By Lynne F. George
In March of 2014, Telma Hall, Alabama State University’s (ASU) head softball coach at the time, adjunct professor, and graduate student, was placed on administrative leave and was banned from campus and from having any student contact. This leave was enacted after ASU received a pair of emails from separate parents of softball players complaining about Hall’s insufficient care of her student athletes. Shortly thereafter, Melvin Hines, ASU’s serving Athletic Director at the time, recommended to Gwendolyn Boyd, ASU’s serving President at the time, that Hall be suspended and eventually terminated. ASU issued a notice of termination on May 2, 2014.
In July of 2016, Hall alleged discrimination on the basis of her gender and retaliation for complaining about differential treatment on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII. She claimed that ASU paid her less than similar male employees, denied her contracts with the same terms/benefits, and provided her sport with less financial support than its male counterpart. It is worth noting that she made these complaints multiple times beginning in 2011. Due to her suspension and termination, Hall claimed that ASU subjected her to stricter scrutiny than male counterparts within the University, such as head baseball coach, Mervyl Melendez.
Melendez received a base salary more than three times Hall’s salary, a car allowance, a signing bonus, and additional performance bonus opportunities that Hall did not have. More importantly, Melendez was under investigation for possible NCAA violations after a parent complained that he had been requiring his student athletes to use performance-enhancing drugs. Hall presented evidence that Melendez was not banned from campus or from contact with students during this investigation. Hall posits that her investigation was similar enough to Melendez’s and she should therefore be subject to the same protocol. Hall also pointed out male bowling coach, Andrew Chatman, who was not suspended even after allegations of sexual relationships with students. She pointed to football coaches, Reggie Barlow and Craig Payne, who had NACA violations concerning student welfare, but also were not suspended during the investigation. Much of Hall’s case centered around her list of comparators in an effort to demonstrate a significant comparison to how similarly situated employees outside of the protected class (i.e., “comparators”) were treated by the defendant.
In January of 2019, ASU’s motion for summary judgement to her claims was denied on the single count of Hall’s claim for gender discrimination stemming from her suspension from employment (coaching and teaching duties), but was granted in favor of ASU and against Hall on all other claims.
ASU was not satisfied with this result and subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgement order regarding the gender discrimination claims. ASU posits that the male coaches to whom Hall compared herself to in her claim do not qualify as comparators. The Court granted the motion, but rejected ASU’s arguments, and the summary judgement stood.
Still unsatisfied, ASU filed another Motion to Reconsider in April of 2022 arguing that Hall’s suspension of pay was not considered adverse employment. In doing so, ASU referenced Davis v. Legal Svcs. Ala., Inc. (2021), in which the 11th Circuit noted that no Circuit has held “that a simple paid suspension, in and of itself, constitutes an adverse employment action” (p. 9). The Court reviewed the actions taken in Hall’s suspension and found that her suspension was not “a simple paid suspension” and therefore the decision was not in conflict with Davis. Once again, ASU failed to prove a manifest error in law and the Motion to Reconsider was denied.
Title VII
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of gender. The court applies framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. vs. Green (1973), which dictates that Hall must establish her employer discrimination case by proving that (a) she belongs to a protected class; (b) she was qualified to do the job; (c) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (d) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside of her class more favorably.
Hall lists the following actions to make her gender discrimination claim: a significant difference in pay, the denial of contracts with the same benefits as male employees, a difference in financial support for female sports, a difference in treatment by suspending her from coaching and teaching, the eventual termination of her employment, stricter scrutiny, and generally failing to follow university policies.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of ASU with respect to Hall’s pay/incentives claim, program budget claim, and termination claim because there was enough evidence presented to give legitimate reasons for the differences in all the issues. Melendez’s pay and incentives were higher based on his experience and success rate. Differences in the baseball and softball programs justify a difference in their budgets. Multiple reasons, including poor performance, were given for Hall’s termination. “Under Eleventh Circuit law, a plaintiff cannot substitute her business judgment for an employer’s, and a court does not sit as a super-personnel department to re-examine business decisions” (Chapman v. AI Transp., 2000). Hall’s 2013 performance appraisal can also be seen as further support to the differences in pay.
