A Texas state appeals court has affirmed a decision denying the application of the public-interest exception in a case involving a challenge to the state athletic association’s rule requiring student-athletes to abstain from athletics for a year when they transfer to another school for athletic reasons.
The plaintiffs in the case were C.J. and Mathew Hatten. During the 2002-2003 school year, the Hattens participated in athletic events at their high school in the Celina I.S.D. The court noted that the Hattens experienced behavioral problems while at the school, which the parents partly attributed to the Celina coaches’ method of disciplining Mathew. In March 2003, the Hatten family moved from Celina to Pilot Point, Texas. In order to participate in athletics in the Pilot Point I.S.D., C.J. and Matthew had to receive approval from Celina I.S.D. that their move to Pilot Point was not for athletic purposes. The Celina athletic director determined that the move was for athletic purposes.
The University Interscholastic League district executive committee determined that C.J. and Mathew changed schools for athletic purposes and were, therefore, ineligible to participate in UIL competition at their new school. This decision centered on UIL Rule 443c (the “athletic-purposes rule”) which states: “A student who changes schools for athletic purposes is not eligible to compete in varsity league athletic contest(s) at the school to which he or she moves for at least one calendar year, even if both parents move to the new school district attendance zone.”
The suspension period was from March 28, 2003 until March 27, 2004. The Hattens appealed to the UIL state executive committee, which affirmed the decision. In October 2003, the Hattens filed suit in Travis County district court, seeking a declaration that they have a due-process interest under the Texas Constitution because of the stigmatizing effect of the UIL’s actions and, in turn, have been deprived of the full evidentiary hearing to which they are entitled.
The district court issued temporary restraining orders and later temporary injunctions, which allowed C.J. and Mathew to play varsity sports despite the UIL’s ruling that they were ineligible, and both students played varsity sports during their year of alleged ineligibility. After a bench trial on the merits, the district court entered a final judgment, denying the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by appellants, declaring that the decisions of the UIL were supported by substantial evidence, dissolving the temporary injunctions, and denying attorneys’ fees to all parties.
The plaintiffs appealed the ruling.
The appeals court recapped the UIL’s argument: “the case is moot because C.J.’s senior year is over, and Mathew’s year of ineligibility has expired. Thus, before reaching the merits, we must determine whether there is a live controversy to be resolved, or whether the matter has now become moot and unreviewable.
“The holding in University Interscholastic League v. Jones, 715 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) is helpful in determining the mootness issue in this case. Gregory Jones, a junior at Irving MacArthur High School and a player on the school’s football team, moved from Irving to Highland Park. Id. at 760. The UIL determined that he had moved for athletic purposes and that he was therefore barred from playing football his senior year at Highland Park. Id. Jones sued to void the UIL’s actions and to enjoin it from preventing him from playing football at Highland Park or from penalizing Highland Park for allowing him to play. Id. The trial court granted the injunctive relief, allowing him to play football at Highland Park, and he later graduated from high school. Id. The UIL appealed, and without reaching the merits, the court stated: ‘Because of the injunction, Jones was allowed to play football at Highland Park. Jones played the 1985 football season and he has since graduated. Therefore, the question of the impropriety of the trial court’s action is now moot.’ Id.
“Here, because C.J.’s and Mathew’s period of ineligibility has expired, and because C.J. has graduated, this appeal is now moot.”
The appellants argued that the exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply, according to the court. “The Texas Supreme Court has recognized only two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception; and (2) the collateral-consequences exception. FDIC, 886 S.W.2d at 767; Gen. Land Office v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990).” The court held that neither applied.
It added, however, that the public-interest exception may permits judicial review of questions of (1) “’considerable public importance’ (2) if the nature of the action makes it capable of repetition and yet prevents effective judicial review.”
But “neither party has cited nor have we found any cases applying the public-interest exception to the UIL’s athletic-purposes rule. In University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.–Austin1993, no writ), the court reviewed the application of the UIL’s ‘over-19 rule’ pursuant to the public-interest exception. Id. at 304. In that case, two students, each of whom attended high school in different districts, obtained a final judgment, enjoining enforcement of the UIL’s over-19 rule and its mandatory-forfeiture rule. Id. at 301, 303. This relief allowed them to participate in the 1991 football season. Id. at 300-01. The UIL appealed, and both students argued the appeal was moot because the 1991 football season had ended and they had graduated. Id. at 303-04. The court distinguished this case from cases holding that the appeals were moot either because the football eligibility of the students had expired or because the student had graduated from high school, stating: ‘[T]he school districts, which are parties to this appeal, have a direct interest in the continued viability of the district court judgment to prevent the UIL from enforcing the mandatory forfeiture rule. Therefore, . . . we have decided to review the case pursuant to a ‘public interest exception’ to the mootness doctrine, . . . .’ Id. at 304 (citation omitted).”
“The facts in Buchanan are distinguishable from the facts in this case. Here, neither Celina I.S.D. nor Pilot Point I.S.D. are parties to this appeal, and neither school district claims a direct interest in the continued viability of the judgment to prevent the UIL from enforcing the mandatory-forfeiture rule. Thus, even though Buchanan concerned the application of a UIL rule, it does not control the disposition of this cause.
“The instant cause is akin to Texas Education Agency v. Dallas Independent School District, 797 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App.–Austin 1990, no writ), which involved the application of the ‘no-pass, no-play” law. Id. at 368. In that case, the state commissioner of education concluded that Carter High School (CHS), a school within the Dallas I.S.D., had used a football player who was ineligible under the ‘no-pass, no-play’ law and declared the entire CHS football team ineligible. Id. As a result, Dallas I.S.D. sued the UIL and other defendants, seeking an order enjoining them from interfering with CHS’s participation in the 1988 championship. Id. The trial court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from disqualifying CHS from ‘”the rights and privileges associated with participation in the 1988 University Interscholastic League Class 5-A state football championship.”’ Id. The appellate court stated that because the 1988 championship had passed, the appeal was moot. Id. at 369. The court further stated that neither the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception nor the collateral-consequences exception applied. Id.
“Here, the evidence does not show that the athletic-purposes rule is more important than the ‘no-pass, no-play’ law, see Tex. Educ. Agency, 797 S.W.2d at 369, or that the rule has the same ‘considerable public importance’ as the attachment and priority of, and ability to foreclose upon, tax liens when the FDIC holds a lien against the same property in its capacity as a receiver, See Whitley Trucks, 865 S.W.2d at 126; a county’s acceptance of bids for construction contracts, Securtec, 106 S.W.3d at 811; or revocation of a person’s concealed handgun license. Lafleur, 32 S.W.3d at 914. We hold, therefore, that the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply to this case.”
C.J. Hatten et al v. University Interscholastic League et al; Ct.App.Tex; 13th Dist.; NO. 13-06-313; LEXIS 7795; 9/27/07
Attorneys of Record: (for appellants) Bill Aleshire, Jennifer S. Riggs, Riggs & Aleshire, PC, Austin, TX. (for appellees) Eugene A. Clayborn, Assistant Attorney General, Administrative Law Division, Brenda E. Brockner, Office of Attorney General of TX, Administrative Law Division, Austin, TX.
