A federal judge from the Middle District of Florida has granted, in part, the Florida High School Athletic Association (FHSAA), Inc.’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint of a high school student-athlete, who claimed he was discriminated against based on his disability.
Plaintiff Thomas Pritchard, an 18-year-old high school senior at the Canterbury School in Fort Myers, did gain a small victory, however, when the court denied the FHSAA’s motion to dismiss his disparate impact claim, ruling that it would be premature to make such a ruling, prior to discovery.
In providing context to its ruling, the court noted that the FHSAA adopts and publishes bylaws relating to student-athlete eligibility. One such bylaw provides the following:
“9.5.1 High School Student Has Four Years of Eligibility. A student is limited to four consecutive school years of eligibility beginning with school year he/she begins ninth grade for the first time. This does not imply that the student has four years of participation. After four consecutive school years, the student is permanently ineligible.”
This relevancy of the bylaw comes into play after a review of Pritchard’s circumstances. The plaintiff participated in interscholastic athletics in Virginia in 9th and 10th grade. He then moved to Florida, where he enrolled at Canterbury High School. Based on a pre-enrollment assessment, Canterbury administrators recommended that he repeat the 10th grade. Plaintiff did so, and competed in the school’s basketball and lacrosse programs. The following year in the 11th grade, plaintiff competed in the school’s football, basketball, and lacrosse programs. Under the defendant’s Bylaw 9.5.1, this was the final year of plaintiff’s eligibility because it was his fourth consecutive year in high school.
Pritchard entered the 12th grade at Canterbury with hopes of participating in another year of athletics. In August 2018, Canterbury filed a request with the defendant to waive Bylaw 9.5.1 and allow the plaintiff to have a fifth year of eligibility. During the 2017-18 school year, Canterbury staff recommended a psychologist test the plaintiff. A full psychoeducational evaluation concluded the plaintiff possessed a learning disorder with impairment in reading and comprehension. Canterbury administrators also identified a previous injury to the plaintiff’s hand, which caused him to have to write with his non-dominate hand, as a physical disability that adversely affected his math proficiency. As a supplement to the school’s requested waiver, the plaintiff’s attorney argued that a waiver was appropriate because of, inter alia, the plaintiff’s learning disability and his hand injury.
The FHSAA’s Sectional Appeals Committee held a hearing on the matter on Sept. 6, 2018 and ultimately denied the request for a waiver. A second hearing was held on Oct. 4, 2018 with the same result. The plaintiff appealed the committee’s decision to defendant’s Board of Directors, which conducted a hearing on Oct. 28, 2018. The Board upheld the committee’s ruling denying the waiver on Nov. 1, 2018.
On Feb. 13, 2019, the plaintiff filed a three-count verified complaint against the defendant, alleging the following: (1) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); (2) disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and (3) disparate impact discrimination under the ADA. He sought a judgment declaring Bylaw 9.5.1 discriminatory as it applied to him, a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, and monetary damages.
Less than a month later, the FHSAA moved to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim. The court granted that motion, leading the plaintiff to file an amended complaint on Feb. 25, 2020. That complaint alleges the following three claims: (1) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); (2) disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and (3) violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution.
On June 1, 2020, the court partially granted defendant’s previously filed motion to dismiss count three of the second amended complaint, and the Fourteenth Amendment portion of the claim was dismissed.
The instant opinion addresses the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in which it argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims because the plaintiff is not “disabled” under those statutes. Regarding count three, the motion asserts the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim and therefore defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
Addressing the claim for disability discrimination under the ADA first, the court noted that Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
“The term ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
“To state a claim under Title II, plaintiff must show (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by reason of plaintiff’s disability. Bricoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007).”
The second amended complaint alleges the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff “by reason of his disabilities by (1) considering his disabilities during the waiver request, and (2) refusing to reasonably accommodate him. The main argument in defendant’s motion for summary judgment is that the plaintiff is not disabled under the ADA. In support, the defendant relies on the psychological report diagnosing plaintiff’s learning disorder, medical records relating to the plaintiff’s hand injury, and admissions made by plaintiff during discovery. The plaintiff responds that the record establishes he has three disabilities: the learning disorder, the hand injury, and alcoholism,” which the court addressed in turn.
In considering the learning disorder, the court reasoned that the plaintiff presented “sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his learning disorder substantially limits his ability to learn. Therefore, summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate.”
Turning to the hand injury, the court wrote that for the plaintiff to demonstrate that for the injury to constitute “a physical impairment, the plaintiff must show that it substantially limits his ability to learn.” As evidence, the plaintiff relied on “letters written by his mother and the Canterbury math lab director.”
The court noted that “because neither of these letters qualify as sworn statements, they cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.” See First-Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., Inc. v. Brannon, 722 Fed. App’x 902, 905 (11th Cir. 2018). Thus, “there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could determine the hand injury substantially limits the plaintiff’s ability to learn. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to show his hand injury is a disability under the ADA, and, therefore, summary judgment on this issue is appropriate.”
Finally, the plaintiff claims he suffers from alcoholism, which he argues is a disability under federal law.
However, “despite the plaintiff’s alleged alcohol dependence, he was able to participate in sports throughout his life, never received a grade below a C at Canterbury, and was admitted to college. ‘In sum, while Plaintiff’s alcohol dependence may have caused him intermittent periods of temporary incapacity, these periodic issues did not rise to the level of establishing a permanent impairment and, thus, do not constitute a disability under the ADA.’ Knowles, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161929, 2011 WL 13175198, does not qualify as a disability under the ADA. … Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate.”
Regarding count two in the second amended complaint, or disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the court noted that to establish a prima facie case on such grounds, the plaintiff must show that he was: “(1) disabled or perceived to be disabled; (2) a qualified individual; and (3) discriminated against on the basis of his disability. Shannon v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S. Postal Serv., 335 Fed. App’x 21, 24 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005)).
In seeking to have count two dismissed, the defendant “made the same argument as it did on the ADA claim: plaintiff is not ‘disabled’ for purposes of the statute.”
Using the same standards as claims raised under the ADA, the court determined that the plaintiff’s hand injury and alcoholism “do not constitute disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act. However, because there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s learning disorder constitutes a disability under both statutes, summary judgment on count two as a whole is inappropriate.”
Thomas Pritchard v. Florida High School Athletic Association, Inc; M.D. Fla.; Case No: 2:19-cv-94-FtM-29MRM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114512 *; 2020 WL 3542652; 6/30/20
Attorneys of Record: (for plaintiff) Michael Lamar Buckner, Michael L. Buckner Law Firm, P.A., Plantation, FL (for defendant) Leonard E. Ireland, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, Clayton-Johnston, PA, Gainesville, FL.
