By Dr. Robert J. Romano, JD, LLM, St. Johns’ University, Senior Writer
On June 10, 2022, the state of Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld a lower court’s ruling wherein the defendants, two football coaches involved in a summer non-contact football camp, were not entitled to the protections afforded under the state’s qualified immunity laws because, in the court’s opinion, they had direct contact and control over the health and safety of the minor-aged camp attendees.
By way of background, in 2015, the plaintiff in this matter, Hunter Knoth, as an incoming freshman and wanting to prepare for the upcoming high school football season, attended the Roy A. Peace Football Camp, a weeklong program sponsored by the Meade County High School football department and operated by two of its coaches – the named defendants, Larry Mofield and Glen Wilson. According to court pleadings, both coaches were at the camp at all times overseeing and directly supervising the safety of the students, with Larry Mofield acting as manager and Glen Wilson running the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the operations, making sure everyone was in the correct place and attending to any needs the athletes might have.[i]
After enrolling and paying the attendance fee, Knoth was injured while playing in one of the camp’s 7 v.7 scrimmages. As alleged, Knoth was in the act of catching a pass when he collided with another player, resulting in him sustaining a broken nose and being knocked unconscious. During the scrimmage, neither Knoth or any of the other campers were wearing, nor were they required to wear, football helmets or any other protective equipment. At the time of the incident, Coach Mofield was unaware of anything occurring since he was on an adjacent field, but Coach Wilson, who was seated on a truck tailgate watching the scrimmage, observed the ball being thrown to Knoth and another camper trying to deflect it. Both Mofield and Wilson did, however, arrive quickly to help administer any first aide. As a result of sustaining the broken nose, Knoth needed to undergo outpatient surgery to repair the fracture.
When Knoth reached the age of eighteen, he filed a lawsuit against both coaches in the Meade Circuit Court, wherein he alleged that they were negligent and careless by allowing both himself and the other young and inexperienced players to engage in football drills and scrimmages without the benefit of either helmets or protective equipment. In response, Mofield and Wilson filed a joint motion for summary judgment on the grounds that they benefit from the protections guaranteed to them under the state’s doctrine of ‘qualified official immunity’.
Under Kentucky law, qualified official immunity is intended to protect public officers and employees sued in their individual capacities “from damages liability for good faith judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment.”[ii] This type of immunity applies only “to the negligent performance by a public officer or employee of (1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment; (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the employee’s authority.”[iii] Interestingly, however, immunity is not afforded to government officials “for the negligent performance of a ministerial act.”[iv]
The Kentucky Supreme Court provides the following guidance for making this critical distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts: “promulgation of rules is a discretionary function; enforcement of those rules is a ministerial function.”[v] Therefore, “a duty is ministerial ‘when the officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts.’”[vi]
In addition, “a government official performing a ministerial duty does so without particular concern for his own judgment; . . . the act is ministerial if the employee has no choice but to do the act.”[vii] The Kentucky Courts have also held that discretionary acts involve “the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment and at their core, involve quasi-judicial or policy-making decisions.”[viii] Immunity is provided for discretionary acts because the “courts should not be called upon to pass judgment on policy decisions made by members of coordinate branches of government in the context of tort actions, because such actions furnish an inadequate crucible for testing the merits of social, political or economic policy.”[ix]
The defendants, Mofield and Wilson argued in support of their motion that the duties they performed at the football camp were discretionary and therefore not ministerial acts, because a) there was no clear, mandatory rule requiring the campers to wear helmets during a no-contact scrimmage, and b) that neither of them were present or actively supervising the scrimmage when the plaintiff was injured.
Regarding the coaches’ first argument, the law in the state of Kentucky holds that ministerial duties can involve more than just the enforcement of rules and that “a degree of discretion with respect to the means or method to be employed in the performance of a duty does not strip away the ministerial nature of the duty.”[x] The Courts have also cautioned that ministerial acts are not limited to those “that are directly compelled by an order or rule.”[xi]
As to their second argument, the Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that “It is possible that some acts that happen when a coach is supervising are outside the scope of what his supervision requires and he will be entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law.”[xii] However, the Court went on to state that the fact that the defendants Mofield and Wilson were not directly present at the time of injury, even though it could possibly be a potential defense to the claim that they breached their ministerial duty, “does not mean such a claim is barred by immunity. The nature of the acts performed by any governmental employee determines whether they are discretionary or ministerial.”[xiii]
Therefore, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in upholding the lower court’s decision, determined that although both Coach Mofield and Coach Wilson had rule-making and supervisory authority over the camp and its camper, under Kentucky law, the direct contact and control they exercised over the safety of the campers were ministerial in nature and therefore they cannot be afforded the privilege of qualified immunity.
[i] Mofield v. Knoth, No. 2021-CA-1004-MR – June 10, 2022.
[ii] Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001)
[iii] Id.
[iv] Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Ky. 2016)
[v] Williams v. Kentucky Department of Education, 113 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Ky. 2003)
[vi] Id.
[vii] Id. quoting Marson v. Thomason, 438 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Ky. 2014)).
[viii] Marson, 438 S.W.3d at 297.
[ix] Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522.
[xi] Marson, 438 S.W.3d at 302.
[xii] Id.
[xiii] Id.
