A federal judge from the Middle District of Georgia has granted summary judgment to a school district, which was sued for race discrimination after it terminated the contract of a white physical education teacher, while retaining a black physical education teacher.
The school district successfully justified its decision because the black physical education teacher had also been an otherwise successful head coach of the football and baseball teams.
Plaintiff Scott Blackmon began working for the Stewart County School District as a health and physical education teacher in 2005. At the time, he also served as the head football coach of the school district’s high school. In 2007, Blackmon also became the high school’s athletic director. But the school district soon became dissatisfied with his performance as coach and athletic director.
In 2009, the school district hired John Hamilton to be its new high school principal. Shortly thereafter, district superintendent and individual defendant Floyd Fort removed Blackmon from the AD position and appointed Hamilton, who is black, to the post. Then, Hamilton decided that Blackmon should no longer be head football coach. Fort agreed, in part because the football team only won one game during the three prior seasons with Blackmon at the helm. The district hired Travis Terry, who is black, to fill a vacant physical education teaching position in July 2009 and soon thereafter appointed Terry to be head football coach and head baseball coach.
In addition to the coaching issues, Blackmon narrowly avoided losing his teaching certification after twice failing a computer competency test in 2009, according to the court.
In 2010, the district faced a budget crisis. Fort recommended that the district eliminate several positions, including one of its two physical education teacher positions. Fort suggested that Blackmon’s position be eliminated because Blackmon had no coaching or other extracurricular duties, while the district’s other physical education teacher was the head coach of the football and baseball teams. The school board agreed and eliminated Blackmon’s position.
Blackmon claimed that the school board terminated him because of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Blackmon did not point to any direct evidence of racial discrimination, triggering the three-step framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) for employment discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the employer may articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action. Id. And if the employer articulates a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the plaintiff must “produce evidence that the employer’s proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
In a typical reduction in force case, the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing “(1) that he was in a protected class,” (2) that he was terminated as part of a reduction in force, (3) “that he was qualified for his current position or to assume another position at the time of discharge,” and (4) “evidence by which a fact finder could reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in reaching that decision.” Padilla v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 270 F. App’x 966, 971 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); accord Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998). But this is not a typical reduction in force case. Viewed in the light most favorable to Blackmon, the school district eliminated the elementary school physical education teaching position and kept the middle and high school physical education teaching position. And the school district terminated Blackmon, its middle and high school physical education teacher, and moved Terry into that position. There is no question that Blackmon was a member of a protected class who was qualified for his physical education teaching position. Under these facts, the court is satisfied for purposes of summary judgment that Blackmon has established a prima facie case of race discrimination.
The school district proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision — budget cuts. It could only keep one physical education teacher. And in determining which physical education teacher to keep, the school district decided to retain the physical education teacher who was also head coach of the football and baseball teams.
To show pretext, Blackmon “must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265. “Provided that the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and [he] cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Id. at 1265-66.
Blackmon appears to acknowledge that the school district was perfectly justified in keeping the physical education teacher who also had coaching responsibilities. But Blackmon argues that he never should have been removed as athletic director or head football coach. Pretermitting the question whether Blackmon can raise these issues now (even though he apparently did not formally challenge these employment actions when they occurred in 2009), Blackmon cannot prevail because he pointed to no evidence that his removal from either position was racially motivated.
The school district established, and Blackmon did not rebut, that Blackmon was removed from the athletic director position in part because the school district wanted to improve the athletic department’s image. The school district established, and Blackmon did not rebut, that Blackmon was removed from the head football coach position because of his team’s dismal record during the previous three seasons. Based on this evidence, the school district was reasonable in stripping Blackmon of his football coaching responsibilities. Given that Blackmon lacked coaching responsibilities, it was rational for the school district to terminate him instead of Terry, who was the head coach of two teams. Blackmon cannot quarrel with the wisdom of this legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Cf. Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting, in the context of a failure-to-promote case, that “a plaintiff must show that the disparities between the successful applicant’s and his own qualifications were of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff.”)
Blackmon seems to contend that he can establish intentional discrimination in three other ways. First, Blackmon argues that Fort was out to get him as evidenced by the 2009 teaching certificate incident. Fort believed that Blackmon’s teaching certificate had expired because Blackmon failed a computer competency test at least twice. When Fort called Blackmon into his office to discuss the teaching certificate, Blackmon telephoned a representative of the Georgia Professional Standards Commission, who verified that Blackmon’s teaching certificate had been renewed. Fort did not take any adverse action against Blackmon based on the teaching certificate incident. Nothing about this episode establishes any discriminatory intent on Fort’s part.
Second, Blackmon pointed to evidence that Viola Fedd, the middle school principal and curriculum director of grades 6-12, had racial animus toward him. But “remarks by non-decisionmakers or remarks unrelated to the decisionmaking process itself are not direct evidence of discrimination.” Standard, 161 F.3d at 1330.
In sum, the court concluded that Blackmon failed to point to sufficient evidence to demonstrate genuine factual disputes regarding his employment discrimination claims.
Scott Blackmon v. Stewart County School District and Floyd Fort; M.D. Ga.; CASE NO. 4:13-CV-179 (CDL), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75826; 6/4/14
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) James L Martin, Lead Attorney, Eufaula, AL. (for defendants) Brian C Smith, Lead Attorney, Gainesville, Ga; Phillip L Hartley, Lead Attorney, Gainesville, GA.
To see the full opinion, visit: https://ecf.gamd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013-00179-29-4-cv
