A federal judge from the District of New Jersey has granted ESPN’s motion to dismiss in a case in which the network and a related entity, ESPN Scouts, LLC, were sued by an ex-employee for allegedly breaching his employment contract.
In addition to the breach of contract claim, plaintiff Christopher J. Lawlor also alleged claims of promissory estoppel for wrongful termination, and a violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.
Lawlor entered a two year services agreement with the defendants commencing August 15, 2007 and ending August 15, 2009. His first year’s salary was $135,000 and his second year’s salary was $140,000. The agreement provided the defendants with an option to extend the contract for two additional years, on the same terms, if they exercised their option by giving the plaintiff notice by June 15, 2009. On or about August 15, 2009, the defendants wrote Lawlor a letter (Letter Extension), which extended the contract until September 30, 2009, but on different terms. The plaintiff signed the letter proposal.
After his contract was not renewed, the plaintiff sued. The defendants responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
In reviewing the facts, the court found that the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim “does not withstand scrutiny. The services agreement did not require the defendants to exercise the option, and, indeed, the defendants only sent the proposed letter extension after the time for exercising the option had elapsed,” wrote the court. “In other words, the parties’ course of dealings does not indicate that the defendants intended to exercise the option or that the plaintiff understood the letter extension as an attempt to do so. More importantly, the text of the letter extension does not purport to be an attempt to exercise the option described in the services agreement. Simply put, the letter extension, signed by both parties, was a new agreement on new terms. The fact that the letter extension’s terms significantly differed from the terms of the original services agreement does not amount to breach of the terms of the services agreement (which already had expired).
The court added that the plaintiff “puts forward no reasoned basis to characterize the language of the letter extension as an attempt to exercise the option in the services agreement. It follows that the Services Agreement was not breached. Celanese Ltd. v. Essex County Improvement Auth., 404 N.J. Super. 514, 962 A.2d 591 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009) (holding that “a court must try to ascertain the intention of the parties as revealed by the language used”).
As for the Promissory Estoppel claim for $5,000, the defendants argued that the claim “is factually false and that plaintiff was, in fact, paid the disputed $5,000. The plaintiff fails to respond in any way to the defendants’ argument. Indeed, plaintiff does not even make a pro forma denial of receipt of payment or seek to stand on the allegations of the complaint. Where an issue of fact or law is raised in an opening brief, but it is uncontested in the opposition brief, the issue is considered waived or abandoned by the non-movant. See Conroy v. Leone, 316 Fed. Appx. 140, 144 n. 5 (3d Cir. Mar. 9, 2009)
Turning to the NJLAD claim, the court recounted the plaintiff’s argument that the defendants “terminated the Plaintiff’s contract due to a perception the he was handicapped due to the fact that he is a recovering alcoholic.
“First, wrote the court, “the plaintiff’s characterization of the sequence of events as a ‘termination’ is conclusory. The plaintiff was not ‘terminated.’ Rather, the parties mutually agreed to an extension of his employment through the letter extension, and, at some point thereafter, the employment relationship ceased. The plaintiff points to no concrete discriminatory acts by the defendants, nor does he assert what officers of the defendants knew he was handicapped, how they knew it, or why the plaintiff has reason to believe that the defendants ‘terminated’ him for that reason as opposed to some other non-discriminatory business reason. Such naked allegations, absent any factual specificity, are insufficient under Twombly. The facts alleged in the complaint must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Christopher J. Lawlor v. ESPN Scouts, LLC, et al.; D.N.J.; Civil Action Number: 2:10-cv-05886, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15775; 2/16/11
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Fernando Iamurri, Fernando Iamurri, PC, Lyndhurst, NJ. (for defendants) Adam N. Saravay, Lisa M. Hannan, Mccarter & English, LLP, Newark, NJ.
