By John J. Miller, Ph.D., Professor of Sport Management, University of Southern Mississippi
Nancy Albert brought action against Defendant Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners, alleging workplace discrimination and retaliation based on her sex. The lawsuit was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, West Palm Beach Division, on March 14, 2022.
Albert was employed by Defendant in its Facilities Development & Operations Department (“FDO”) as the Director of Electronic Services and Security Division (“ESS”) for eight years from 2011 to 2019. As ESS Director, Plaintiff reported directly to James Beno, FDO’s Director of Operations, and Audrey Wolf, Director of FDO. After she became the Director of ESS, Ms. Albert learned that Beno was the President of Baseball Operations for Elite Squad Baseball. The Elite Squad Baseball was a competitive baseball league for teenagers in Palm Beach County. As President of the Elite Squad, Beno would often have male FDO staff members conduct baseball related meetings, work, and errands during FDO work hours.
In 2012, Albert recommended to Beno that Jason Davis, an FDO employee who was also part of the baseball league, function as manager of a night shift unit at FDO. After offering the suggestion, Albert contended that Beno started to single her out by continually belittling her in front of subordinates and male employees. Albert further alleged that Beno barred from working at the FDO main office supposedly due to complaints about her management ability.
In 2018, Albert met with Audrey Wolf, Director of FDO and Wayne Condry, FDO Director of Human Services. During the meeting, Albert detailed that Beno treated her poorly and asked that he be removed as her supervisor. After the meeting, Albert alleged that her complaints were disregarded while Beno continued to ridicule her.
In another meeting in 2019, Albert alleged that Beno made unwarranted and derogatory statements about her that created a ‘good ol’ boy network’ that excluded her. The exclusion, as contended by Albert, resulted in Beno treating her differently than the other male directors. One week after the meeting, Albert was terminated due to her supposed recurring “demeaning attitude, condescending tone, micromanagement/control and harassment” (para. 41). On May 3, 2021, Albert filed a complaint against the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners asserting violations against Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; retaliation in violation of Title VII; and sex discrimination in violation of Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. The Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners countered by filing a motion to dismiss all claims.
The U.S. District Court concluded that the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sex discrimination in violation of Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA) were dismissed with prejudice. However, the retaliation in violation of Title VII was allowed to proceed. The following information will delve into the complaints
Sex Discrimination under Title VII and Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA)
Title VII states that it is illegal for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). The FCRA was introduced in this case since it “is based on Title VII, decisions construing Title VII apply to the analysis of FCRA claims” (Johnson v. Miami-Dade County, 2020). Citing Crawford v. Carroll (2008), the Court in this case explained that for disparate treatment discrimination cases, such as this one, prima facie must be based on four items. First, the plaintiff must show that she belongs to a protected class. Second, Albert needed to reveal that she was qualified to do the job. The third item required Albert to explain how she was subjected to adverse employment action. The final item mandated Albert to reveal how the defendant treated employees who were similarly situated in a more favorable fashion.
Regarding this allegation, the Court presented two primary reasons that Albert’s allegations were insufficient. First, the Court concluded that Albert did not present enough evidence to reveal that discrimination occurred due to her being a female. Secondly, the Court reported that Albert did not satisfactorily establish prima facie.
Concerning whether discrimination took place, the Court revealed that Albert’s contention was deficient in inferring that her termination or Beno’s supposed disparaging treatment of her were caused due to her sex. Finally, the Court ruled that Albert did not offer any information regarding individuals in comparable positions in the company has not alleged any information whatsoever regarding the comparators’ position other than referring to them as “male directors” (Lewis v. City or Union City, 2019). Additionally, citing Lewis v. City or Union City (2019), the Court stated that Albert did not provide comparator information such as employment or disciplinary histories, their related conduct, or whether they worked under the same supervisors or policies.
Using the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) framework to determine prima facie, the employer must establish a burden of production, not one of influence. Furthermore, Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) revealed three items for using prima facie case. First, the plaintiff must establish a preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of discrimination existed. Secondly, the plaintiff must prove prima facie, the defendant must present valid and nondiscriminatory reasons for not accepting the employee. Finally, if the defendant can present such reasons, the plaintiff has an opportunity to provide by a preponderance of evidence, that the reasons provided by the defendant were not its true reasons but were a ploy for discrimination (Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 1981). Thus, the court in this case did not accept prima facie by reckoning that Albert did not adequately show that she was treated less favorably than other similarly situated individuals outside of her class (Lewis v. City or Union City, 2019). Thus, the Court dismissed without prejudice Albert’s claim of sex discrimination under Title VII and Florida Civil Rights Act.
Hostile Work Environment
Title VII harassment allegations are tortious simply to the degree that they make out a case of sexual discrimination (Abrams v. Piedmont Hospital, Inc., 1997). As such, the Court revealed that the harassing contentions from Albert regarding Beno yelling at her and telling her that everyone hated her failed to explain that such actions were due to her being a female. In support, Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama (2007) stated that “Title VII does not prohibit profanity alone, however profane. It does not prohibit harassment alone, however severe, and pervasive. Instead, Title VII prohibits discrimination, including harassment that discriminates based on a protected category such as sex” (pp. 1301-1302).
Albert alleged that discrimination took place predicated on her claim of a hostile environment. To establish a case for hostile work environment, Albert needed to show that: (1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment [was] based on a protected characteristic of the employee; and (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the employer is responsible for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or of direct liability (Arnold v. Heartland Dental, LLC, 2015). The Court indicated that Albert did include any claims of hostile work environment in her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge. Instead, the allegations specifically illustrated that the disparate treatment by Beno included Albert being demeaned and often reprimanded in front of staff without cause. Additionally, Albert assertions that her recommendations were ignored could not be corroborated unless done so by a male employee. However, since a hostile work environment claim could not be realistically projected to develop out of such contentions, they were deficient for Albert’s administrative remedy contentions. Thus, the Court dismissed the count of hostile work environment without prejudice.
Retaliation Under Title VII
Title VII is comprised of two provisions: substantive and an anti-retaliation (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 2008); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, 2008). Substantive Title VII reveals that employers may not treat an employee in a contrarily fashion due to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Anti-Retaliatory Title VII bars an employer from retaliating against employees who make complaints or participate in probes regarding breaches of Substantive Title VII. In this case, Albert alleged that Anti-Retaliatory under Title VII took place. For a case of retaliation to occur, Albert needed to prove she: (1) she participated in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action (Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 1993).
The Court agreed with Albert’s contentions that her termination from her position was the result of her complaints and Beno’s alleged discrimination. For a causal link to be present it must prove that the time of the supposed retaliatory action must be unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive before such a link may be surmised (Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 1997). The emphasis is to determine whether a causal connection existed between Albert’s sexual discrimination and her termination from her job. Since only one week passed between Albert complaint of Beno’s alleged sex discrimination, the Court found it plausible that a causal connection existed. Thus, the Court ruled that Albert may proceed with her claim of retaliation under Title VII.
References
Abrams v. Piedmont Hospital, Inc. 27 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
Arnold v. Heartland Dental, LLC, 101 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2007).
Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008).
Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993).
Johnson v. Miami-Dade County, 948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020).
Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co. 126 F.3 494, 503 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1224 (11th Cir. 2019).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 250-53 (1981).
