A federal judge has dismissed the complaint of a father and son, who alleged that a school district denied the son the opportunity to take the proper courses in high school, which would have allowed him to obtain the approval of the NCAA Clearinghouse and thus compete in Division II athletics at the collegiate level.
The court found specifically that the plaintiffs had not met the “minimum standard which requires that the pleadings ‘give defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3, 104 S. Ct. 1723, 80 L. Ed. 2d 196 (1984) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).”
Plaintiff Robert Marinnie, Sr. filed the claim on April 28, 2006, claiming that his son, who was a special education student of Palmyra High School, received notice in the summer of 2004 that the NCAA Clearinghouse had deemed him ineligible to participate in NCAA Division II athletics because he had not been provided the proper courses in high school and because his SAT score was too low.
The plaintiff sued, alleging that his son was not provided with foreign language courses in high school and was not advised that he could receive “time consideration” for the SAT.
Specifically, the plaintiff tied his claim to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, the federal “No Child Left Behind legislation,” “Title VII of the United States Code” and the “New Jersey Law Against Discrimination,” N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1 et seq. He sought compensatory damages of $9 million, and punitive damages of $9 million as well as unspecified declaratory and injunctive relief.
The defendants countered with a motion to dismiss based on Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or that the pleading was insufficient. The court noted that the fact that the plaintiff was representing himself, or pro se, did not absolve him from complying with the aforementioned minimum pleading standards.
Turning to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the court noted that a plaintiff must show that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived him of his rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See, e.g., Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005)(citing Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.1995).
“Plaintiffs have not identified the constitutional right or federal law that has been violated; they have not alleged that each of the Defendants acted under color of state law; and they have not stated how such conduct deprived them of their rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Accordingly, Defendants have met their burden of establishing that, based on the allegations in their Complaints, Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their Section 1983 claim which would entitle them to relief.”
Similarly, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim and 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
Turning to the claim based on the No Child Left Behind Act, the court wrote that the plaintiffs have not alleged facts that would put the defendants on fair notice of what their claims are under this act, and the grounds upon which it rests. “For example, they have not put Defendants on notice of how, when or under what provision Defendants may have violated the NCLBA. Further, several courts have held that the NCLBA does not confer a private right of action. See Dunleavy v. New Jersey, No. 06-0554, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92346, 2006 WL 3780673, (D.N.J. 2006)(concluding that Congress did not intend to create individual rights under the NCLBA and dismissing plaintiff’s claim); Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding NCLBA does not reflect the clear and ambiguous intent of Congress to create individually enforceable rights and dismissing plaintiff’s cause of action under § 1983 to enforce the NCLBA). The Third Circuit has upheld a District Court’s dismissal of a complaint on the grounds that even if a private cause of action exists pursuant to the NCLBA, the plaintiffs failed to raise facts to support such a claim. Cole v. Montague Bd. of Educ., 145 Fed. Appx. 760, 763 (3d Cir. 2005). We dismiss Plaintiffs’ NCLBA claims on the same grounds as upheld in Cole, i.e., even if a cause of action exists, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that could present a claim under the NCLBA.”
Lastly, in consideration of the plaintiffs’ Title VII claim, the court found that the plaintiffs “have not provided Defendants with fair notice of what their claim is under Title VII and the grounds upon which it rests. Even if the Court were to assume that Plaintiffs intend to bring a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, Plaintiffs must make out a prima facie case. See Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock University State System, 470 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 2006). They have not done so and, therefore, their claims are dismissed.”
In sum, the dismissed the plaintiffs’ original complaint, without prejudice, and gave them 30 days to amend their complaint in order to state cognizable claims. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)(holding that “. . . even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, if a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a District Court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002))
Robert Marinnie, Sr., et al. v. Palmyra Board Of Education, et al.; D.N.J.; Civil Action No. 06-1977 (NLH), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20038; 3/20/07
Attorneys of Record: (for the plaintiff) Robert Marinnie, Jr., Plaintiff, Pro se, Palmyra, NJ. (for the defendant) Melissa Thersa Dutton, Lead Attorney, State of New Jersey, Division of Law, Trenton, NJ. Gregory J. Giordano, Lead Attorney, Lenox, Socey, Wilgus, Formidoni, Brown, Giordano & Casey, LLC, Trenton, NJ.
