A Connecticut state court judge has granted a facility owner’s motion to dismiss the negligence claim of a plaintiff, who was participating in a hockey game when he was injured by another player, which led him to sue the facility owner.
Plaintiff Peter Maro was participating in an adult hockey league of the Southern Connecticut Hockey League LLC (League), whose games were held at the skating rink operated by Chelsea Piers (“Chelsea Piers”) in Stamford, Connecticut. Maro suffered an injury when defendant Edward Cliff Merrill (“Merrill”), allegedly, “caused his body and/or hockey stick to come into violent contact with plaintiff in which was otherwise an avoidable collision and outside the rules of play.”
Maro sued for negligence. In Count Three, he alleged that his injuries were caused by Chelsea Piers’ negligence. Maro made what the court deemed “a vague allegation ‘that Chelsea Piers failed to provide safe playing conditions.’ The only allegations specifically addressed to Chelsea Piers’ conduct, policies or practices are in paragraphs 49 (h) and (i):
‘h. In that Chelsea Piers failed to require Defendant Southern Connecticut Hockey League to maintain adequate insurance coverage for the acts complained of herein;
‘i. In that Chelsea Piers failed to ensure that the Southern Connecticut Hockey League instructed the participants to behave in a safe and sportsmanlike manner….’”
Before rendering its decision, the court reviewed “the standards for deciding a motion to strike. … (when) it challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.”
The court “construes the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency …. Thus, if facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied …. Moreover, the court notes that what is necessarily implied in an allegation need not be expressly alleged …. It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted …. Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.” Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013). “If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint support a cause of action … the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike.” Bouchard v. People’s Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). On the other hand, “[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.” Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
The Complaint Fails to Allege Subordinate Facts to Support Conclusory Allegations of Negligence
The court concluded that the complaint “is devoid of any facts that allege that Chelsea Piers was involved in the operation of the League, supervision of the League’s play, including the game in question, or played any role in the events that allegedly caused plaintiff’s injuries.
“Perhaps recognizing the dearth of allegations against Chelsea Piers in its capacity as rink owner, plaintiff alleged that Chelsea Piers was a ‘partner’ in the League based on marketing statements in its website in which it said it was “proud to partner with the Southern Connecticut Hockey League (SCHL) for all adult league games. The SCHL provides multiple divisions for all ages and skill levels, ranging from novice to professional. SCHL offers players and teams real-time standings, statistics, and rosters.”
This was not sufficient for the court, which described the aforementioned language as “a vague statement of some relationship between Chelsea Piers and the League entirely consistent with renting the rink for League games without any role in the operation or supervision of the League or its games and other activities. Without an allegation of subordinate facts that would tend to demonstrate some control over or involvement or participation in the League’s activities alleged to have negligently caused plaintiff’s injuries, Chelsea Piers cannot be held to have breached any legal duty owed to plaintiff for negligence liability to attach.”
The plaintiff also cited Dushay v. S. Conn. Hockey League, LLC, (FBT CV 20-6096649 S), 2023 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2018 (Saadi, J.), in which Judge Saadi denied a motion for summary judgment by a rink owner to dismiss the case brought by a minor player injured in a hockey practice by a youth league team, for the proposition that the owner of a skating rink has a duty to protect participants in a league hockey game.
“In Dushay, Judge Saadi denied the summary judgment motion of the skating rink owner concluding that the rink owner had a legal duty of care to protect minors using its rink and to enforce its rule requiring adult supervision of minors engaged in hockey practice,” wrote the judge. “Here, by contrast, plaintiff was injured during an adult league game and plaintiff has not alleged Chelsea Piers failed to enforce any rules, practices or procedures related to the rink use that caused his injuries. No authority has been cited that would extend the special protections afforded to ensure safety of minors engaged in youth sports and activities to adults who participate in adult sports and activities and the Court is unaware of any public policy to that effect that would apply in the alleged circumstances.”
The court also noted that Judge Saadi in Dushay granted a motion for summary judgment by a youth hockey league holding that “it had no duty to prevent injury to a player during a hockey practice in which it was not involved. Judge Saadi contrasted her case with this court’s decision in Peeples V. North End Baseball League of Bridgeport, Inc., 2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2570, 2016 WL 6499072 *3-7 (Conn.Super. 2016) (Krumeich, J.), which had denied summary judgment to the city owner of a baseball field and a youth baseball league because there were material issues of fact whether the city as owner and the league, which was in possession and control of the city-owned playing field during the game, had violated legal duties, the city’s duty to inspect the playing field it owned and the league’s duty under league rules to inspect the playing field prior to the game at which a minor player was injured by falling into a hole on the field of play.”
In conclusion, the court wrote that the plaintiff “has not alleged any specific rule, policies or practices of Chelsea Piers relating to the safety of participants in the hockey game in which plaintiff was injured, or any basis for alleging any duty to impose such a rule or follow such policies or practices, so the conclusory allegations in paragraph 49 (i) are unsupported. As to the allegations that Chelsea Piers failed to require the League to ‘maintain adequate insurance coverage’ in paragraph 49 (h), such allegation appears unrelated to causation of the injury alleged and lacks any factual basis for any legal duty owed to plaintiff to require the League to maintain insurance coverage for adults using its rink or that such rule, policy or practice exists.
“These allegations fail to allege claims of negligence by Chelsea Piers for want of subordinate facts sufficient to establish any legal duty that was breached which caused plaintiff’s injuries.”
Peter Maro v. Edward Cliff Merrill; Super. Ct. Conn., Judicial District of Stamford-Norwal; DOCKET NO: FST CV 23-60661352 S; 11/26/24
