A California state appeals court has affirmed a lower court’s ruling that a high school baseball coach, who was dismissed after the last day of classes at Mira Costa High School (MCHS), was properly classified as a “temporary athletic team coach” and was not entitled to the specified protections afforded a “probationary” certificated teacher.
In so ruling, the panel found that the district was not required to give him written notice that he was a temporary employee, since the notice requirement of Education Code, section 44916, did not apply to coaches because section 44919, subd. (b), “expressly defined the position of an athletic coach as temporary.”
Michael Neily was hired by the Manhattan Beach Unified School District in January 2002 as a “certificated” teacher and varsity baseball coach at MCHS. In June 2004, the District relieved Neily of his duties as a full-time teacher, but continued his employment as the baseball coach at MCHS. On June 15, 2009, MCHS’s principal, Julie Ruisinger, advised Neily “of an intent to terminate his services” as the school’s baseball coach.
Neily initially filed a “grievance” against the District and then on Aug. 10, 2009, a verified petition for writ of traditional mandate, arguing that the District had unlawfully classified him as a temporary employee, and that the District had a mandatory duty under the Education Code to classify him as either a probationary or substitute employee.
At trial on Sept. 22, 2009, the trial court dismissed Neily’s complaint, ruling that “a baseball coach is classified as a temporary employee under aforementioned Education Code. “Neily could be given notice of termination ‘at any time before the end of the school year.’ (Citing Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 918 [129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 62 P.3d 54].
Neily appealed, claiming that when the trial court ruled, he was not a ‘probationary.’
Elaborating, the court wrote that Neily’s implicit argument in his current appeal is that “there is one, mutually exclusive path to defining a position as temporary, namely, a school district must expressly indicate that the position is temporary in a written statement given to an employee in compliance with section 44916. The trial court did not accept Neily’s argument, and neither do we.
“In our view, there is a second path to defining a position as temporary, namely, a section of the Education Code expressly defines the position as temporary. Unfortunately for Neily, there is a section of the Education Code providing such a definition applicable to his case. Section 44919, subdivision (b), expressly and unambiguously provides that a school district ‘shall classify as temporary employees persons … who are employed to serve in a limited assignment supervising athletic activities of pupils.’”
“Because there is no evidence in the record to dispute that the District employed Neily to serve in a limited assignment supervising athletic activities of pupils, Neily is incorrect that the District had a duty mandated by law to classify him as a probationary employee,” wrote the court. “To the extent Neily argues he performed the duties of a certificated teacher within his role as baseball coach, we simply do not see evidence in the record supporting his position. In short, we find that the more specific provision in section 44919, subdivision (b), controls over the more generally applicable provisions found in section 44916, given the facts in Neily’s current case.”
Michael Neily v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District; Ct. App. Calif., 2d App. Dist., Div. 8; 192 Cal. App. 4th 187; 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 92; 1/27/11
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff and appellant) Daniel M. Graham. (for defendant and respondent) Gibeaut, Mahan & Briscoe, Gary R. Gibeaut and John W. Allen.
