issue in the National Football League (NFL) concerns the right of injured players to claim workers’ compensation benefits in states where they played games instead of where the team is based.
Kendall Newson, a former receiver for the Miami Dolphins, suffered a career-ending knee injury in 2005 during a preseason game at Heinz Field in Pennsylvania and sought injury benefits under Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation statutes.
In an effort to keep the case within its own state’s jurisdiction, the Miami Dolphins (Dolphins) filed a lawsuit against Newson in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, asking U.S. Judge Magistrate Lisa Pupo Lenihan to dismiss Newson’s workers’ compensation claim, because it should be decided by the arbitration panel under Florida law and not a Pennsylvania workers’ compensation judge.
 
Under Florida law, professional sports clubs are not required to provide workers’ compensation benefits for players. However, the NFL Management Council (NFLMC), on behalf of the Dolphins, and the NFL Players Association (NFLPA), on behalf of players, agreed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and Implementation Agreement that the Dolphins would provide “equivalent benefits” to its players under Florida law through an independent arbitration panel. In return, the Dolphins receive immunity from tort suits.
For Newson, prevailing under Pennsylvania law would mean a difference of almost $4 thousand per year plus medical benefits that his attorneys claim are better than those available in Florida. While Newson’s benefits may not seem like much, increased benefits for hundreds of players over time add up significantly for Dolphins’ management.
 
While commencing this litigation in Pennsylvania, the Dolphins are simultaneously pursuing similar claims in approximately 100 consolidated cases in California, seeking a declaratory judgment that:
 
1. The Implementation Agreement requires all current and former Dolphins players to file claims for injuries sustained while employed by the Dolphins exclusively with the implementation panel and/or exclusively under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act.
 
2. The choice of law provision in player contracts requires them to file claims for injuries sustained while employed with the Dolphins exclusively before the Implementation Panel and/or exclusively under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act.
 
The Dolphins have argued on two different grounds that the Implementation Agreement requires all current and former Dolphin players to file for workers’ compensation benefits exclusively with the implementation panel and/or under Florida law.
 
First, by creating a contractual right to equivalent benefits for Dolphins players under Florida’s workers’ compensation laws, the Implementation Agreement precludes Dolphins players from filing workers’ compensation benefits outside of Florida’s private arbitration panel.
 
The NFLPA, however, argues in opposition that there is no textual basis for the Dolphins assertion. There is no mandatory or compulsory language in the CBA or Implementation Agreement that indicates “equivalent benefits” as the exclusive remedy for Dolphin players. The fact that arbitration panel is the more desirable method of determining entitlement to benefits, does not necessarily mean players may only file claims in Florida with the arbitration panel.
 
Moreover, by its own language, the Implementation Agreement only applies to local processing of workers’ compensation claims and is merely the mechanism by which equivalent benefits are determined under Florida law. No provision in the Implementation Agreement speaks to claims filed under other state’s laws. Thus, it should not be construed to prohibit injured players from filing in states other than Florida where they may have statutory rights to workers’ compensation benefits. Because Newson’s claim for workers’ compensation against the Dolphins is not related to his contractual right to equivalent benefits, but to his statutory right to file in Pennsylvania, the Implementation Agreement has no bearing on his claim.
 
Second, the Dolphins argue that the Implementation Agreement waives the right of individual players to pursue workers’ compensation claims outside of Florida and requires them to submit to the independent arbitration panel.
However, the NFLMC and NFLPA have no authority to waive rights of players to pursue workers’ compensation in other states or otherwise undercut any state’s jurisdiction.
 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that under federal labor law, unions and management cannot waive the unwaivable statutory rights of union members created under state employee benefits laws.
 
Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation statute [like California’s] specifically states that no employee/employer may waive its application. Thus, even assuming the Implementation Agreement waived the right of Newson and other Dolphin players to seek workers’ compensation benefits in Pennsylvania (which it does not) such an agreement would be void.
 
