A federal judge from the Northern District of Illinois has granted the Southeastern Conference’s motion to dismiss it from a class action lawsuit, in which former University of Florida athletes alleged the SEC and NCAA were negligent in how they handled their concussions.
Specifically, the court ruled that the plaintiffs could not prove that the conference had sufficient ties to Indiana where the case was initially filed. Therefore, jurisdiction could not be established.
The SEC was represented by Robinson Bradshaw attorneys Robert W. Fuller, Pearlynn G. Houck, Stephen M. Cox and Richard C. Worf.
Plaintiff Jamie Richardson filed the action individually and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated student-athletes, who played football for the University of Florida (UF). He sued based upon theories of negligence, fraudulent concealment, breach of express and implied contract, breach of express contract as a third-party beneficiary, and unjust enrichment, all arising out of the defendants’ alleged failure to adopt and implement adequate concussion treatment, concussion management safety protocols, and return-to-play guidelines.
The SEC’s motion to dismiss argued that the claim should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6).
As for the underlying argument, Richardson, who played wide receiver for the UF football team from 1994 to 1996, claims he sustained repetitive concussive and subconcussive hits during practices and games. He also alleged that, during this time, the NCAA and the SEC failed to put in place adequate concussion treatment, concussion management safety protocols, and return-to-play guidelines. As a result, he would “be quickly put back into games and practices despite his injuries.” Moreover, he alleged that “the SEC and the NCAA knew at the time that such treatment, protocols, and guidelines were necessary to monitor, manage, and mitigate the risks associated with traumatic brain injury.” Richardson now “suffers from severe daily headaches, memory loss, dizziness, and other debilitating symptoms.”
In their complaint, the plaintiffs made the well-worn, yet exhaustive, argument that the defendants had a duty to protect them and were well aware of the dangers of concussion.
The court never got to the underlying argument.
In assessing the SEC’s motion, the court noted that according to “hornbook law … two types of personal jurisdiction exist: general and specific.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 n.8-9, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984). Richardson contends that this court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the SEC under either rubric.
“First, general jurisdiction exists where the defendant has continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum. See id. at 416. To determine whether the contacts of the defendant are continuous and systematic, courts analyze whether and to what extent the defendant conducts business in the forum state, whether the defendant maintains an office or employees in the state, whether the defendant advertises or solicits business in the forum state, and whether the defendant has a designated agent for service of process in the state. See id. ‘Those contacts must be so extensive as to make it fundamentally fair to require [a non-resident defendant] to answer in any Indiana court in any litigation arising out of any transaction or occurrence taking place anywhere in the world.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Interclaim (Bermuda) Ltd., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (quoting Purdue Research, 338 F.3d at 787)).
“Here, it is undisputed that the SEC has never maintained an office or employees in Indiana. Womack Decl. ¶ 7a. Rather, the SEC always has had a single office in Alabama as its principal place of business. Id. In addition, the SEC has not conducted any of its operations in Indiana and has never had any member institution located in Indiana. Id. ¶ 4. The SEC and its employees also do not recruit student-athletes from Indiana, or any other state for that matter, for good reason. Id. ¶ 7c. The SEC’s member institutions compete with each other to recruit student-athletes, and the SEC cannot favor one-member institution over another by involving itself in recruiting. Id. Finally, the SEC has never retained a registered agent for service of process in Indiana. Id. ¶ 5.
“Despite this, Richardson argues that the SEC is subject to general jurisdiction in Indiana because the SEC broadcasts its sports programming into all fifty states, including Indiana, thereby generating millions of dollars of revenue. But the SEC’s efforts to broadcast television programming into all fifty states does nothing to prove that its contacts with Indiana are greater than its contacts with other states. See Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 471 (1st Cir. 1990); Philpot v. Rural Media Grp., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-1985-WTL-MJD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136743, 2015 WL 5837567, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 7, 2015). Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20, 134 S. Ct. 746, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014).
“Richardson also points out that one of the SEC’s member institutions (presumably the University of Kentucky, though he does not say) is situated in a state that shares a media market with Indiana. As a result, Richardson argues, the SEC has a greater broadcasting presence in Indiana than in most other media markets. Without more, however, the mere fact that the University of Kentucky is located in a state that shares a media market with Indiana does not establish that the SEC has continuous and systematic general business contacts with Indiana sufficient for general jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court concludes that the SEC is not subject to general jurisdiction in Indiana.”
Similarly, the specific jurisdiction argument failed.
“To be subject to specific jurisdiction, a defendant need only have sufficient minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” wrote the court, citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940)). Further, “jurisdiction is proper . . . where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial connection with the forum State.” Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). In addition, “courts look to the defendant’s ‘conduct and connection with the forum State’ to determine if he should ‘reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there.’” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980).
Importantly, the court noted that the University of Florida “has never played a football game in Indiana. Nor has the SEC ever organized or conducted any athletic competitions in Indiana. Prior to 2000, the NCAA did not have any offices in Indiana, and the SEC would have had to direct any communications with the NCAA to its then-headquarters in Kansas. After the NCAA relocated its headquarters to Indiana in 2000, SEC employees have travelled to Indiana to attend meetings conducted by the NCAA, but none of these meetings related to Richardson or the regulation of football during the time that Richardson played at UF.
“Nevertheless, Richardson maintains that the SEC is subject to specific jurisdiction in Indiana. In support, he points to certain individuals from SEC member institutions who have either served on NCAA committees or boards or have attended NCAA meetings.
“As an initial matter, it is unclear whether each of these individuals’ participation in NCAA committees, boards, or meetings required their physical presence in Indiana. In addition, other than Barnhart, there is no indication that any of these individuals participated in these activities on behalf of the SEC, rather than his or her school. Perhaps, most importantly, Richardson has not explained how their various contacts with Indiana relates in any way to the claims that he has asserted in this case.”
Richardson, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated v. Southeastern Conference et al.; N.D. Ill.; MDL No. 2492; Master Docket No. 16 C 8727; Original N.D. Ill. Docket No. 16 C 9980; 3/30/20
