An Illinois state appeals court affirmed the finding of a trial court that the Constitutional rights of an international student athlete supersede the general rule of noninterference with a high school athletic association’s bylaws. Thus, the court affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the amended bylaw of the Illinois High School Association (IHSA), which would have made the international student athlete ineligible unless he was living with a parent or legal guardian within the school district.
Plaintiff Rodrigue Ceda Makindu, who was born in the Democratic Republic of Congo, arrived in the U.S. on October 2, 2012 on an F-1 student visa. He arrived with the help of James Schmidt, who is currently the athletic director of the Plano schools. The plaintiff, then 16, began attending Mooseheart Child City and School, Inc. (Mooseheart). Mooseheart is a residential school that the Moose Fraternal Organization founded over 100 years ago to help students in need. All students reside on campus.
Mooseheart is a member of the IHSA, which is administered by a board of directors and its executive director, currently Martin Hickman. Hickman’s duties include interpreting IHSA bylaws and making eligibility determinations for students to participate in IHSA activities, including interscholastic sports.
In 2012, the plaintiff, through Mooseheart, sought a determination from Hickman regarding the plaintiff’s eligibility to participate in IHSA activities. Hickman informed the plaintiff that, under the current bylaws, the plaintiff would not be able to participate until October 2, 2013.
Specifically, bylaw 3.034.3. provided that students who were not participating in “an approved student exchange program” or living with a parent or guardian would not be able to participate in IHSA activities.
The plaintiff appealed Hickman’s decision to the IHSA board of directors. On December 16, 2013, the board affirmed Hickman’s decision.
On February 26, 2014, the plaintiff filed a complaint and a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), seeking to set aside Hickman’s decision and allow the plaintiff to play interscholastic sports. On February 28, 2014, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a TRO.
On October 1, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the amended bylaw violated his equal protection rights under both the United States and the Illinois constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2.
On October 27, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary and a permanent injunction to prevent the IHSA from implementing amended bylaw 3.034.3, thereby allowing him to participate in interscholastic sports for his senior year.
On November 21, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Among the evidence presented by the IHSA was a document that the National Federation of State High School Associations had authored, which described numerous concerns arising from the athletic participation of F-1 visa students who do not come through approved foreign exchange programs that randomly place foreign students.
The association also presented evidence that associations in other states, such as in Indiana and in Kentucky, had adopted similar rules restricting participation by international students in non-approved programs. Some states, such as Ohio, had chosen to limit the number of international students who may participate at any member school.
Schmidt, meanwhile, testified that the plaintiff had e-mailed him and asked about playing basketball in the United States. Schmidt forwarded his e-mail correspondence with the plaintiff to Karl Rife, the executive director of Mooseheart. Schmidt contacted Mooseheart because he knew that there would be no tuition there. Mooseheart ultimately accepted the plaintiff as a student and waived his tuition.
On December 1, 2014, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the IHSA from enforcing its amended bylaw. The trial court found that the plaintiff had raised a “fair question” that his right to equal protection had been violated. In addition, the trial court found that a preliminary injunction was warranted because the plaintiff had established the likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his claim.
The IHSA appealed. Among its arguments was that the trial court failed to afford due deference to the IHSA’s well-established right to craft and enforce bylaws deemed necessary by its membership to further the IHSA’s legitimate interests in creating a level playing field and preventing recruitment of foreign athletes.
The appeals court honed in on the IHSA’s rational for creating the amended bylaw, which it suspected was “related to its recent conflicts with Mooseheart,” which had become an athletic power in recent years due to an influx of international students.
“(T)he trial court properly determined that allowing the plaintiff to play basketball during his senior year best maintained the status quo,” wrote the appeals court.
“Had the IHSA not amended the bylaw, the plaintiff would have been able to play high school basketball during his senior year. The constitutionality of that amended bylaw is what the parties are disputing. Thus, to return the parties to where they would have been without the controversy, they must be returned to where they were before the bylaw was enacted. As that is what the trial court did, the trial court properly maintained the status quo.”
The appeals court also rejected the IHSA’s argument that its amended bylaw “is entitled to great deference. Relying on Proulx v. Illinois High School Ass’n, 125 Ill. App. 3d 781, 787, 466 N.E.2d 620, 81 Ill. Dec. 34 (1984), and Lee v. Snyder, 285 Ill. App. 3d 555, 560, 673 N.E.2d 1136, 220 Ill. Dec. 715 (1996), the IHSA argues that a court cannot substitute its judgment regarding the application of an association’s bylaw absent clear and convincing evidence that the bylaw was enacted as the result of fraud, collusion, or mistake of fact. However, an association’s bylaw cannot violate one’s Constitutional rights. See Griffin High School v. Illinois High School Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1987) (association’s bylaws cannot violate person’s right to equal protection); see also Lee, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 559 (acknowledging an exception to the general rule of noninterference with an association’s bylaws where one’s constitutional rights are at issue). Thus, as the plaintiff’s equal-protection rights were at issue, the trial court was not obligated to defer to the IHSA’s judgment in the amendment of bylaw 3.034.3.”
Rodrigue Ceda Makindu v. Illinois High School Association; App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist.; No. 2-14-1201; 2015 Ill. App. LEXIS 362; 5/14/15
