A federal judge from the Middle District of Pennsylvania has granted a motion to dismiss filed by the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (PIAA) in a case in which it was sued by a parent who argued that a PIAA rule restricting her choice of which high school she could compete for violated the Constitution.
In so ruling, the court relied on “the settled law that there is no constitutionally protected right to play sports” and noted the importance of the PIAA rule in maintaining competitive balance.
The plaintiff in the case was Shonda Chapman, the parent and natural guardian of J.D.C., a minor. As of the beginning of the 2013-2014 school year, J.D.C. was a full-time home-schooled student who resides within the Susquehanna Township School District. In September 2013, J.D.C.’s parents additionally enrolled him in two classes at Covenant Christian Academy, a private school, for which they paid $500 tuition and a $75 activity fee. Although Covenant Christian agreed to allow J.D.C. to play on its sports teams, the PIAA ruled J.D.C. ineligible, pursuant to Article III of the PIAA bylaws (Attendance Rule), which states that a home-schooled student with less than full-time enrollment in a private school is ineligible to play at that private school. Rather, according to the PIAA, J.D.C. must play in the public school district in which he resides.
On January 31, 2014, the plaintiff sued in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff brought claims arising out of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution, alleging that the PIAA rule in question violated the Fourteenth Amendment. “Specifically, she alleges that it violates her fundamental right to direct the education of her son, in addition to her right to equal protection and free exercise,” wrote the court. “She further alleged that she has a protected liberty interest in the benefits of paying an activity fee to further her child’s education without arbitrary and irrational government interference. She also alleged that the actions of the PIAA were arbitrary and capricious in violation of state law, and that the PIAA did not correctly interpret its by-laws.”
Five days, the defendants (The PIAA and several board members) removed the action to federal court, and subsequently moved to dismiss the claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or failure to state a claim.
In its analysis, the court noted the defendants’ argument that “the Attendance Rule is facially neutral and does not burden Plaintiff’s right to free exercise. Therefore, according to the defendants, the court should apply rational basis review, and because the rule is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, it does not violate the United States Constitution.”
The court agreed, noting that “any burden the Rule places on the plaintiff’s religious exercise is minimal. Multiple courts have found that to the extent high school athletics eligibility requirements may burden religious freedom by ruling students ineligible for interscholastic sports at the private religious school of their choice, such a burden does not offend the Constitution. For example, in Walsh v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 616 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980), the plaintiffs challenged a rule which provided that upon completion of elementary or high school, a student was eligible to participate immediately only at a high school within his home district. If a student matriculated to a school outside of his district, he was deemed ineligible for one year. The plaintiffs wished to have their son play sports at a parochial school located outside of their home district, and challenged the rule. The court held that any burden placed by this rule was ‘de minimis:’
“The encroachment of the . . . rule on the free exercise of religion is both limited in scope and insignificant in magnitude. The transfer rule does not deny these parents or their children the right to actively practice the Lutheran faith. Similarly, it neither prohibits a parent from enrolling his child in Lutheran High School nor interferes with the ability of such a child to obtain the religious education provided by that school. Id. at 158. The court finds Walsh’s reasoning sound, and finds that application of the Attendance Rule does not place a constitutionally intolerable burden on Plaintiff’s free exercise. See also Robbins v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, 941 F. Supp. 786, 792 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
“Indeed, the United States District Court of Maine decided a virtually identical case to the one before this Court in Pelletier v. Maine Principals’ Association, 261 F.Supp. 2d 10 (D. Me. 2003). There, the plaintiffs challenged a requirement that home-schooled children must play sports in the public school district in which they reside. The plaintiffs, however, sought to have their children play at a private religious school. The court applied rational basis and found there was no burden on the free exercise of religion. Id. at 14-16. The court wrote:
“The Pelletiers can enroll their children at Seacoast or any other private school they choose. Or they can choose home schooling, as they have. They can choose not to participate in organized athletic programs at all, or to participate on an exhibition basis through private schools that will let them. Or, because the State has made the choice possible, they can have their home-schooled children participate in the full range of interscholastic athletic programs through their local public high school. With all these choices, Maine has not burdened the Pelletiers’ free exercise of religion. Id. at 16.”
The plaintiff also argued that the Attendance Rule infringes on a parent’s right to guide her child’s upbringing, education and religion, and the Attendance Rule must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
Of particular relevance here was Angstadt v. Midd-W. Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 2004), a case in which the court found that “the Attendance Rule does not unreasonably interfere with the plaintiff’s right to direct her child’s education.”
The plaintiff argued that Angstadt “is not controlling.” The court disagreed.
“What Plaintiff essentially argues is that the right to guide a child’s education also includes the right to be free from any state restrictions as to when and where her child may play interscholastic sports. However, no court has declared that such a right exists, and such a finding would be directly contrary both to the Third Circuit’s holding in Angstadt and to the settled law that there is no constitutionally protected right to play sports. See Angstadt, 377 F.3d at 344 n.2; Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1989) (‘Participation in extracurricular activities is not a fundamental right.’)”
Accordingly, the court dismissed the Constitutional claims against the defendants with prejudice.
Shonda Chapman v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association et al.; M.D. Pa.;
No. 1:14-cv-00192, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84299; 6/18/14
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) David Joseph Chapman, LEAD ATTORNEY, Schmidt Kramer PC, Harrisburg, PA. (for defendants) Alan R. Boynton, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, McNees, Wallace & Nurick, Harrisburg, PA; Geoffrey B. Fehling, LEAD ATTORNEY, McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC, Harrisburg, PA.
