By Jacob F. Kratt, of Ricci Tyrrell Johnson & Grey
Over the past few years, courts in Pennsylvania have been called upon to examine duties owed by colleges and universities to their student-athletes and related issues such as waivers executed by student athletes in connection with their participation in university athletics.
Recently, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued its decision in Baumbach v. Lafayette College, 272 A.3d 83 (Pa. Super. 2022), holding that a college had a duty to protect a student-athlete traveling back to campus from practice with the college’s crew team. The court’s most recent decision was an expansion of an earlier decision, Feleccia v. Lackawanna College, 215 A.3d 3 (Pa. 2019), which addressed liability for injuries suffered by athletes at practice. The basis for both holdings was that the college/university assumes a duty regarding the care of the student-athletes under these circumstances, a finding which could have broader implications beyond college athletes.
Before analyzing the details of Baumbach, it is important to briefly review the prior state of the law in this area, most notably the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Feleccia and the earlier federal court decision in Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993).
In 1993, the Third Circuit decided Kleinknecht which predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “would hold that a special relationship existed between the [c]ollege and [student-athlete] that was sufficient to impose a duty of reasonable care on the [c]ollege.” This “special relationship” holding would, if generally applied, have serious implications for colleges and universities with athletic teams. However, this decision was not binding precedent in Pennsylvania, and was not fully tested until 2019 when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its decision in Feleccia.
In Feleccia, the Supreme Court held that universities assume a duty to student-athletes to provide trained medical personnel by means of the “special relationship” created by the student’s participation in connection with a university athletic team. In the Court’s opinion, this holding did not create a new duty, but was based on the application of existing standards in a new context. Feleccia involved a pair of players trying out for the Lackawanna College football team who both suffered injuries in the same drill during the same practice, at which the university’s only medical staff were not certified “athletic trainers,” since neither had passed the athletic training examination (in fact, both had failed the examination, causing the college to change their titles from “athletic trainer” to “first responder”). In connection with plaintiffs’ participation with the football team, both had signed a consent form by which they each gave “voluntary consent to receive emergency medical services in the event of an injury during an athletic event provided by the athletic trainer, team physician or hospital staff.” The Supreme Court held that the college had a duty to provide medical staff because it had undertaken to do so. To support this finding of a purported undertaking, the Court cited several acts by the university: having the players, including the plaintiffs, execute the consent to treatment by “athletic trainers”; holding the employees out as athletic trainers despite knowing they were not certified; and allowing these employees to provide care to injured athletes despite their not being so certified. Whether or not the provision of these uncertified employees at a football practice satisfied that duty was a question for the jury. It is noteworthy that the basis for the Court’s finding a duty was the college having taken actions for the safety of its student-athletes, which could incentivize some to do less rather than more to protect student-athletes since taking more protective actions could lead to increased duties and potential liabilities as well.
In March 2022, the Superior Court confronted another university/student-athlete duty question in Baumbach v. Lafayette College, 272 A.3d 83 (Pa. Super. 2022). Baumbach involved a student-athlete who was injured when she was hit by a drunk driver while traveling back from practicing off campus with the college’s crew team. The college’s crew team operated out of a boathouse leased from the City of Easton located on Lehigh Drive, a road which did not have sidewalks or other pedestrian walkways, and to which the college did not provide transportation for the athletes attending practice at the boathouse. There was a parking lot adjacent to the boathouse, but when it was full or otherwise unavailable, the athletes parked at a remote lot down Lehigh Drive and walked along the side of the road to access the boathouse. In addition, the coaches had previously led runs along Lehigh Drive, instructing the team members to run in single-file as far from the road as possible and to watch for cars, despite knowing a fatal accident involving a pedestrian had recently occurred along that stretch of road, The plaintiff was severely injured when she was struck by the drunk driver’s vehicle while walking back along Lehigh Drive to the remote lot after practice, by which time the sun had set. The trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of the school and coaches, but the Superior Court reversed and reinstated these claims, finding that the college’s affirmative actions taken for the safety of plaintiff imposed on it a duty to protect plaintiff against an unreasonable risk of harm arising from that conduct. Specifically, the Court referenced the management agreement into which the college entered for the boathouse, providing a parking lot adjacent to the boathouse, and hiring coaches to supervise the athletes, including instructing the athletes regarding their conduct along Lehigh Drive as support for its finding that the university assumed a duty regarding this potential danger. This created a jury question as to whether the college breached that duty.
The decisions in Feleccia and Baumbach have redefined the scope of potential liabilities for educational institutions with regards to athletes. Feleccia, at a minimum, should cause extra thought to be given to the medical care provided for and available to intercollegiate athletes, including provision of licensed personnel. While the Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that such personnel need to be physically present at events, a cautious reading of the opinion would counsel at least having a licensed athletic trainer present at such events. Now, Baumbach has gone a step further in holding that less affirmative conduct could support a conclusion that the university had assumed a duty. Barring a further review of Baumbach by the Superior Court en banc or granting of allocotur by the Supreme Court, these decisions should cause athletic departments of colleges and universities in Pennsylvania to reexamine how they provide for student-athletes, including provision of medical personnel, supervision of coaches, and even transportation arrangements to and from practices and other activities.
