By Cara H. Wright, J.D., Professor, Trinity University
Howard Norsetter alleges in Norsetter v. Minnesota Twins, LLC that the Minnesota Twins, LLC violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) when it decided not to renew his one-year contract as a talent scout and failed to consider him for other open scouting positions.
Norsetter, a permanent resident of Australia, was employed as the Twins’ international scouting supervisor based in Australia. He was employed by the Twins under a series of one-year, fixed-term contracts for 27 years as a talent scout. Norsetter was 59 years old at the time his contract with the Twins expired.
Norsetter brought many notable players to the Twins organization over the course of his career. He received favorable evaluations, reviews, and feedback regarding his job performance. In September 2016, Norsetter signed a contract that would expire on December 31, 2017. The terms of the contract stated that the Twins could terminate the contract for any reason with ten days written notice.
In the fall of 2016, the Twins hired new management that assessed the Twins’ scouting strategy to determine how the Twins could most effectively spend their money and receive the best return on their investment. It was determined that the Twins were spending “an inordinate” amount of money scouting in Australia, which was considered a “niche market,” relative to their return on the investment. The Twins management decided to part ways with Norsetter along with the other international scouts based in other countries. The revision of the Twins’ scouting strategy appeared to be the general approach for most of the 30 clubs.
Norsetter was informed in September 2017 that his position was being eliminated following the expiration of his contract on December 31, 2017. Following the expiration of Norsetter’s contract, the Twins hired eight scouts in North America who were in their 20s, 30s, and 40s; six were more than 20 years younger and three were more than 30 years younger than Norsetter. Norsetter was not informed of or considered for the openings, even though Norsetter did inform the Twins that he would relocate and take a pay cut to remain with the Twins.
Procedural History
In September 2018, Norsetter sued the Twins, claiming that the Twins discriminated against him on the basis of his age in violation of the MHRA. In May 2019, the district court granted the Twins’ motion for summary judgment, determining that the Twins’ decision to not renew Norsetter’s contract was not motivated by discrimination. The district court reasoned that Norsetter established a prima facie case of age discrimination but that the Twins articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not renewing Norsetter’s contract. The district court further reasoned that Norsetter failed to show that the Twins’ reason or conduct was pretextual.
Norsetter appealed and the case was reversed and remanded to the district court for further limited discovery. Following the additional discovery, both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment in November 2020. The district court granted the Twins’ motion for summary judgment, determining that, while Norsetter had established a prima facie case of age discrimination, the Twins met their burden to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their business decision not to renew Norsetter’s one-year contract. The district court further determined that Norsetter did not meet his burden of showing that the Twins’ decision was pretextual. Norsetter again appealed.
Case Analysis and Decision
On appeal from summary judgment, the court reviewed de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law. Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, LLC, 829 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. 2013). Norsetter alleged that the Twins violated the MHRA by discriminating against him because of his age. The MHRA provides that an employer may not, because of age, “discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2(3) (2020).
Under the MHRA, an age-discrimination plaintiff can survive summary judgment by submitting sufficient circumstantial evidence to survive the burden-shifting test set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 98 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See Dietrich v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 536 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Minn. 1995) (applying McDonnell Douglas test to claim under MHRA). There are three steps in the McDonnell Douglas analysis: first, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; second, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct; and third, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason offered by the defendant is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
The district court concluded, and the parties do not contest, that Norsetter met the first step of the McDonnel Douglas analysis by showing a prima facie case of age discrimination. On appeal, Norsetter contests the district court’s findings and conclusions on the second and third steps of the McDonnel-Douglas analysis.
A. The Twins offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not considering Norsetter for the open scouting positions.
Norsetter admitted that the Twins provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for reorganizing its scouting department and eliminating Norsetter’s position. However, he argues that the Twins failed to provide a credible legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not considering him for the open scouting positions.
The record reflected that the Twins considered Norsetter to be their Australian scout and Norsetter’s expertise to be in international scouting; consequently, the Twins did not consider him for a domestic scouting position. The record further establishes that the Twins decided to shift their international scouting philosophy after reviewing their investment returns and changes to the MLB rules capping international player signing expenditures. This resulted in the elimination of not only Norsetter’s position as the Australian scout, but also several other “niche” international scouting positions. Furthermore, Norsetter acknowledged that the Twins (1) changed its international scouting philosophy throughout his employment and (2) needed to focus its international scouting efforts in Latin America.
Norsetter argued that because the Twins were aware of his desire to remain employed with the organization, they were required to inform him of the open positions and failed to do so. However, the law does not impose this requirement on employers. See, e.g., Leidig, 850 F. Supp. at 805. The court determined that the Twins’ explanation for its decision to eliminate Norsetter’s position in the Australian market is legitimate and nondiscriminatory.
B. Norsetter has not offered evidence sufficient to show that the Twins’ proffered explanation was merely pretextual.
The court determined that the Twins provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not renewing Norsetter’s contract and the burden shifted to Norsetter to put forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Twins proffered explanation was a pretext for discrimination. Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 724 (Minn. 2001).
Norsetter argued that he was far and away the best candidate for the open domestic scouting positions and that the Twins’ actions were against its best interest and contrary to its policy and practice. Norsetter further argued that he was not informed of other scouting positions; that his request to be considered for the other open scouting positions was ignored, and that statistical evidence suggested pretext. Here, even with all reasonable inferences in Norsetter’s favor, the court noted that he did not put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Twins’ proffered explanation is pretextual.
While Norsetter put forth statistical evidence that the Twins favored hiring younger domestic scouts since his employment ended, this evidence alone is insufficient to prove pretext. See, e.g., Hutson v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 1995) The court noted that Norsetter’s beliefs regarding his skillset are irrelevant to determining pretext. Wilking, 153 F.3d at 873. Norsetter did not carry his burden of showing that the Twins’ proffered explanation was pretext.
Conclusion
The court determined that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Twins. The lower court decision was Affirmed.