The motion for summary judgment with respect to Hall’s difference in treatment during suspension was denied because there was evidence that Hall “suffered from a differential application of work or disciplinary rules” (Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 1999, p. 1309). This evidence includes the fact that Hall was banned from campus and therefore unable to access her files or participate in the investigation. She was also denied an opportunity to respond to allegations. Melendez was never suspended or banned from campus, and he was able to answer for himself regarding the allegations against him and participate in the investigation. Hall’s ban from campus also took away the employment benefit of tuition-free classes, which she had been pursuing. Additionally, it caused her adjunct teaching contract to not be renewed. One could argue that stripping her of these employment benefits goes against the concept of “suspension with pay” because she was not being fully compensated as she had been previously.
ASU’s Motion to Reconsider
By granting ASU’s first motion to reconsider, the court admitted that it is possible they made an error in finding that Melendez was in fact a comparator, despite the key statement found in Boyd’s testimony where she states that the baseball coach “should have been suspended as Hall was.” Since a motion to reconsider is only granted in the event that there is new evidence or “manifest errors of law or fact,” ASU will need to prove with new evidence that Melendez was not an appropriate comparator for the claim.
Determining Comparator in Discrimination Claim
Determining whether or not Melendez was a comparator in this case is truly crucial to the discrimination claim because discrimination is a comparative concept by its very nature (Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1223). Therefore, the Court’s decision to grant ASU’s motion to reconsider was a responsible one to make sure this important determination was not in error.
ASU claimed that Melendez was not an appropriate comparator to Hall because there was a different president/decisionmaker in place during the Melendez investigation, so Melendez and Hall had different supervisors and because Boyd was unaware of Melendez’s alleged infraction at the time of Hall’s suspension. The two situations were not “nearly identical,” according to ASU because of this difference in leadership.
ASU cited two cases (Lewis v. City of Union City, 2019 and Hester v. Univ. of Ala. Birmingham Hosp., 2020) when making the argument that “a similarly situated comparator will ordinarily have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff.” However, the Court ultimately rejected this argument noting that comparator criteria is applied “generally” in Hester and, in Lewis, potential comparators would “not invariably” have the same supervisor. “Because Boyd’s presidency straddled the Melendez and Hall investigations, the different treatment of the two under the same employment policy supports the determination that Melendez is a proper comparator” (Hall v. Ala. State University, 2019).
The court also rejected ASU’s argument that Boyd did not know about Melendez’s allegations when Hall was suspended because the ASU officials who made the recommendation for Hall’s discipline were the same. Further, Hall presented that she “was subjected to different treatment under the same employment policy by the same group of officials” (Hall v. Ala. State University, 2019).
The use of the word ‘policy’ is worth noting here because the court is referring to an overall employment policy managed by various ASU officials, where there should be a standard of disciplinary action within the organization. The processes should be consistent based on policy and the disciplinary decision should not come down to just one person (i.e., the ASU president).
ASU’s Motion to Reconsider failed because they could not show any manifest error in the law or fact.
Adverse Employment Action
One of ASU’s key arguments in its motion to reconsider was that suspension without pay is not considered adverse employment action. However, several previous cases found evidence that suspension with pay could be considered adverse employment action. The court found that “the circumstances of Hall’s suspension constituted a serious and material change in the terms, conditions or privileges of her employment” and that it was “not a situation in which Hall was restored to her position at the end of the suspension.” It was also relevant that Hall’s pending allegations were one of the reasons she was eventually terminated and her inability to access her campus files prevented her from answering the allegations. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Hall’s suspension was an adverse employment action.
Conclusion
In conclusion, ASU could not prove any manifest error in law or fact related to the court’s decision to deny summary judgement to the discrimination claim in suspension, and therefore Hall’s discrimination claim in suspension of employment stands was upheld.
Lynne George is a sport management doctoral student at Troy University. She has nearly 10 years of experience working in the sports industry, including roles in both professional sports and collegiate athletics. She currently oversees Troy University’s student entrepreneurship center and advises student athletes on maximizing their NIL monetization opportunities through personal branding.
References
Chapman v. AI Transportation, 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000).
Davis v. Legal Services, Alabama, Inc., 20-12886 (11th Cir. 2021).
Hall v. Alabama State University, 2:16-cv-593-GMB (WO) (M.D. Alabama, Northern Division 2019). https://casetext.com/case/hall-v-ala-state-univ-1
Hall v. Alabama State University, 2:16-cv-593-JTA (WO) (M.D. Alabama, Northern Division 2022)
Hester v. University of Alabama Birmingham Hospital, 18-15335 (11th Cir. 2020).
Lewis v. City of Union City, 15-11362 (11th Cir. 2019).
Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 99-6166 (11th Cir. 1999).
