The Alabama Supreme Court has affirmed a lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment to a track coach, who was sued after he told the plaintiff to compete in an event she had never competed in, the high jump, and she became injured.
Like the trial judge, the state’s high court concluded that the coach was exercising his judgment as a coach and was entitled to state-agent immunity.
The incident occurred on April 12, 2003. Plaintiff Tamesha Feagins, an eighth-grade student at Center Street Middle School in Birmingham and member of the track team, was participating in a city-wide track meet for middle schools. After arriving late for the event, Coach Curtis Waddy informed her that she had to perform in the high-jump event, an event she had never competed in. The plaintiff protested that she did not know how to perform the event. Yet, the coach, according to the court, insisted that she try.
On her practice jump, the plaintiff injured her knee, spawning the suit. She alleged specifically that Waddy “negligently, willfully, wantonly, and in bad faith failed to adequately train and supervise Tamesha in the high jump, resulting in her injury.”
Waddy ultimately moved for summary judgment, a motion that the trial court granted, citing State-agent immunity. An appeal followed.
The plaintiff’s appeal centered on the argument that the court erred in entering a summary judgment for Waddy because a question of material fact exists as to whether Waddy trained Tamesha in the proper technique for performing the high jump. She argues that Waddy had no discretion in training Tamesha and thus that he was performing a ministerial function instead of a discretionary function and is not protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”
The court did note that in “limited circumstances” it “has held that State-agent immunity does not apply to the actions of a coach. In Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003), Douglas, a 29-year-old, 200-pound wrestling coach, wrestled Giambrone, a 15-year-old, 150-pound student, in a challenge wrestling match during practice. While Douglas was performing a wrestling maneuver called a ‘cement job’ on Giambrone, Giambrone suffered a severe spinal-cord injury, which rendered him a quadriplegic. Giambrone’s mother, acting individually and on behalf of Giambrone, sued Douglas. Douglas claimed that his actions were protected by State-agent immunity. This Court noted: ‘A State agent acts beyond his authority and is therefore not immune when he or she ‘fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.’ Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000).’ 874 So. 2d at 1052. Although the local board of education had not adopted any rules, regulations, policies, or procedures establishing how wrestling practice was to be conducted, the high school athletic director had furnished Douglas with the guidelines and rules of the Alabama High School Athletic Association and the National Federation of Wrestling, as well as the Alabama High School Athletic Directors and Coaches Association Directories. Both the AHSAA and NFW rules addressed potentially dangerous wrestling holds and illegal headlocks. Likewise, the Athletic Directories contained a code of conduct that prohibited “inequitable competition. This Court concluded that the athletic director exercised judgment the local board allowed him to exercise in giving Douglas the rules and guidelines of the AHSAA and NFW, as well as the Athletic Directories. ‘We cannot agree that such guidelines and rules must be adopted by the Board before they can create a duty on Douglas’s part.’ 874 So. 2d at 1055. Thus, this Court concluded that the summary judgment based on State-agent immunity was inappropriate as to the coach in that situation.”
In the instant case, “it is undisputed that Waddy was discharging his duties in educating students by coaching the track team. By selecting which participants would participate in which event, Waddy was exercising his judgment in discharging his duties in educating students, and ‘we may not second-guess his decision.’ Ex parte Spivey, 846 So. 2d 322, 332 (Ala. 2002).”
Venus Feagins v. Curtis Waddy et al.; S.Ct.Ala; 1051349; 2007 Ala. LEXIS 156; 8/3/07
