A student athlete, who alleged that she was a victim of sexual harassment by her coach and that her school condoned it, has withstood, for the most part, the school’s motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff Beth Bloomer was a student-athlete at Becker College in Worcester, Massachusetts, where she was a member of the equestrian team. The team was coached by Edmund Paro, a 67-year-old male.
Throughout the fall 2007 semester, Paro used sexual innuendo when instructing the team, according to Bloomer’s complaint. For example, when instructing the team on what type of clothing they should wear in competition, he allegedly suggested shirts that would allow spectators a more explicit view of their breasts as they rode. He also recommended that they wear “thong” style underwear, so that spectators would have a more explicit view of their buttocks.
Bloomer also suggested that Paro touched members of the team in a sexually suggestive manner, pinching members of the team on the buttocks and massaging their backs “to relieve sore shoulders.”
“As he engaged in this behavior, Paro constantly reminded team members that he decided who would ride which horse and who would participate in competitions and enjoy other benefits of being on the equestrian team,” according to Bloomer. “He also exhibited favoritism when he gave particular team members horses to ride.”
In October 2007, a complaint was filed with Becker College, alleging that Paro was sexually harassing members of the equestrian team. On November 23, 2007, the school issued a “Final Warning” to Paro.
That fall, Bloomer began experiencing roommate troubles, and Para offered to let her stay in a room at her house. This happened several times. Bloomer alleged that each time Para would try to get her to drink alcohol and he would touch her thighs and breasts. The complaint recounted several more incidents where Para allegedly made advances toward Bloomer. She also claimed the school was indifferent toward her.
Bloomer would ultimately sue, alleging claims under Title IX, sexual harassment, negligence and breach of contract, among other things.
The court addressed the two Title IX counts, or deliberate indifference to a hostile educational environment (Count 1) and quid pro quo sexual harassment (Count 2).
“The plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Becker officials with authority to take corrective action had actual notice of Paro’s sexual harassment of female students on the equestrian team. The plaintiff alleges that in October 2007, a complaint was filed with Becker alleging that Paro was sexually harassing members of the equestrian team. She further alleges that on November 23, 2007, Becker issued a ‘Final Warning’ to Paro (suggesting, among other things, that he had received earlier warnings).
“The plaintiff has also alleged that Becker exhibited deliberate indifference to her allegations of sexual harassment. In particular, she alleges that she attempted to complain about Paro to Dean Zinno’s office, but was told to come back later because the other complaint was being investigated. The plaintiff also alleges that when she went to Kirsten Garvey to complain about Paro’s behavior, she was told to come back after the semester break. Those allegations, taken together, are sufficient for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) to allege that Becker had the requisite degree of knowledge. The complaint therefore states a claim for sexual harassment under Title IX.”
Similarly, the court found that “a reasonable inference under the circumstances” could be assumed that the plaintiff “had to tolerate Paro’s ongoing harassment in order to receive the full benefits of membership on the equestrian team and the related educational benefits. For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), that is sufficient to state a claim for quid pro quo harassment.”
Counts 3 and 4 alleged that Becker “violated Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 151C (the equivalent of Title IX under Massachusetts law) through its deliberate indifference to the hostile educational environment (Count 3) and quid pro quo sexual harassment (Count 4) by its employee.” Using a similar rationale, the court denied that part of the defendant’s motion that applied to these counts.
The court was more receptive to the defendant’s motions on the remaining counts, except for count 6.
Count 5 asserted a claim for assault and battery alleging that Becker is vicariously liable for the tortious acts committed by Paro, its employee. But the court, in dismissing that count, found “that the acts alleged could not have been committed within the scope of Paro’s employment,” which is a requirement of such a claim.
Count 6 alleged that Becker “is vicariously liable for a false imprisonment imposed on her by Paro. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Paro falsely imprisoned her on November 9, 2007, by driving her from the equestrian facility to his house and refusing to drive her home, and also on November 30, 2007, when he forced her into his hotel room and onto his bed.”
The court wrote that “in the context of a motion to dismiss, the court must take all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and deny the motion if her claim is plausible on its face. It is at least plausible that Paro was acting, at least in part, in Becker’s interest when he allegedly falsely imprisoned the plaintiff. Moreover, these acts occurred within the time and space parameters of his employment as Becker’s equestrian coach. The allegations of false imprisonment set forth in the complaint are therefore sufficient to state a claim that Paro’s acts were committed within the purview of his authority.”
Counts 7 and 8 alleged negligent retention and supervision of an employee by Becker that caused injury to the plaintiff. Becker successfully argued that these counts should be dismissed because the plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that her damages were reasonably foreseeable.
Finally, count 9 alleged that Becker breached a contract with the plaintiff by failing to provide an academic environment free from sexual harassment, assault and battery, and false imprisonment. Becker argued successfully that that count should be dismissed because the plaintiff has not alleged the essential elements of a breach of contract claim.
Beth Bloomer v. Becker College and Edmund J. Paro; D. Mass.; Civil Action No. 09-11342-FDS; 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82997; 8/13/10
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Douglas A. Pettis, North Providence, RI; Michael F. Natola, Boston, MA. (for defendant) Christine Z. Freund, Holland & Knight (B), Boston, MA; Joseph G. Yannetti, Morrison Mahoney LLP, Boston, MA; Lawrence F. Boyle, Morrison, Mahoney, & Miller LLP, Boston, MA; Paul G. Lannon, Jr., Holland & Knight, LLP, Boston, MA. Alan K. Tannenwald, Rebecca J. Wilson, Peabody & Arnold LLP, Boston, MA.
