A federal judge from the Southern District of Texas has granted summary judgment to Texas Southern University in a case in which the former women’s basketball coach sued the school, alleging that TSU fired him because he complained about Title IX violations.
The court found that the coach failed to show that the school’s reason for firing him, a very poor record on the court, were pretext for a retaliatory reason.
TSU hired the plaintiff, Claude Cummings, III, as its head coach in 2003. In his five years as head coach, Cummings recorded a win-loss record of 23-87. The academic record of the women’s basketball team was also subpar during that time. His team’s Academic Performance Rating (APR) stayed below the NCAA Division I average.
In 2007 and 2008, the school fired its men’s basketball coach and head football coach for their team’s poor performances on the field and in the classroom.
Approximately one week before Cummings was terminated; he met with Interim Athletic Director Cole to discuss what he perceived as inequities between the men’s and women’s athletic programs at TSU. According to the court, Cummings complained that “TSU had run afoul of the requirements of Title IX by (1) permitting the men’s basketball team to hire more assistant coaches than the women’s basketball team, (2) requiring Cummings, but not the coaches of the men’s football and basketball teams, to teach classes to earn his full coaching salary, (3) not hiring either a Title IX Coordinator or a Senior Women’s Administrator, and (4) providing the men’s basketball team larger operating and recruiting budgets than the women’s team.”
Cummings had lodged similar complaints from 2004 to 2007 with former Athletic Director Alois Blackwell and several other officials within the athletic department.
Cummings sued in early 2010. TSU moved for summary judgment on January 28, 2011. Cummings countered that there “is a genuine issue of material fact regarding TSU’s retaliatory motive, evidenced by the short period of time between Cummings’ meeting with Cole and Cummings’ termination.”
The court wrote that “since Cummings bases his allegations on circumstantial and not direct evidence, the court will analyze Cummings’ claim under the familiar burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824—26 (1973). See Lowrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 911; Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 2010) (Title VII case) (explaining that the McDonnell-Douglas approach applies when the plaintiff’s claim is based on circumstantial evidence).
“Under the McDonnell—Douglas framework Cummings must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2106 (ADEA case); Lowrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 911. If Cummings makes a prima facie showing, the burden of production then shifts to TSU to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its employment action. Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas LP, 534 F.3d 473, 484 (5th Cir. 2008) (Title VII retaliation case); Lowrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 911. If TSU meets this burden, the inference of unlawful retaliation dissolves and Cummings must establish that TSU’s reason is a pretext for the actual retaliatory reason. Id. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that TSU intentionally discriminated against Cummings remains with Cummings. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2106.”
It continued noting that “since the parties do not dispute that Cummings’ complaint about TSU’s alleged noncompliance with Title IX qualifies as a ‘protected activity’ or that Cummings’ termination was an ‘adverse employment action,’ the only issue is whether Cummings has established the requisite causal connection between the two.”
Skipping ahead, the court turned to TSU’s articulation of legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for Cummings’ termination, and whether he had raised enough of a question that they were pretext.
“Cummings submits no evidence, direct or indirect, that could persuade a reasonable jury that his termination was in retaliation for his complaints about TSU’s noncompliance with the requirements of Title IX instead of the poor on-the-court and academic records of his basketball teams,” wrote the court. “Cummings does not contend that TSU’s stated reason is unworthy of credence. In fact, as mentioned above, Cummings agrees with Cole’s assessment of his win—loss record and his teams’ APR record. The football and men’s basketball coaches were terminated in the months leading up to Cummings’ termination after posting similarly deficient win—loss and academic records. Moreover, based on his performance evaluations with the former athletic director, Cummings knew that TSU expected him to win more frequently.
“Other than Cummings’ ‘unwavering . . . belief that he was summarily terminated because of his complain[ts] about the inequities in the programs,’ the only basis for Cummings’ allegation is that he was terminated approximately one week after his meeting with Cole, during which he made the Title IX complaints. Temporal proximity standing alone, however, is insufficient to establish an issue of fact as to pretext after an employer has provided a non-retaliatory reason. Aryain, 534 F.3d at 487 (citing Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., LLC, 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 2007)). Cummings offers no evidence that Cole was upset about Cummings’ complaints, admonished Cummings for making such complaints, or otherwise indicated that the complaints triggered Cummings’ termination. To the contrary, during the meeting Cole agreed with Cummings that TSU was not in compliance with its Title IX obligations.
“A plaintiff cannot prove pretext simply by grounding his claim in a mere belief that an employer acted with a discriminatory or retaliatory motive. See Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 611 (5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting an argument that was based on plaintiff’s speculation as to retaliatory motive); Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000) (refusing to rely upon a plaintiff’s subjective belief as to discriminatory intent). In order to withstand summary judgment, Cummings must offer evidence from which the jury may infer that retaliation, in whole or in part, motivated the adverse employment action. Roberson v. Alltel Information Services, 373 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2004) (Title VII case).”
Claude Cummings, III, v. Texas Southern University;. S.D.Tex.; CIVIL ACTION NO. H-10-1096, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49181; 5/6/11.
Attorneys of record: (for plaintiff) John C Knobelsdorf, II, LEAD ATTORNEY, MacNaughton Knobelsdorf & Co, Houston, TX; Reginald E McKamie, Sr, LEAD ATTORNEY, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX. (for defendant) Erika M Laremont, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office Of The Attorney General, General Litigation Division, Austin, TX.
