A federal judge from the Northern District of Alabama has sided with a school district in a case where a coaching candidate alleged that the school district discriminated against her because she was female.
In so ruling, the court agreed with the school district, finding that the plaintiff was not hired because, in the past, she had poor interactions with her players.
Plaintiff Amy Moss is employed as a Health and P.E. teacher at Phil Campbell High School, which is part of the Franklin County Board of Education, or the defendant. She also serves as the girls track coach. Her previous suit against the defendant stemmed from her termination as girls basketball coach at the aforementioned high school in March 2010.
The lawsuit addressed in the instant opinion involved her non-selection in September 2011 as girls basketball coach and girls softball coach at Belgreen High School.
Gary Williams is Superintendent of the Franklin County school system. Available positions within the school system are required to be posted. According to the plaintiff, after hearing in August 2011 that Richie Hester, a history and science teacher at Vina High School, had assumed the vacant positions of girls basketball coach and softball coach, the plaintiff called the Board of Education and asked when the job would be posted. It was posted the next day. The plaintiff also contacted the assistant principal at Belgreen High School, Robyn Bragwell, to confirm whether the rumors she heard about Hester assuming these job duties were true.
The court noted that officials waited to post the opening because they were trying to convince the existing coach to remain. While the plaintiff applied for the job, she was not interviewed. Hester, who had informally interviewed for the job, was hired.
The plaintiff claimed Hester was previously fired by the Board of Education for allegedly having a relationship with one of the members of the girls basketball team, which he coached at the time. He was also accused of selling drugs in the Vina, Alabama area. “The plaintiff asserts these rumors as evidence that Hester and other men in defendant’s employ have been given more than one opportunity after being accused of misconduct, but she has not,” wrote the court.
Meanwhile, “Williams stated the plaintiff does not relate well to young people because she can be abusive to them and uses inappropriate language. Williams also testified that in the past, a male coach who used inappropriate language was going to be fired for it, but that individual resigned first.”
School officials maintained that because they “already knew both Hester and Moss, they did not see a need to conduct interviews for the softball/basketball coaching position. Between the two of them, (they) believed Hester to be a better fit for the coaching job because he lived in the community, grew up in the community and worked near there.”
Moss would ultimately sue, claiming gender discrimination. She also alleged retaliation for filing EEOC charges. The defendants moved for summary judgment, leading to the instant opinion.
Since the court found no direct evidence of discrimination, it looked to the three prong test fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
“First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1527-1528 (11th Cir. 1997). Assuming the employee meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory employment action. Harris v. Shelby County Board of Education, 99 F.3d 1078, 1083 (11th Cir.1996). The defendant can feasibly present such strong evidence of a nondiscriminatory rationale that summary judgment is warranted. Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 939 F.2d 946, 950 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1058, 112 S. Ct. 935, 117 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1992)(quoting Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 596 (11th Cir.1987).
“An employer’s stated reason is not a pretext unless it is shown that both: (1) the reason was false; and (2) the real reason was unlawful. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). A plaintiff may show a pretext either ‘directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’ Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir.2005). In both instances, a plaintiff must show pretext with ‘concrete evidence in the form of specific facts.’ Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1308. Mere ‘conclusory allegations and assertions’ will not suffice.” Id.
“Once a defendant presents a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the presumption of discrimination drops from the case. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 and n. 10. The plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason offered by the defendant was not the true reason for the employment decision, but rather a mere pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. The focus of the case after the defendant meets its burden of production is on the defendant’s subjective intent and the motivation behind the defendant’s adverse employment action directed at plaintiff. Harris, 99 F.3d at 1083.
In the instant case, the court found that the plaintiff “meets her prima facie burden of proof by establishing that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably by her employer than similarly situated employees outside her protected class. Maynard v. Board of Regents of Div. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir.2003); Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 842-43 (11th Cir.2000); EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir.2000). ‘To show that employees are similarly situated, the plaintiff must show that the employees are similarly situated in all relevant respects….’ Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir.2003).”
The court noted, however, that the defendant has also met its burden. So the plaintiff had to show that the proffered reasons were pretext for the real reasons, which she failed to do. She “failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact on her claim of gender discrimination, such that a jury could find in her favor on this claim.”
The court added that “the evidence supports a finding that winning records and years of experience were not the primary considerations of the board when selecting a candidate to fill the vacant coaching positions. Rather, the board member for that district wanted someone who would bring a sense of community to Belgreen. Because plaintiff cannot demonstrate this explanation to be false, the court must grant judgment in defendant’s favor on this claim.” See e.g., Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.1991).
Amy D. Moss v. Franklin County Board of Education; N.D. Ala.; CASE NO. CV-12-J-3811-NW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161563; 11/13/13
Attorneys or Record: (for plaintiff) John D Saxon, Margaret Goldthwaite Murphy, JOHN D SAXON PC, Birmingham, AL. (for defendant) Claire Hyndman Puckett, LEAD ATTORNEY, BISHOP COLVIN JOHNSON & KENT LLP, Birmingham, AL.
