A federal judge from the Southern District of Indiana has found that a school’s haircut policy for the boys’ basketball team did not constitute gender discrimination, infringe upon a student’s due process rights, or deny him equal protection.
In sum, the court found that the aforementioned claims could not survive on their merits.
This case arose after A.H., the son of plaintiffs Patrick Hayden and Melissa Hayden, was removed from the Greensburg Junior High School boy’s basketball team because he did not comply with an unwritten haircut policy that required him to wear his hair above his ears and collar.
The family sued, alleging that the defendants’ removal of A.H. from the basketball team for failing to comply with the haircut policy violated his right to equal protection and his right to procedural and substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
They named the following as defendants: the Greensburg Community School Corporation; Greensburg Community School Board Members Lisa Tressler, David Weigel, Valerie Moorman, Dave Meyer, Al Moore, Tony Owens, and Steve Taylor; the superintendent of Greensburg Community Schools, Tom Hunter ; the principal of Greensburg Junior High School, Dave Strouse; the assistant principal and athletic director of Greensburg Junior High School, Debbie Smith; and Greensburg varsity boys basketball team head coach, Stacy Meyer.
At the time, plaintiffs’ attorney Ron Frazier told the media: “It seems like there were actions directly taken by the school administration to punish the Hayden family for challenging the policy. At that point they just wanted to have a discussion, and if a system is so broken that you can’t even discuss the policies and the discipline, then lawsuits have to be filed. You should be able to walk into school and talk to administrators about policies that affect your children. Every parent wants that.”
In considering the plaintiffs’ arguments, the court first reviewed 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action against a person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 129 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1994) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
The plaintiffs brought both a procedural and a substantive due process claim against the school board and the individual defendants in their official capacity. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed the defendants denied A.H. procedural due process, in the form of a hearing or a meeting as proscribed by the Greensburg Administrative Guidelines, prior to Coach Meyer’s decision (supported by those administrators) to terminate A.H. from the basketball team.
The plaintiffs further alleged that the school board and the individual defendants violated A.H.’s “fundamental right to wear the hairstyle of his choice,” and that their enforcement of the Haircut Policy denies A.H. “an ingredient of personal freedom protected by the United States Constitution.”
Focusing first on the procedural due process claim against the school board, the court noted that public schools “may lawfully enact and enforce dress and grooming policies.” Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 394 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim that a dress code’s prohibition on blue jeans violated student’s fundamental rights under due process clause); Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1971) (rejecting claim that public school’s dress code that contained restrictions on hair length violated student’s fundamental rights).
“Moreover, schools may condition participation in interscholastic sports upon “a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995). Indeed, ‘students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.’ Id.
“In a case upholding the constitutionality of a random urine testing program instituted by the Tippecanoe School Corporation for school athletes and cheerleaders, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Indiana High School Athletic Association imposes “extensive requirements” upon ‘individuals participating in interscholastic athletics” and “[s]uch regulations have been upheld against a variety of challenges under the federal constitution and Indiana law.’ Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe Co. Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1319 & n.9 (7th Cir. 1988). Notably, the decision cited two cases upholding the constitutionality of grooming policies as applied to interscholastic athletes. Id. n. 9 (citing Davenport v. Randolph Cty. Bd. of Educ., 730 F.2d 1395 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding rule requiring interscholastic athletes to be clean shaven); Humphries v. Lincoln Parish Sch. Bd., 467 So.2d 870 (La. App. 1985) (upholding removal of interscholastic athletes for violation of rule prohibiting facial hair during football season)).
“As a student wishing to participate in interscholastic sports in the Greensburg School Corporation, A.H. is subject to reasonable regulations, including Coach Meyer’s Haircut Policy. Thus, to the extent A.H. wishes to play basketball under Coach Meyer, A.H. does not have a protectable liberty interest to wear the hairstyle of his choice.”
Turning to the substantive due process claim, the court noted that such claims require a plaintiff to show that the government’s policy is completely arbitrary and lacking any rational connection to a legitimate government interest. Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 2000).
“The Haircut Policy is not the product of arbitrary government action,” wrote the court. “Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 procedural and substantive due process claims against the School Corporation are dismissed.”
As for the due process claims against the individual defendants, the court found that A.H. “has not established the violation of a protected liberty or property interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 procedural and substantive due process claims against the individual defendants are dismissed.
Next, the court turned to whether the defendants violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws “because the mandatory haircut policy is not applied to any girl trying out for any sport.”
The court was not persuaded.
“There is no evidence that the School Corporation, Coach Meyer, or any of the other Individual Defendants intentionally discriminated against A.H. because of his membership in the class of male athletes,” wrote the court. “The Haircut Policy applied only to those male athletes who played basketball under Coach Meyer. It did not apply to male athletes who played sports other than basketball, such as football, track, or wrestling. Simply put, the Policy is not based on unlawful gender classifications.”
For similar reasons, the court dismisses the Title IX claim.
“While the Haircut Policy was not implemented against any female student athletes, it was also not applied to male student athletes who participated in sports other than basketball. In other words, as stated above, the Policy as enforced does not discriminate against A.H. because of his gender.”
Patrick Hayden and Melissa Hayden, on behalf of their Minor Child, A.H. v. Greensburg Community School Corporation, et al.; S.D. Ind.; 1:10-cv-1709-RLY-DML, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34494; 3/13/13
Attorneys of record: (for plaintiffs) Ronald William Frazier, Thomas W. Blessing, FRAZIER & ASSOCIATES, Indianapolis, IN. (for defendants) Jason Thomas Clagg, William T. Hopkins, Jr., BARNES & THORNBURG, Fort Wayne, IN; Thomas E. Wheeler, II, FROST BROWN TODD LLC, Indianapolis, IN.
