By Tyler Charlton, Emory Law 3L
In November 1994, the voters of Rhode Island approved a constitutional provision designed to restrict gambling within the state. Under the state’s new constitutional provision, article 6, section 22, a majority of “electors voting in a statewide referendum” must authorize any new type, or types, of gambling. In addition, the provision stated that a majority of voters in the particular municipality must approve the legislation via a local referendum. Approximately 20 years later, this constitutional provision was amended to further restrict gambling by requiring a vote on any new gambling locations as well.
Even with the state’s constitutional mechanism in place, the Rhode Island General Assembly expanded gambling, in two, separate ways. In 2011 and 2016, legislation was passed that authorized “state-operated casino gaming” at Twin River-Lincoln Casino and Tiverton Casino Hotel (also owned by Twin River), respectively. Each act of legislation (collectively titled the Casino Gaming Acts) received the requisite number of votes and went into effect. In addition to the Casino Gaming Acts, Rhode Island’s General Assembly also passed the 2018 Sports Wagering Legislation and the 2019 Online Sports Wagering Legislation (collectively, the Sports Wagering Acts). The Sports Wagering Acts, however, did not proceed through the established process of voter approval via a state and local referendum. As such, their enactment became the basis of litigation. Specifically, Plaintiff Daniel Harrop alleged the Sports Wagering Acts violated the Rhode Island Constitution. For this reason, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment and sought a declaratory judgment to declare these acts as unconstitutional.
In response to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendants raised two objections to summary judgment. They were as follows: (1) Plaintiff’s claim is not justiciable; and (2) Plaintiff is estopped from challenging the constitutionality of article 6, section 22. As threshold issues, the Court individually addressed each objection prior to analyzing Plaintiff’s constitutional argument. The Court found neither argument persuasive.
With regard to justiciability, the Court articulated that two requirements must necessarily be met. The first requirement is that a plaintiff must have standing. Previously, the Court already found that Plaintiff had standing and consequently declined to revisit the issue. The second component requires that “the plaintiff … have some ‘legal hypothesis which will entitle the plaintiff to real and articulable relief.’” Although such relief typically comes in the form of damages, the Court held there was a justiciable controversy because Plaintiff requested both declaratory and injunctive relief. Upon finding a justiciable controversy, the Court next considered the issue of estoppel. Here, the Court simply deferred to the holdings of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Specifically, the (state’s) Supreme Court had never applied this estoppel doctrine in any context other than in administrative[7] and zoning matters.[8] As a result, the Court declined to extend the doctrine to the present matter.
After resolving the threshold issues, the Court moved to the principal arguments and considered the constitutionality of the Sports Wagering Acts. The Court used a two-step approach, which involved determining whether: (1) sports wagering is a type of casino gaming and (2) the 2012 and 2016 referenda gave Rhode Island voters “fair notice” that they were authorizing sports wagering. The Court also analyzed whether the 2019 Online Sports Wagering Legislation impermissibly expanded the locations of gambling.
In considering the first aspect of the constitutional issue, the Court determined that sports wagering constitutes a form of casino gaming. The Court arrived at this conclusion for two reasons. First, under the Casino Gaming Acts, casino gaming is explicitly defined to encompass “casino-style games played with … equipment, for money.” Under the Sports Wagering Acts, sports wagering is clearly played with equipment and for money, which places it squarely within the definition of casino gaming. Secondarily, federal regulations explicitly provide that sports betting is included in Class III gaming. Because sports wagering is a type of Class III gaming, which is considered a form of casino gaming, sports betting was effectively authorized through approval of the Casino Gaming Acts.
Having determined that sports wagering falls within the definition of casino gaming, the Court proceeded to the second step of the analysis. As an initial matter, the Court determined that both the public referendum and ballots complied with statutory requirements. Next, the Court considered the fair notice requirement. In general, a referendum is required to accurately present the question or issue and apprise the citizen enough so they may make an intelligent and informed decision. However, fair notice does not necessarily mean that every detail or ramification is explained. Here, the Court held that the Referenda Questions and Handbooks utilized language indicating the list of table games in the legislation was non-exhaustive. As such, the provided definition of casino gaming did not preclude sports wagering and consequently provided “fair notice.” The Court also noted that voters are presumed to know the law. The Court determined voters were provided ample information to understand that sports wagering would be authorized through approval of the Casino Gaming Acts.
Finally, the Court analyzed a secondary constitutional issue created by the 2014 amendment to the constitutional provision. Plaintiff argued the 2019 Online Sports Wagering Legislation permitted gambling in various new locations through creation of a “virtual casino,” which consequently required voter approval under the Constitution. The Court, however, articulated that all sports wagers servers were located at either of the Twin River Facilities. As a result, no gambling activity occurred outside of legislatively approved locations and thus there was no constitutional violation.
In conclusion, the Court determined the Sports Wagering Acts were constitutional and dismissed Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Harrop v. R.I. Div. of Lotteries; R.I. Super. Ct.; No. PC-2019-5273, 2020 R.I. Super. LEXIS 45; 6/1/20
[7] Easton’s Point Ass’n v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 522 A.2d 199 (R.I. 1987).
[8] Russell v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 219 A.2d 475 (1966).
