A federal judge from the Middle District of Pennsylvania has dismissed a lawsuit brought by a high school football coach in that state, who claimed that his firing came only after he exercised his right to free speech.
The court afforded plaintiff Ted Jackson Sr. ten days to add more detail and present an amended complaint. Jackson did just that over the summer, and the case was recently sent to mediation.
Ted Jackson Sr. was the head varsity football coach for the Dallas School District for 28 years, beginning in 1984. As such, he led the school district football team to 14 Wyoming Valley Conference titles, four Eastern Conference titles, three District 2 titles, and the 1993 PIAA Class AA state title.
During the 2011 season, the plaintiff’s son, Ted Jackson Jr., came under fire after he was suspended as an assistant football coach for two games during the 2011 season after receiving unsportsmanlike conduct penalties in consecutive games. The elder Jackson expressed his “disappointment in how his son had been treated.”
After a poor evaluation, the plaintiff’s contract was not renewed after the season. Jackson presented evidence that his evaluation went from fairly exemplary to poor in a matter of months.
In the fall of 2012, he sued the school district and several administrators, alleging violations of the United States Constitution and he brings his causes of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Count I asserted a cause of action for violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments rights to speech and association with regard to his termination. Count II asserted that he was not selected for the position of head coach in violation of his speech and association rights. Count I and Count II are asserted against the defendants in their official capacities. Count III and Count IV assert the same causes of action against the defendants in their individual capacities.
The plaintiff sought reinstatement to his former employment; a permanent injunction against the defendants enjoining them from taking adverse employment actions based upon political affiliation, speech and association; a permanent injunction against defendants enjoining them from retaliating against plaintiff for filing this action as vindication of constitutional rights; back pay; compensatory damages; punitive damages; pre-judgment interest; reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and other relief as may be just and equitable.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, pursuant Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the plaintiff did not plead his case with the requisite specificity.
They based their claim on the following grounds:
the plaintiff has failed to properly plead a freedom of speech claim;
the plaintiff was not terminated, his coaching agreement expired;
the defendants are shielded by qualified immunity; and
the plaintiff cannot maintain a punitive damages claim against a municipal defendant or school director in his official capacity.
Regarding the defendant’s first argument that the plaintiff’s claim was inadequate, the court found that he has “not made sufficient allegations for the court to make a reasoned determination as to whether his speech is Constitutionally protected.” Specifically, the plaintiff’s “complaint contains conclusory allegations that the speech is ‘Constitutionally protected’ and that it ‘implicated a matter of public concern as to content, form and context as it involved a matter of political, social or other concern to the community.’ These averments are merely legal conclusions which do not have a presumption of truth, and they can be disregarded.” See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009)
However, the court was willing to give the plaintiff time to amend the complaint, rather than dismissing his case outright.
The court next Turned to the defendant’s next argument, that the plaintiff was not ‘terminated’ because he had a yearly contract that was not renewed.
“Under state law, the plaintiff has no property interest in having his contract renewed for a subsequent year, thus, plaintiff cannot assert a claim for the school failing to renew the contract,” wrote the court. “The plaintiff avers that according to both the United States Supreme Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, a property interest is not required for the assertion of a First Amendment claim.”
While the defendants agreed with the plaintiff that “the First Amendment right to be free from retaliation is not defeated by the lack of property or liberty interest in employment,” they maintained that the plaintiff “either has a termination case or a non-selection case. He could not suffer both.” The court found it “premature” to rule on this argument, suggested instead that more discovery was needed.
Similarly, the court noted that making a determination whether the defendants were shielded from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity was also premature.
To decide such a case, a court “must determine if the facts alleged show a violation of a Constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. … (I)f the plaintiff establishes his claims, then qualified immunity will not protect the defendants. This portion of the defendants’ motion to dismiss will thus be denied.”
On the last argument, the court again ruled that more times was needed. “If the plaintiff does establish that the individual defendants acted as alleged then a jury may conclude that the school directors acted ‘in the face of a perceived risk’ that their action would violate federal law, and an award of punitive damages may be appropriate. Thus, we will not dismiss the punitive damages claim.”
Ted Jackson, Sr. v. Dallas School District et al.; M.D. Pa.; No. 3:12cv1903, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85704; 6/19/13
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Joseph C. Borland, LEAD ATTORNEY, Borland & Borland, LLP, Wilkes-Barre, PA; Kimberly D. Borland, LEAD ATTORNEY, Borland & Borland, Wilkes-Barre, PA. (for defendants) Andrew T. Bench, King Spty Herman Freund & Paul LLC, Bethlehem, PA; John E. Freund , III, King Spry Herman Freund & Faul, LLC, Bethlehem, PA.
