A federal judge from the Southern District of Ohio has denied a motion for reconsideration filed by sporting good s manufacturer Riddell in the Korey Stringer wrongful death litigation, finding that the maker of helmets and other football equipment had a duty to warn the trainers and coaches of the Minnesota Vikings that the equipment could contribute to heat stroke or heat exhaustion on extremely hot days.
The impetus of the litigation occurred almost a decade ago when Stringer, then an offensive lineman for the Vikings, suffered a heat-related illness over the span of three days and died.
Specifically, Head Trainer Charles Barta recognized that Stringer was having health problems associated with the heat on July 29, 2001. Accordingly, Barta escorted Stringer to an air-conditioned first-aid trailer in the middle of practice. Stringer recovered that day and Barta gave him two bottles of Gatorade to assist in rehydration that night.
Barta examined Stringer on the morning of July 31 and pronounced him ready to participate. Later that morning, however, Stringer began having more problems, which led to his return to the trailer. His condition deteriorated. Coordinator of Medical Services Fred Zamberletti arrived and noted that Stringer was breathing rapidly. Concluding that Stringer was hyperventilating, Zamberletti instructed another trainer to place a plastic bag around Stringer’s mouth for 45 to 60 seconds. Zamberletti took Stringer’s pulse and felt that Stringer’s skin was cool and sweaty. Zamberletti then made emergency arrangements to transport Stringer to the hospital. After arriving at the hospital, Stringer’s body temperature registered 108.8 degrees. He died early the next morning.
Stringer’s heirs sued in 2002, alleging, among other things, that the individual defendants mishandled the care and treatment of Stringer. That part of the suit was resolved. The products liability suit against Riddell remained.
On July 10, 2009, the district court granted in part and denied in part Riddell’s motion for summary judgment. It granted summary judgment in favor of Riddell on the plaintiff’s claims of design defect and breach of warranty, leaving only the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim for trial. Riddell moved for reconsideration.
“Riddell maintains that this court committed ‘clear error’ in holding that Riddell, as a matter of law, had a duty to warn of the risk of heat exhaustion and heat stroke, and in extending the duty to warn to non-injured, non-users of the products, i.e., the Vikings’ trainers and coaches,” wrote the court in the instant opinion.
“In its motion for reconsideration, Riddell rehashes the same arguments the court previously rejected — that the only relevant risk is merely the risk of the football player getting hotter while wearing Riddell’s equipment, and that because this risk is obvious, Riddell had no duty to warn. Riddell again relies on Holowaty v. McDonald’s Corporation, 10 F. Supp.2d 1078 (D. Minn. 1998), in which the plaintiff argued that McDonald’s had a duty to warn of the dangers of spilling hot coffee because, although the risk of suffering minor burns was obvious, the risk of more serious burns was not. The district court rejected this argument in the 2009 opinion, holding that ‘an alleged difference in the anticipated degree of danger does not make the risk associated with the use of the product any less obvious.’ Riddell maintains that, like Holowaty, this case involves nothing more than a ‘difference in the anticipated degree of danger,’ and that the risk of developing heat exhaustion and heat stroke is simply an extension of the obvious risk of getting hotter.”
The court rejected that reasoning again “for the same reasons.
“As the court previously explained, this case is more akin to Gamradt v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 380 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Minnesota law), in which the court held that even though it may have been obvious that detonation of a black smoke grenade would cause minor breathing discomfort, it was not obvious that a person exposed to the smoke in an enclosed space could lose 60 percent of his aerobic lung capacity. The court therefore concluded that knowledge of the mere danger associated with minor smoke inhalation did not relieve the manufacturer of the duty to warn about foreseeable dangers associated with the use of the grenade indoors.”
The court also examined Riddell’s other argument “that by defining the relevant risk as the risk of developing heat exhaustion and heat stroke, this court, in essence, held ‘that Minnesota law . . . requires manufacturers to warn about all possible circumstances in which a common product may be used, and all conceivable consequences of that use.’
“This, of course, is not what the court held. As the court has explained, a duty to warn exists only if the injury was reasonably foreseeable. See Balder v. Haley, 399 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Minn. 1987) (citing Germann, 395 N.W.2d at 924)); Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Minn. 1967) (“The duty to warn rests on foreseeability.”). For the reasons previously stated, the court has concluded that, based on the evidence presented, the specific risk of developing heat exhaustion and heat stroke was reasonably foreseeable and was not obvious. Riddell therefore had a duty to warn of that risk.”
In another relevant passage of the opinion, touching on the role of causation in the products liability action, the court offered that “the Vikings purchased Riddell’s helmets and shoulder pads for the players, and the coaches and trainers exercised control over how these products would be used. They dictated when the equipment would be worn and what the players were required to do during the practice sessions. The court has already determined that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether a warning would have altered the conduct of the Vikings’ coaches and trainers. Based on the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could find that the lack of warning played a substantial part in bringing about Korey Stringer’s death. It is irrelevant to the causation analysis that the coaches and trainers were non-injured, non-users.”
Kelci Stringer v. National Football League, et al.; S.D.Ohio; Case No. 2:03-cv-665, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98874; 9/22/10
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Stanley Morris Chesley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Paul M De Marco, Renee Ann Infante, Waite Schneider Bayless & Chesley Co LPA, Cincinnati, OH; Kenneth R White, PRO HAC VICE, Mankato, MN; Louise Malbin Roselle, Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co – 1, Cincinnati, OH; Wilbert Benjamin Markovits, Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley, Cincinnati, OH. (for defendant National Football League, NFL Properties LLC, MD John Lombardo) Benjamin C Block, Gregg H Levy, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC; Sarah Daggett Morrison, LEAD ATTORNEY, Chester Willcox & Saxbe – 2, Columbus, OH. (for defendants Riddell/All American, Riddell Sports Inc) Robert C Tucker, LEAD ATTORNEY, Scott J Kelly, Tucker Ellis & West LLP, Cleveland, OH. (for defendants All American Sports Corp., Riddell Inc) Irene C Keyse-Walker, Scott J Kelly, Robert C Tucker, Tucker Ellis & West LLP, Cleveland, OH.
