A federal judge from the Southern District of Mississippi has delivered a mixed ruling for the president of the University of Southern Mississippi (USM), who was sued, along with the school and interim athletic director, by the former senior associate athletics director for internal affairs.
In the wake of her firing, plaintiff Diane Stark filed suit in November of 2012 against USM, Interim AD Jeff Hammond, and School President Dr. Martha Saunders in the Circuit Court of Forrest County, Mississippi. She alleged the following claims for relief under state law: intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; breach of implied contract; constructive discharge; outrage; negligence; menace; promissory estoppel; equitable estoppel; and detrimental reliance. It was alleged, inter alia, that Hammond made the workplace intolerable, that USM and Dr. Saunders ratified Hammond’s conduct, that USM breached a contractual obligation to compensate the plaintiff through June of 2012, and that the plaintiff was wrongfully terminated as a result of reporting Hammond’s misconduct.
On February 6, 2013, the plaintiff filed an amended pleading in the state court, adding federal claims under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. These federal claims center upon alleged gender discrimination. Later that month, the defendants removed the litigation to federal court.
On July 10, 2013, Stark filed an amended complaint, adding the Board of Trustees as a defendant. The amended complaint also includes a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of the plaintiff’s Equal Protection and Due Process rights, as well as her rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
On August 26, 2013, Dr. Saunders moved to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). She claimed specifically she was entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s Constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The court noted that a state official sued in his individual capacity under § 1983 is protected by qualified immunity insofar as his “‘conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 2013)
Furthermore, “Overcoming qualified immunity requires showing that (1) an official’s conduct violated a Constitutional right of the plaintiff and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Williams v. City of Cleveland, Miss., 736 F.3d 684, 688 (5th Cir. 2013)
The court considered the plaintiff’s First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process claims in that order.
Regarding the First Amendment, the court found that the plaintiff “was primarily speaking as an employee and not a public citizen in asserting her various grievances regarding Jeff Hammond. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to state a legally cognizable violation of the First Amendment, and no consideration of the objective reasonableness of Dr. Saunders’ conduct (the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis) is necessary. Dr. Saunders’ request for dismissal of this claim will be granted.”
The analysis of the Equal Protection claim was less clear-cut.
Dr. Saunders argued that the plaintiff has “failed to allege any specific conduct” by which she “violated any rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause. This argument is well taken with respect to the plaintiff’s unequal pay allegation, but not her failure to promote claim. A supervisory official ‘cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.’ Hampton v. Oktibbeha County Sheriff Dep’t, 480 F.3d 358, 365 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux, 768 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1985)).”
In summary, the plaintiff’s claim “against Dr. Saunders under § 1983 for violation of her right to equal protection based on unequal pay will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, whereas the plaintiff’s failure to promote claim (grounded on the same legal bases) will proceed past the pleading stage. Dr. Saunders may seek dismissal of this remaining cause of action at the summary judgment stage or at trial.”
As to the due process claim, the court looked first at the procedural component of the Due Process Clause.
On this, it was unwilling to find “at the pleading stage that the provisions of USM’s employee handbook did not give rise to a protected property interest, or that Dr. Saunders’ alleged failure to hear the plaintiff’s grievances and complaints was ‘objectively reasonable.’ Jabary v. City of Allen, No. 12-41054, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23628, 2013 WL 6153241, at *9 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2013). The plaintiff’s procedural due process claim brought against Dr. Saunders under § 1983 based on the procedures in USM’s employee handbook will not be dismissed at this point in the litigation. However, Dr. Saunders’ entitlement to qualified immunity on this claim may be revisited after further factual development at the summary judgment stage or at trial.”
Diane Stark v. University Of Southern Mississippi et al.; S.D. Miss.;
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13cv31-KS-MTP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39134; 3/25/14
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Kim Turner Chaze, LEAD ATTORNEY, KIM T. CHAZE, ATTORNEY, Eufaula, AL. (for defendants) Alan M. Purdie, LEAD ATTORNEY, PURDIE & METZ, PLLC, Ridgeland, MS. J. Cal Mayo, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, Paul B. Watkins, Jr., MAYO MALLETTE, PLLC, Oxford, MS