Still, the Dolphins contend that the CBA, which is a product of federal law, should preempt state workers’ compensation law. However, federal law allows state jurisdiction in this instance. The state has authority under its police powers to regulate employment and protect its workers.
 
Another challenge for the Dolphins, as discussed above, is that the Implementation Agreement only deals with local processing of workers’ compensation claims and determination of “equivalent benefits” under Florida law. Florida law excludes football players from workers’ compensation coverage. Therefore, no athlete covered by the Implementation Agreement has a right to file workers’ compensation in Florida but for the CBA. Since professional athletes have no statutory right to workers’ compensation in Florida, there is no right to be waived.
 
Even if construed as a valid waiver, it may not be clear and unmistakable because the language of the Implementation Agreement could reasonably be interpreted as applying only to claims for contractual equivalent benefits under Florida law rather than all claims for workers’ compensation against the Dolphins.
 
Perhaps the biggest problem for the Dolphins is that no arbitrator or court has ever endorsed its position. In fact, there is an Arena Football League (AFL) arbitration Tampa Bay Storm (Storm) v. Brache/Daniels (2009) directly supporting the NFLPA’s position on preclusion and waiver.
 
In the AFL case, two injured players sued the Storm, an AFL team, for workers’ compensation in California. The Arena Football League Player’s Association (AFLPA) and NFLPA are run by the same professionals and an identical Implementation Agreement was negotiated in both leagues. The Storm like the Dolphins claimed that the CBA, Implementation Agreement, and/or player contract barred the players from filing for workers’ compensation benefits in California state court. The Arbitrator, Clarke, relying on the same arguments and Supreme Court authority raised in Newson’s case, held that there was nothing in the CBA, Implementation Agreement, or player contract precluding or waiving the player’s right to file workers’ compensation benefits in state courts outside of Florida.
 
Even more interesting, in the more than 23 years since the establishment of the Implementation Agreement, the Dolphins never attempted to assert that it prevented players from filing workers’ compensation claims outside of Florida until now.
 
The NFLPA has produced records of at least 14 former Dolphin players who have filed workers’ compensation claims outside of Florida, specifically in California; thus, establishing a course of dealings over the past 20 years contrary to the position the Dolphins now take in this litigation and pending arbitration.
 
According to documents, when former Dolphins players filed in California, rather than argue that the Implementation Agreement precluded such claims, the Dolphins settled the cases and in some instances stipulated that the players could not file in Florida, but instead only in California.
 
For example, in Robert Brudzinski v. Miami Dolphins, the stipulation agreement included language that the applicant had no desire to pursue litigation in Florida; Eric Sievers v. Miami Dolphins: the order approving compromise and release provides, “Applicant further acknowledges he elects to prosecute his claims for workers’ compensation against the Dolphins in the State of California, and he will dismiss with prejudice all claims filed in the State of Florida, if any.” Jeffrey Buckey v. SF 49ers et al, addendum to compromise and release provides, “Applicant has been advised by competent counsel that he has the right to bring claims in multiple jurisdictions. By this compromise and release, he elects California as his sole location for jurisdiction of any and all workers’ compensation claims against these settling defendants.”
 
Alternatively, the Dolphins contend that the choice of law provision in the player contract precludes injured players from filing claims for benefits outside of Florida. The Cincinnati Bengals (Abdullah) and Tennessee Titans (Matthews) have used choice of law/forum selection clauses in player contracts to establish exclusive jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims under its state’s law. However, the difference is under Florida law, players have no right to workers’ compensation benefits. Because Florida law excludes professional athletes from workers’ compensation protection, including such a provision in the player contract, is nonsensical and should have no bearing on a player’s right to pursue a workers’ compensation claim under the laws of other states.
How the court will decide in the case of Miami Dolphins v. Kendall Newson remains a question, but there is no doubt that other NFL teams will be keeping a close eye on the court’s decision.
 
Bryson can be reached at nmbryson@dons.usfca.edu
 


 

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