A federal judge from the Eastern District of Michigan has denied a boxer’s motion to reconsider his decision dismissing the boxer’s claim that his former manager interfered with his boxing career.
The plaintiff, Jermaine Franklin, Jr., is a professional boxer who first met the defendant, Mark F. Haak, in 2014 after he won the U.S. National Golden Glove amateur championship. That same month, Franklin entered into a contract with Haak. From December 2014 until July 2018, Franklin worked under Haak’s management. During that time, he was 17-0. Franklin claimed the defendant never compensated him more than $3,000 for any of the fights.
In August 2018, Franklin’s mother informed Haak on behalf of Franklin that he was ending the boxer-manager relationship. Franklin enlisted Aaron Alfaro as his spokesperson who then contacted Haak, informing him that Franklin wished to end the boxer-manager relationship, according to the complaint.
In late October 2018, Franklin entered into a promotional contract with Salita Promotions to fight on Feb. 15, 2019 as the main event on a telecast. However, according to Franklin, Haak contacted the Senior Vice President of Showtime, Inc., Gordon Hall, and explained that he was Franklin’s manager. He said he had not granted approval for Franklin to participate in the fight, which led to Showtime dropping him from the fight.
On Jan. 14, 2019, Franklin sued Haak, alleging, among other things, violation of the Pennsylvania Boxing Act. Haak filed a counterclaim, requesting a declaratory judgment that the contract “is valid, binding and enforceable.”
On Jan. 21, 2020, the court granted Haak’s motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. Among the counts dismissed was Franklin’s allegation that Haak violated the act. In so ruling, it reasoned that the act and its accompanying regulations do not provide for a private right of action. Rather, the Pennsylvania State Athletic Commission has the power to regulate boxing within Pennsylvania.
On Feb. 4, 2020, Haak filed a motion for declaratory judgment for the relief requested in his counterclaim. In his response, Franklin argued that the contract was invalid because Franklin did not participate in the negotiations leading to the contract. Instead, he relied on Haak’s interpretation of the contract, and that the contract failed to include “critical protections.” The court ruled for Haak.
Franklin argued in his motion for reconsideration that the court erred, citing a passage of the aforementioned act, which provides:
“No contract between a manager and a professional boxer shall be legally valid until both parties to the contract appear before the commission and have received its approval, which shall be endorsed on the contract.” 5 Pa.C.S.A. § 1104.
Franklin claimed they never appeared before the State Athletic Commission of Pennsylvania, nor did they receive the commission’s approval.
The court disagreed.
“Regardless of the potential merit of the plaintiffs’ argument, they have presented it too late,” wrote the court. “Nowhere in their response brief to the defendant’s motion for declaratory judgment do the plaintiffs mention the Pennsylvania Boxing Act. A court cannot commit a palpable defect on an issue when a party never presented the issue in the first instance. As explained by the Sixth Circuit, ‘issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.’ McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997). The plaintiffs did not reference their newly minted argument in a “perfunctory manner” in their response to the defendant’s motion. They did not give the court so much as a skeleton of the argument. Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied.”
Also, “regardless of whether the plaintiffs had presented the issue in their response to the defendant’s motion for declaratory judgment, it would not have been granted because Pennsylvania law does not apply,” according to the court.
Still, it revisited Franklin’s argument that “Pennsylvania would take great interest in these attempts of Haak’s to escape the rules and regulations promulgated by the Pennsylvania athletic commission by searching out states that lack such safeguards in order to claim jurisdiction,” in which it cited De La Hoya v. Top Rank, Inc. In that case, a district court in the Central District of California applied California boxing law rather than New York boxing law. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25816, 2001 WL 34624886, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2001). Franklin noted that the court made such a determination because California boxing law “provided boxers with greater protections than New York boxing law. However, the court made this determination as part of its conclusion that California had a more substantial relationship to the parties and the transaction than did New York.
“The same is not true in this case. Pennsylvania does not have a significant interest in having its boxing code applied. Franklin is a Michigan resident and (co-plaintiff) Jermaine Franklin Jr., Inc. is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Saginaw, Michigan.” Franklin has “not demonstrated that Pennsylvania has an interest in providing relief to nonresidents such as themselves.”
Franklin v. Haak; E.D. Mich.; Case No. 19-10137, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99795; 6/8/20
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Katrina I. Crawley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Detroit, MI. (for defendant) David M. Zack, Blevins Sanborn Jezdimir Zack PLC, Detroit, MI; Marcus R. Sanborn, BSJZ Law, Detroit, MI.
