Court Denies Sports Facility’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Premises Liability Case

Feb 20, 2015

A state court judge in Connecticut has denied a sports facility’s bid for summary judgment in a premises liability case in which the parent of a lacrosse player sued the facility after his son was injured during a lacrosse event.
 
The plaintiff sought to recover damages for an injury allegedly sustained by his son at the indoor tennis courts of the Farmington Farms Tennis & Athletic Club. He specifically asserted premises liability claims against Tennis Enterprises, Ltd., and Farmington Farms Tennis & Athletic Club, Inc., as the alleged owner and operator of the facility, respectively.
 
The defendant claimed that it did not have “any actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect—a hook that was part of a tennis net post and was bent outward into the area in which the lacrosse play took place—on which the plaintiff allegedly injured his leg.”
 
Such “notice” is required for the plaintiff to prove his claim See Meek v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 72 Conn.App. 467, 474, 806 A.2d 546, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 912, 810 A.2d 278 (2002); Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 235-39, 397 A.2d 1335 (1978). A plaintiff may present circumstantial evidence as to the question of notice. Cruz v. Drezek, supra, 175 Conn. 238-39.
 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Farmington Farms relied on affidavits by Frederick Timme and Joel Taylor, who are, respectively, president and secretary of the Farmington Farms Tennis & Athletic Club, Inc., and co-owners of Tennis Enterprises, Ltd. “Both Timme and Taylor aver that prior to the date of the plaintiff’s alleged injury, they ‘had no personal knowledge of a bent hook condition on one of the net posts alleged to have caused the plaintiff, Daniel Rider, to become injured,’” wrote the court. “They further aver that they are not aware of any ‘board member, agent, servant and/or employee of Farmington Farms Tennis & Athletic Club, Inc., or Tennis Enterprises, Ltd.’ who had personal knowledge of such a bent hook condition prior to the date of the plaintiff’s alleged injury, and that neither ‘Farmington Farms Tennis & Athletic Club, Inc., or Tennis Enterprises, Ltd. received any written or verbal notice of a bent hook condition’ prior to the date of the plaintiff’s alleged injury.”
 
The defendants also relied on the plaintiff’s responses to requests for admission, in which “the plaintiff admits that, at the time of his responses, he was not aware of any evidence showing that either the defendant had actual knowledge of the specific bent hook at issue. The plaintiff qualified his response to each request, however, with the following statement: ‘Admitted at this time, however, discovery is not complete and therefore this answer is subject to change.’ The plaintiff also admitted that he was not aware of any evidence establishing how long the hook at issue had been bent and elongated prior to the plaintiff’s accident. His response, however, was similarly qualified by his reservation that discovery was not complete and the answer was subject to change.
 
“Even without considering the plaintiff’s submissions in opposition to summary judgment, the defendants’ submissions do not establish that they are entitled to summary judgment because they do not address at all the issue of constructive knowledge. At most, the defendants’ submissions establish that neither owner had personal knowledge of the alleged defect, that they were not aware of any employee or agent of the defendants who had personal knowledge of the defect, and that the corporate defendants had not received written notice of the defect. The plaintiff’s admissions that he did not know how long the defect had existed were qualified by his statement that discovery was not yet complete.”
 
The court resonated with the plaintiff’s argument that “the evidence presented by the defendants does not exclude the possibility that a reasonable jury could find that the defective condition had existed for a sufficient period of time that the defendants should have discovered it in the exercise of reasonable care. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the facility was being used for a purpose for which it was not designed—that is, lacrosse rather than tennis—apparently without a specific inspection to determine whether it was safe for such use. Moreover, even if the evidence submitted by the defendants had been sufficient to shift the burden of responding to the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s evidence, as summarized above, is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the defective condition of the hook prior to the plaintiff’s accident and with sufficient time to remedy it.”
 
Patrick Rider, PPA Daniel Rider v. Tennis Enterprises, LTD et al.; Super. Ct. Conn., Hartford; HHDCV126030039S, 2014 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3093; 12/15/14


 

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