A federal judge from the Northern District of Indiana has denied a school district’s motion for summary judgment in a case in which it was sued by a student on the Munster High School swim team in connection with a hazing incident and the subsequent investigation.
The court, however, did grant, for the most part, the motion for summary judgment submitted by the individual defendants.
“It’s often been said that high school is the best four years of your life,” the court began in its opinion. “But for one young man, plaintiff J.H., high school was anything but.”
The plaintiff was a member of the high school swim team, where hazing was rampant. During his freshman and sophomore years, he was a victim of hazing, enduring physical and emotional mistreatment. J.H. and his mother complained to various school officials. Dissatisfied with the response, J.H. sued, pursuant to § 1983 Equal Protection action, naming the school and various school officials in their individual and official capacities as defendants. Specifically, he alleged discrimination based on gender under the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX, retaliation under the First Amendment, and a negligence claim under Indiana state law.
The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The court promptly dismissed the claims made against the individual defendants in their “Official Capacity” since they were redundant of the claims against the school district.
As for the Section 1983 Equal Protection claim, the court noted that the plaintiff would have to show that the school district acted with a discriminatory intent or deliberate indifference.
Elaborating on this, the court wrote that a district, “generally speaking, cannot be found liable for the acts committed by its coaches, teachers, administrators, etc. But there are three well-known exceptions to this rule: Munster can be found liable under Section 1983 if J.H. can show: ‘(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the Constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policy-making authority.’ Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2012).”
The court continued: “So what all this boils down to is that J.H. must show that Munster engaged in a widespread practice of ignoring complaints of hazing from the boys’ swimming program, either intentionally or with deliberate indifference to the boys’ rights, simply because the complaints were coming from boys and not girls. Hayden v. Greensburg Community School Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2014).
“This case bears a striking resemblance to Hayden where a public high school had various policies governing the appearance of its student athletes. 743 F.3d at 572. Although a written policy proscribed various restrictions on both males and females regarding how they could wear their hair, an unwritten (but enforced) policy set forth by the boys’ basketball coach placed additional restrictions on his team members. Id. Namely, his players could not wear long hair, and the plaintiff, who wore his hair long, was not allowed to play on the team until he cut his hair. Id. The court found that the policy led to the disparate treatment of males versus females insofar as the males were ‘subject to a burden that a girl in the same position is not’ and that was enough to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 580.”
Revisiting the instant case, the court wrote that it “must determine whether J.H. has presented sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Munster had a policy of ignoring hazing on the boy’s team such that it ended up with a boys team that was infested with hazing and a girls team that apparently had none. Admittedly, the situation in J.H.’s case is a little more nuanced than that of Hayden. Here, there is no express policy of allowing hazing to occur in one program and not the other. But J.H. has presented evidence that would allow a jury to infer such an unspoken policy exists. In support of his theory, J.H. has presented a laundry list of ways that the officials at the school ignored hazing in the boys’ program.”
Thus, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Equal Protection claim. “J.H. has set forth sufficient evidence to support his claim,” according to the court.
The court sided with the plaintiff on the claim of gender discrimination, pursuant to Title IX, as well.
“While the standards for proving discrimination under Title IX and the Equal Protection clause ‘may not be wholly congruent,’ here the proof required overlaps significantly,” it wrote, citing Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 2012).
“In the typical Title IX discrimination case where students are harassing each other or where a teacher harasses a student, a plaintiff must show (1) discriminatory harassment of which the school has (2) actual knowledge and yet (3) treats with deliberate indifference, and (4) the harassment must be severe and objectively offensive enough that it deprives the plaintiff of access to educational opportunities. Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2014).
“… J.H.’s argument is that Munster engaged in a practice or custom of deliberate indifference such that the school purposefully ignored complaints of hazing in the boys’ program based on gender. Thus, the same evidence supporting that the custom or practice exists, identified at length above, also supports deliberate indifference since the custom or practice was deliberate indifference. And since the basis of the claim is the school’s own policy, they obviously had actual knowledge of it (and in any event, as the evidence above shows, they had actual knowledge of the specific acts of hazing by at least the winter and spring of 2011).
“So the only thing left not previously addressed is whether the actions were severe and pervasive enough to deprive J.H. of educational opportunities. To prove this element, J.H. must present evidence showing discrimination ‘so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victims’ educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied access to an institution’s resources and opportunities.’ Davis, 526 U.S. at 651. Here, too, I find J.H. has presented enough evidence. J.H. has presented evidence that because of the defendant’s inaction regarding hazing on the boys swim team, he was forced to quit the swim team and graduate early, and that his grades declined. He also suffered psychological effects such as anxiety, depression, and suicidal thoughts, all requiring treatment.
“One key difference between an equal protection and Title IX claim is that unlike an equal protection claim brought under Section 1983, Title IX authorizes suits against institutions and programs only and does not authorize suits against school officials, teachers, or other individuals. Levin, 692 F.3d at 614. A plaintiff can, however, use evidence that ‘a single school administrator with authority to take corrective action responded to harassment with deliberate indifference’ to establish liability under Title IX, whereas such a showing would be insufficient under the Equal Protection Clause without the additional showing of a widespread custom or practice. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246, 257, 129 S. Ct. 788, 172 L. Ed. 2d 582 (2009). So basically, J.H. can’t bring a Title IX claim against the school administrators, but can use evidence of what those administrators did (or, in this case, didn’t do) to support his claim against the school itself. Thus, I will dismiss J.H.‘s Title IX claim against the individual school officials. But his Title IX claim based on the inequality between the girls’ and boys’ swimming programs will proceed against defendant Munster.”
J.H. v. School Town of Munster, et al.; N.D. Ind.; Cause Number: 2:12-cv-69 PS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13213; 2/3/16
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Valparaiso, IN. (for defendants) Jacquelyn S. Pillar King, Maryann Kusiak McCauley, Michael D. Sears, Lead Attorneys, Crist Sears and Zic LLP, Munster, IN; Kathleen M. Maicher, Lead Attorney, Spangler Jennings & Dougherty PC—Mer/IN, Merrillville, IN.
